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Abstract 
  
This thesis evaluates the applicability of public-private partnerships (PPPs) and alternative delivery 
strategies to transportation megaprojects.  There has been tremendous expansion of innovative 
procurement and financing mechanisms in this area.  However, there are still many hurdles to overcome 
before these options can penetrate the transportation market with any regularity.  The thesis identifies 
the barriers and their origins, and suggests changes to policy and institutional frameworks that may be 
incorporated to encourage a broader range of delivery options. 
 
There is potentially much to be gained from increased private sector involvement in transportation 
megaproject delivery, but it requires significant investment of public sector time and money at the outset 
to be able to identify the most appropriate course of action.  The public and private sectors often have 
diverging short-term versus long-term interests that must be reconciled if PPPs are to provide improved 
outcomes.    
 
The thesis introduces the various stages of megaproject development and the way public and private 
sector strengths may be packaged together throughout these stages to form alternative delivery strategies.  
It also provides an assessment of the many issues surrounding the business case, risk, management, and 
contracts.  These issues are later revisited in an evaluation of several projects in the U.S. that have 
utilized “traditional” and alternative delivery strategies in the past.  Included in this assessment are two 
larger case studies:  Boston’s Big Dig and Puerto Rico’s Tren Urbano.  Each incurred both successes and 
failures as a result of the traditional delivery strategy in Boston and the alternative delivery strategy in 
Puerto Rico, respectively. 
 
The research provides guidance to Transport for London (TfL) as TfL proceeds with delivery of 
Crossrail; a large-scale rail initiative in the greater London region.  As part of its preliminary analysis in 
advance of Crossrail, TfL has sought input from around the world on experiences with unconventional 
megaproject delivery.  To that end, this thesis provides context from North America.   
 
Yet the majority of the conclusions and recommendations are intentionally broad so as to have relevance 
not only for TfL, but for any public sector agency considering experimentation with alternative delivery 
strategies for transportation megaprojects.   
 
Thesis Supervisor:  Frederick P. Salvucci 
Title:  Senior Lecturer, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Objective and Methodology 
 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the roles of both the public and private sectors in the 
procurement of transportation megaprojects, and to formulate a set of strategies by which the two 
can work together more effectively to achieve efficiencies in transportation megaproject delivery.  It 
will examine if and when alternative delivery strategies that provide for an augmented role for the 
private sector are appropriate for transportation megaprojects given their size, scope, and 
uncertainty.   
 
The thesis will answer the following questions: 
 
1. Under what circumstances are alternative strategies appropriate delivery mechanisms for 
transportation megaprojects? 
 
2. How must the public sector reorganize itself in order to be able to provide proper oversight 
and management of private sector partners?   
  
3. How might the lessons learned assist Transport for London with its delivery strategy for 
Crossrail? 
 
These questions are answered by analyzing the various tradeoffs among these strategies and the 
extent to which they have been successful on transportation megaprojects delivered previously.  
Risks embedded in these projects are introduced and evaluated to demonstrate how they are 
traditionally allocated.  The thesis also suggests how the public sector may be able to reduce and/or 
transfer certain risks to the private sector, and at what cost. 
 
While certain outcomes may be unique to those individual projects, many of these overall lessons 
have widespread relevance for any public agency seeking to experiment with new strategies for 
project delivery.  At the very least, the problems encountered should tell a cautionary tale, and the 
successes can be used as models to be replicated.   
 
The goal of the thesis is to encourage the public sector to be more thorough in its preliminary 
analysis of transportation megaprojects so that it may become more effective at determining which 
of the many strategies now at its disposal is best suited to meet its goals.   
 
1.2 Background 
 
The continuing struggle to develop transportation infrastructure to serve a growing and increasingly 
mobile population, both in the United States and abroad, poses many challenges for the public 
sector.  Over the last half-century, transportation has been a core function of government and one 
generally assumed to be most effectively delivered by the public sector.  As public sector funds 
become increasingly scarce, the ability of government to retain the technical capacity needed to 
develop and implement large and unique projects is diminished. 
 
Project delivery is the method by which an agency or an owner contracts for the development of a 
structure or facility.  The common project delivery model in the U.S. is to secure a combination of 
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federal, state, and local funds to finance megaprojects, use private sector consultant resources to 
plan and design them, and then contract out to the private sector for the construction of these 
facilities.  Upon completion, the responsibility for operations and maintenance (O&M) falls back on 
government entities, or is contracted out to private parties.  This prevalent sequence leads to 
problems when the public sector cannot adequately identify its objectives or ensure that they are 
being met.   
 
Some suggest that this trend calls for less private sector involvement because of its ability to take 
advantage of these weaknesses inherent in the public sector agency delivery model.  Or it may, in 
fact, call for greater private sector involvement if contract structures increase transparency, 
oversight, and adherence to quantifiable performance metrics.   
 
1.3 Public Sector Inefficiencies 
 
A public owner seeking to deliver a project first needs to know: 
 
1. what it wants; 
 
2. how to articulate what it wants; 
 
3. the preferred strategy to go about getting what it wants; and 
 
4. how to ensure it is ultimately getting what it wants. 
 
The planning stage of development seeks to deal with the first two of these requirements.  These are 
areas where the public sector must retain the most responsibility and competency.  It is not in 
determining its goals where the public sector demonstrates signs of weakness, but rather in the 
execution of achieving them.   
 
It is difficult to identify public sector agencies with the knowledge and in-house expertise to perform 
project delivery exclusively on its own.  A reliance on the private sector, at least in a consultant’s 
role, comes at a cost, but when the public sector attempts to perform these tasks internally the result 
is often delay and even more cost.  Allocation of roles, responsibilities, and risk between the public 
and private sectors is a significant challenge, and one that is exacerbated as the size and scale of 
these projects grows.   
 
1.4 Uniqueness of Transportation 
 
Transportation megaprojects are very capital intensive, involve high initial sunk costs, are site and 
use specific, generally operate under conditions of limited competition, take a long time to complete, 
and their success or lack thereof depends heavily on long-term demand estimates.  These features 
make delivery strategies particularly difficult to establish. 
 
One characteristic relatively unique to transportation infrastructure investments is their “lumpiness.”  
Transportation projects do not serve their function if only partially constructed, and tend to 
contribute exponentially when tied to a broader network.  This makes it difficult to quantify the 
benefits of a megaproject given the financial and time investments required.  With much uncertainty 
about funding and political support being able to endure long procurement and construction stages, 
the risk of failure becomes greater as projects grow in size, scope, and cost.   
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Phoenix, for example, has just built its first light rail line.  For such a car-dependent, sprawling city, 
this light rail line will have difficulty attracting ridership initially.  The required shift in mindset for 
the potential rider may take years.  This does not mean that it shouldn’t have been built.  A 
continued investment in policies that improve upon mass transit’s viability in Phoenix is critical, 
however, if the full benefits of this initial investment are to be realized. 
 
Another feature of transportation megaprojects is their physical footprint.  They occupy a lot of land 
and span jurisdictions and territorial boundaries.  This requires appeasing numerous constituencies 
and stakeholders.  Many of them also include significant tunneling, which adds even more 
complexity.  Issues related to right-of-way acquisition, interfaces with intersecting modes and 
operations, and environmental remediation cannot be fully addressed until after the project has 
undergone some level of design.  
 
1.4.1 Political Turnover 
 
The timeline for megaprojects is such that internal public sector power is bound to change hands 
throughout the procurement and construction processes, perhaps even several times over.  With 
projects often requiring a dozen years or more to go from conception to completion, the turnover 
of key management personnel in the public sector is frequent and leads to a potentially detrimental 
loss of institutional memory.   
 
Hence, it may be the private sector whose involvement is more stable over the long-term.  A 
political administration may therefore find it advantageous to cede responsibilities to private sector 
firms, but must exhibit continuity and expertise to provide proper management and oversight of 
those firms.   
 
1.4.2 Funding and Contractual Laws 
 
Another constraint among megaprojects more generally is that funding and contractual laws often 
inhibit the public sector’s ability to come up with the financial and technical resources necessary to 
deliver megaprojects effectively.  These obstacles include: 
 
• state and local laws that explicitly prohibit certain procurement strategies; 
 
• requirements that a project is designed to a certain level before funding commitments are 
made; and 
 
• annual appropriations processes that provide piecemeal funding, thus delaying delivery. 
 
1.5 The Promise of Alternative Delivery Strategies  
 
New strategies are emerging that seek to create a more collaborative environment with private sector 
entities in transportation asset delivery.  An “alternative delivery strategy” (ADS) will be defined in 
this thesis as any delivery mechanism different than the traditional design-bid-build (D-B-B) delivery 
strategy.  Under D-B-B, the public sector fully finances the project, designs the facility before 
bidding out for construction, oversees construction, and performs all operations and maintenance 
functions while retaining ownership of the asset.  While private firms are usually engaged to assist 
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the government throughout many of these stages, nearly all project risk is retained by government 
throughout the process. 
 
Alternative delivery strategies are growing tremendously in the U.S.: 
 
Procurement of Non-Residential Design and Construction Projects in the U.S.
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Non-Traditional                     
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 Figure 1.1 – Non-residential Procurement Trends in the U.S. 
 
While there has been a growth in the transportation sector as well, it has not been as dramatic.  
Today, over half of all non-residential design and construction projects are procured by a method 
other than traditional D-B-B, though in transportation the percentage of projects using an ADS in 
the past ten years is closer to one-third1.  The thesis will document the growth of these strategies. 
 
1.6 The Risk of Inexistence 
 
Alternative delivery strategies seek to reallocate the risks associated with projects, of which there are 
many.  But perhaps the most overlooked and undervalued risk of all, especially when dealing with 
transportation megaprojects that literally have the ability to reshape cities and regions, is the risk of a 
project’s inexistence.   
 
Megaprojects are oft-maligned despite their transformational effect.  In the case of Boston’s Big Dig, 
its lasting legacy to many will be its cost overruns.  True, the project did incur these cost overruns – 
severe ones at that – but the benefits are significant.  They include aesthetic enhancements, 
congestion reduction, and the elimination of a key physical barrier that isolated neighborhoods.  It 
was also the sparkplug for a multi-billion dollar reinvestment in the South Boston waterfront.  More 
importantly, what was the alternative?  Considering the lack of an above ground alternate route 
alignment, the Central Artery would have had to be shut down for several years during 
reconstruction, which would have crippled mobility into and through the heart of Boston.    
 
Or take London’s Jubilee Line Extension, which was 84% over its original £1.9B budget and 
delivered six years late, but has emerged as the prime catalyst for the development of an entire 
financial center at Canary Wharf and other regeneration opportunities in East London2.   
 
Transportation is the sole means to a myriad of ends.  Revisionist history leads people to focus 
excessively on comparisons to baseline cost and schedule estimates which are often only preliminary, 
and are based on incomplete information.  
                                                 
1 Design-Build Institute of America.  “What is Design-Build?” 
2 Priemus, Flyvbjerg, and van Wee, 189 
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1.7 Crossrail Defined 
 
This thesis will conclude with recommendations for Transport for London (TfL) on the 
procurement of Crossrail.  Crossrail is a proposed east-west rail line through central London 
expected to cost £15.9B, or approximately US$23B at the time of publication3.  It is among the 
largest transportation capital projects being developed in the world today.  The line will extend well 
beyond the City’s boundaries, spanning 118.5 km, including 41.5 km in tunnels4.  Crossrail will 
connect Maidenhead and Heathrow Airport in the west to Shenfield and Abbey Wood in the east 
via a new twin-bore tunnel under central London.  Crossrail will serve 38 stations and 24 trains per 
hour are proposed to run through the central section in each direction at peak times5. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Crossrail Regional Map6 
 
1.7.1 Crossrail Objectives 
 
Crossrail’s key objectives include7: 
 
• supporting the economic growth of London and the regeneration of abandoned industrial 
land in East London by tackling congestion and the lack of capacity on the existing rail 
network; 
 
• improving rail access into and within London; 
 
• reducing cross-city journey times by creating new direct journey possibilities between points 
throughout the region; 
 
• creating a new direct rail link between Heathrow Airport and East London; and 
 
• improving connections to other London airports and international rail. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Crossrail.  “Crossrail Announces Tender Lists for Major Project Contracts.” 
4 Crossrail.  “Major Boost for Crossrail as BAA Agrees £230 million Funding - Joint DfT & BAA Release.”   
5 Crossrail.  “Major Boost for Crossrail as BAA Agrees £230 million Funding - Joint DfT & BAA Release.”   
6 Crossrail.  “Regional Map.”   
7 Crossrail.  “Environmental Statement.”  Volume 1.  Chapter 1, page 4. 
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1.7.2 Crossrail Timeline 
 
Crossrail obtained the key parliamentary approval known as Royal Assent in 2008, and with a 
funding package in place is set to proceed with procurement and construction, to commence in 
2009.  Crossrail is currently at a critical stage during which many key decisions will be made that will 
define its path to completion by the anticipated date of 2017.  Alternative delivery strategies for at 
least part of its development have not been ruled out. 
 
1.8 What Makes a Project a Megaproject? 
 
Whereas a $100M project may be commonplace in certain cities and countries, it may easily qualify 
as a megaproject in many others.  The distinction lies in the scale of the project relative to other 
projects previously delivered in that particular location.  Whether one establishes a lower bar of $2M 
or $2B as appropriate to qualify as a megaproject, the thesis still essentially identifies the same issues.   
 
The nature of megaprojects is such that they are so big that there are few, if any viable alternatives 
that will provide the same net positive result.  Megaprojects shouldn’t be viewed as mere successes 
and failures.  Rather, transportation megaprojects should be evaluated based on what is necessary to 
expand accessibility in an efficient and sustainable fashion.   
 
1.9 Outline of Chapters 
 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will introduce the basic stages of megaproject development, 
and Chapter 3 identifies the various ways these stages can be packaged together to form alternative 
delivery strategy (ADS) models.  This chapter will also weigh the advantages and disadvantages of 
each of these strategies.  Chapter 4 identifies factors comprising the business case to justify a 
project’s development and help influence procurement decision making.   
 
Chapter 5 introduces the notion of risk, which is precisely what the public sector seeks to minimize 
and/or transfer in its evaluations of ADSs.  It also classifies key risks specific to transportation 
development; risks that will be analyzed at various points throughout the thesis. 
 
Chapter 6 goes into detail about the various management structures that have the potential to aid the 
public sector in its relationships with private sector entities, but can also reduce control and 
accountability.  Chapter 7 is devoted to the methods by which contractors are selected and paid, as 
well as the complex legal and regulatory minefield that public sector agencies often have to navigate 
when seeking to contract with the private sector utilizing an ADS model. 
 
Subsequent chapters begin to look at specific cases where these many different strategies have been 
employed.  Chapter 8 will provide some historical context into the evolution of ADSs, and Chapter 
9 describes changes in public funding mechanisms that have created an environment more 
welcoming to innovative procurement.  Chapter 10 summarizes several studies and surveys that have 
sought to gauge the industry’s perceptions of ADSs. 
 
Chapters 11 and 12 look more in-depth at two “complete” case studies, Boston’s Big Dig and 
Puerto Rico’s Tren Urbano; the former procured traditionally and the latter alternatively.  These 
cases have been chosen based not only on their size and complexity, but also because of their unique 
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governance structures and the wealth of local knowledge at MIT on these two projects in particular.  
Included in both of these chapters will be analysis of some of the successes and failures that can be 
directly attributed to their approaches to both management and delivery.   
 
Chapter 13 provides a more thorough introduction to Crossrail beyond what is conveyed here in the 
introductory chapter.  This chapter will examine the project itself, its business case, its role in 
London’s long-term vision, and its delivery strategy. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 14, this analysis is combined into a series of conclusions and recommendations 
that will ideally not only serve Transport for London in its continued efforts on Crossrail, but will 
also be of use to other public sector agencies wishing to experiment with ADSs in the future.   
 
1.10 Terminology 
 
There are certain terms that will each be elaborated upon at respective points in the thesis that call 
for a cursory definition here at the beginning: 
 
Traditional design-bid-build (D-B-B) – the standard public sector procurement strategy that 
involves completing design fully before contracting for construction. 
 
Alternative delivery strategy (ADS) – any procurement strategy other than traditional D-B-B.  
This is the term used in this thesis to denote what many define as a public-private partnership (PPP).  
PPP is a term that will predominantly be avoided in the thesis due to various ambiguities in its 
definition.   
 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) – see Alternative Delivery Strategy. 
 
Design-build (D-B) – the most basic of ADSs.  Under D-B, final design and construction are 
procured together under a single contract.   
 
Crossrail – a new £15.9B rail line through central London scheduled to be constructed by 2017. 
 
Client/sponsor/owner/agency – each of these terms is used interchangeably to describe the 
public sector entity that represents the public side of any public-private procurement strategy. 
 
Bidder/joint venture (JV)/consortium/firm – each term refers to the private sector side of any 
public-private procurement strategy. 
 
Constructor/builder – the entity in charge of construction. 
 
Franchise/concession – the transfer to a private party the right and responsibility to operate a 
facility for a given period of time.   
 
Concessionaire/vendor – the entity in charge of a franchise/concession. 
 
Facility/project/end-product/asset – each refers to the final deliverable as part of a delivery 
contract, such as a rail line.   
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Chapter 2:  Transportation Megaproject Development 
 
This chapter identifies individual components of transportation megaprojects.  It also introduces the 
various ways that these components may be packaged, or “bundled,” in an effort to combine 
functions at potentially reduced overall cost and leading to a better quality end-product. 
 
2.1 Project Stages 
 
There are six main stages of transportation megaproject development:  planning, design, 
construction, operations, maintenance, and financing8.  The first five stages generally follow a linear 
progression, while financing can take many shapes and is often a prevalent issue throughout 
development.  The following is a representation of a traditional transportation project timeline9: 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Typical Transportation Project Development Process 
 
2.1.1 Planning/Feasibility/Appraisal/Conception 
 
The first stage of any transportation project, “mega” or otherwise, is a detailed planning process.  
This ranges from basic scoping issues such as identifying the project’s purpose and location to more 
specific functional design frameworks and detailed analyses of project alternatives.  This is the stage 
during which a project is validated to policymakers and stakeholders who ultimately hold the power 
to give the project the go-ahead.   
 
Although little of any project’s expenditures are made during this stage, it is by far the most 
important.  With each subsequent stage, the owner’s ability to impact a project’s costs and benefits 
decreases while expenditures increase10.   
                                                 
8 Beard, Loulakis, and Wundrum, 115. 
9 Nevada Department of Transportation.  “Typical Transportation Project Development Process.” 
10 Chris Gordon Lecture, MIT. 
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2.1.2 Design 
 
During design, the client develops detailed solutions to reflect parameters and constraints 
conceptually outlined in the planning stage11.  This is an iterative process that witnesses the evolution 
of the design from concept to eventually a final design that details proposed physical features and 
functional characteristics.  Designs are submitted to planning authorities in order to obtain permits 
required for construction.  These permissions may or may not be granted based on compliance with 
rules and regulations pertaining to building codes, zoning, health, and safety.  If not granted, it can 
lead to increased cost and possibly reduced function if the project scope is altered to meet the 
requirements.  
 
2.1.2.1 30% Design 
 
The project sponsor generally performs in-house or contracts with an engineering and design firm to 
prepare conceptual plans12.  Developing conceptual plans brings the project to what is commonly 
known as the “30% design” stage, suggesting that the design is about 30% complete.  At this point, 
the project’s costs and schedule can be better ascertained.  The 30% design stage is critical because it 
is generally when the public agency makes decisions about how the rest of the delivery should 
proceed.  By now the public agency has only invested a small percentage of the project’s total costs 
and can still theoretically abandon the project entirely, although that is rare even at this stage.  Soon 
thereafter, however, the project becomes too far along, or “too developed to fail,” such that the only 
means to incorporate change is through increased cost, reduced functionality, or both.   
 
2.1.2.2 Final Design 
 
In traditional D-B-B procurement, the project is developed to its full 100% design stage before 
construction contracts are issued.  Ideally, design is executed with construction and other later stages 
in mind.  However, it is extremely difficult to accurately envision at the outset how the design of a 
complex transportation megaproject will be implemented by a separate construction entity that did 
not contribute to the development of the design.   
 
Designs of megaprojects are truly never final.  The design should be allowed to evolve throughout 
the delivery process in response to newly-emerging issues.   
 
2.1.3 Construction 
 
Construction entails managing various resource inputs, including labor and materials, needed to 
produce the final product13.  There are different technical and management processes required in 
infrastructure construction.  Standard projects can get by on routine procedures, while innovative 
construction requires highly flexible management philosophies to adapt to complex situations.  The 
final activity in construction is the testing of the product before turning it over to the owner.   
 
                                                 
11 Howes and Robinson, 22. 
12 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Report to Congress on the Costs, Benefits, and Efficiencies 
of Public-Private Partnerships for Fixed Guideway Capital Projects,” 3. 
13 Howes and Robinson, 23. 
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2.1.4 Operations and Maintenance 
 
The next stage is to operationalize and maintain the asset according to the relevant performance 
benchmarks, operational targets, and the expectations of the users of the facility14.  Operations may 
also include the collection of user fees, repairs, cleaning, landscaping, security, and support facilities.  
Traditionally, all responsibility is handed over to the client at the end of construction, with the 
exception of defects liability.  Thereafter the client arranges for facility management.   
 
It is extremely advantageous for the client to secure an operator early so that their functional 
expertise may be incorporated prior to the “final design” completion.  The services derived at the 
operational stage need to be sustainable over the whole life-cycle of the project and the owner will 
need to take measures to conserve the asset over that lifespan.   
 
2.1.5 Financing 
 
Project financing is traditionally secured by the public sector, most often through various forms of 
taxation.  Alternative delivery strategies attempt to achieve cost savings and to shift costs to other 
levels of government and onto future users.  The public sector may seek to shift financial risk to the 
private sector, though that has significant implications on project costs.  
 
This thesis will address many of the key financing elements inherent in any transportation 
megaproject, including those specific to the case studies described throughout, however 
transportation megaproject financing under alternative delivery strategy models is generally outside 
the scope of this thesis.  With regard to financing, this thesis focuses more on the implications of 
who finances a project and what approach these entities may take to transfer and/or reduce their 
financial risk, more so than on how they secure financing.   
 
Given the amount of financing necessary to deliver transportation megaprojects, it is also inherently 
difficult to make broad-based generalizations about financial plans.  The global financial climate is 
variable enough such that each project needs to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Project funding mechanisms change significantly over time as well.  For decades the U.S. Federal 
government covered 90% of the capital costs for the Interstate Highway System, but once declaring 
the system complete has precipitously reduced its contribution.  The financial outlook in London 
today may be quite different several years from now, while Crossrail is still being developed.  The 
long gestation periods for megaprojects suggests that the financing element may have to be revisited 
throughout delivery. 
 
2.2 Project Bundling 
 
In the conventional “unbundled” public procurement model, each stage is viewed independently.  
Full design of the facility is completed before any construction begins and only once a project is 
completed or near completion are the operations and maintenance stages considered.  Opportunities 
for overlap and efficiency are rarely explored. 
 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 24. 
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Over the past few decades, however, the public sector has occasionally fostered experimentation in 
combining, or “bundling,” one or more of these tasks.  Bundling is normally argued for on the 
grounds that it enhances the potential for economies of scale and scope.   
 
The following diagram provides a brief introduction into the various bundling techniques that may 
be employed on transportation megaprojects.  These will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 315. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Project Stages and Delivery Options 
 
2.3 Factors Influencing Decision Making 
 
The decision on whether or not to bundle functions often comes down to whether informed 
assessments can be made a priori regarding costs and risks.  The difficulty in bundling megaprojects 
is that it is extremely hard to put a dollar amount on any single element, let alone the entire project.  
Plus, bundled contracts for megaprojects, particularly those that include operations and 
maintenance, are usually very lengthy – typically 20-30 years on average.   
 
One scenario that makes bundling an attractive option is when the construction techniques to be 
used are particularly innovative and tailored specifically for a single project.  A private sector entity 
may, for example, be expert at a particular tunnel excavation method and can leverage this expertise 
to assist in performing other related functions too.  This “special-purpose” approach is fairly 
common in transportation megaprojects, but can give much leverage to the lone, or very few, 
construction firms that are capable of delivering them. 
 
The public sector must be wary of such situations when a private sector consortium is given too 
much power simply because the public sector lacks financial or managerial expertise.  The 
specialization that the private sector may provide has to be weighed against the cost to the public 
sector of acquiring the skills necessary to perform key delivery tasks or to provide adequate 
oversight of those to whom it has delegated these roles.  Failure to evaluate this tradeoff has often 
led to non-competitive bidding processes and monopolistic qualities among private sector entities, 
neither of which benefit the public sector.   
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  "Design-Build Effectiveness Study – Required by TEA-21 
Section 1307(f)," i.   
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Chapter 3:  Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
Alternative delivery strategies (ADSs) seek to combine conventional public approaches to project 
delivery with private sector competencies, where appropriate.  Incorporating private sector expertise 
allows the public sector to concentrate more on its strengths in policymaking and regulatory control.  
This chapter elaborates on these strategies as well as the perceived advantages and disadvantages of 
each.  Many of these advantages and disadvantages will be a focus in a later analysis that looks at 
projects utilizing these alternative strategies.   
 
3.1 Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
Delivery strategies run the gamut, from each component considered separately, to all being delivered 
by the same entity in a single contract.  With growing numbers of tools in the procurement toolbox, 
there is increasing opportunity for the public sector to explore new ways of delivering on 
transportation investments based on their in-house capacity and the scale and complexity of the 
project to be undertaken.   
 
Attitudes towards delivery strategies have changed with growing dissatisfaction towards 
conventional procurement and construction methods16.  Purely private ventures and purely public 
ventures have each had their own problems independently.  Political scientists and economists 
remind us that neither perfect governments nor perfect markets exist17.   
 
For strictly private development, hurdles have included raising capital, and vulnerabilities to changes 
in technology and regulation18.  The public sector has tended to get bogged down by bureaucracy 
and political meddling, and struggles to find a balance between performing adequate operations and 
maintenance of existing facilities versus investing in new capital projects.  This, coupled with the 
traditional procurement model becoming increasingly plagued by time delays and cost overruns has 
led to a growth in alternative delivery strategies in the past couple of decades. 
 
3.1.1 A Note on “Public Private Partnerships” 
 
Before delving into the definitions of procurement methods, a key distinction needs to be made 
about the term Public-Private Partnership (PPP).  The U.S. DOT defines a PPP as “a contractual 
agreement formed between public and private sector partners, which allows more private sector 
participation than is traditional19.”  Because of this term’s overuse and ambiguity, this thesis will tend 
to avoid the term PPP in favor of more specific delivery strategy monikers soon to be defined, such 
as Design-build (D-B). 
   
To avoid confusion, when speaking more broadly about non-traditional forms of collaboration the 
term Alternative Delivery Strategy, or ADS, will be used.  An ADS will be defined in this thesis as 
any delivery method other than “traditional” design-bid-build (D-B-B).   
 
                                                 
16 Grimsey and Lewis, 51. 
17 Berg, Pollitt, and Tsuji, 3. 
18 Grimsey and Lewis, 71-72. 
19 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  “Case Studies of Transportation Public-Private Partnerships 
in the United States,” 2-2.   
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3.2 Traditional Design-Bid-Build (D-B-B) 
 
The “traditional” procurement method is also known as design-bid-build (D-B-B).  Under D-B-B, 
government assumes the role in planning, financing, and operating projects.  The client will appoint 
an in-house design team and in most cases engage the services of a private sector manager who may 
also be the principal designer20.  The design team will develop the design to roughly the 30% level 
and begin the process of obtaining environmental approvals.  If the client decides not to develop 
final design on its own, it will contract out to a design firm the delivery of the design from 30% to 
100%. 
 
The public agency then conducts a bidding process for the selection of a construction contractor.  
Traditionally, contracts are awarded to the bidder that proposes to complete the job for the lowest 
price.  Other factors, such as schedule and contractor qualifications, may also be considered21. 
 
The construction contractor assumes responsibility for the construction by the agreed-upon time in 
the contract with the client.  The public sector agency inspects and oversees the implementation of 
the final design.  This allows the agency to hold its contractor accountable, assuming the agency can 
adequately perform this oversight role or hire consultants to provide oversight on its behalf.  Under 
traditional procurement, the construction contractor can be held liable for negligence or a breach of 
warranty, but is otherwise immune to project failure22.  The public agency retains all project risk, 
including the risk of design defects and design changes.  
 
The contractor often hires several, if not dozens, of subcontractors who specialize in certain trades.  
In 1991, subcontractors accounted for 75% of all construction companies, and that number has 
been growing ever since23.  Subcontractors are theoretically accountable to their contractor, and the 
prime contractor accountable to the owner.  Owners retaining risk need to be able to identify 
inadequacies in work performed by both contractors and subcontractors, and intervene when 
necessary, though doing so risks reducing the general contractor’s accountability.   
 
Both public agencies and private firms have tended to stick to this traditional method.  On the 
public side, the perceived transparency instills a level of public confidence and corresponds with a 
low degree of political risk.  On the private side, the traditional competitive arena minimizes 
financial risk.  
 
3.2.1 Traditional Design-Bid-Build (D-B-B) Advantages 
 
1. Designer directly accountable to client.  Under D-B-B, the design entity has a clear obligation to 
protect the long-term interests of the client.   
 
2. Few legal, political, and administrative barriers.  Since D-B-B has been the predominant delivery 
strategy for many decades, most public agencies have established guidelines that permit its 
use.  Many even go so far as to strictly prohibit any other delivery method.   
 
                                                 
20 Howes and Robinson, 121. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Loulakis, 190. 
23 Levy, 2006, 9. 
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3.2.2 Traditional Design-Bid-Build (D-B-B) Disadvantages 
 
1. Designers and clients may lack oversight capacity.  When 100% design drawings and specifications 
are handed over to a construction contractor, as is the case in D-B-B, the client needs to 
recognize that a contractor may seek to cut corners.  If the client cannot be the watchdog, it 
will often have to contract with the designer to perform that function skillfully.   
 
2. Longer project duration.  By having to develop a design fully before tendering construction 
contracts, traditional D-B-B has been known to add years to a project’s duration.  The 
efficiency gains from beginning construction on some elements while final design is still 
being developed are usually lost in D-B-B. 
 
3.3 Design-Build (D-B) 
 
Rather than contract for a designer and then separately for construction, design-build (D-B) is an 
integrated package whereby a single contractor has full responsibility for both functions.  Once a D-
B team is assembled, an incremental process of negotiation usually leads to the agreement of a 
guaranteed maximum price (GMP) for a finalized design and specification.  The figure below 
displays a typical timeline of both a D-B and a D-B-B project, and the potential time savings 
associated with D-B24: 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Design-Build vs. Design-Bid-Build Timeline 
 
Significant time savings are associated with the overlap of final design and construction in D-B.  D-
B-B loses time in having to first select one or more engineers to design the facility, and later a 
contractor to construct the facility.   
 
                                                 
24 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  "Design-Build Effectiveness Study – as Required by TEA-
21 Section 1307(f),” vii. 
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Design-build is really the foundation for these alternative delivery strategies.  Most others have 
design-build at its core, and tack on additional tasks as deemed appropriate.   
 
3.3.1 Design-Build Advantages 
 
1. Single-source responsibility.  Design-build contracts provide clarity about the roles of various 
players, and also the risks for which each is expected to account.  The owner can more easily 
hold a D-B firm accountable for poor performance.  With D-B both the designer and 
contractor are not only involved earlier and from the same general starting point, but they 
also cannot easily point fingers at each other since they are contractually bound and equally 
accountable to the owner.    
 
2. Construction begins earlier.  There are many features of construction that are technically ready 
even at the 30% design stage.  The ability to begin construction at 30% design can shave 
years off a project’s timeline and achieve savings in construction inflation costs.  Sped up 
construction will reduce the likelihood of negative inflationary impacts.   
 
3. Value engineering.  D-B fosters innovations in the way that the designers and constructors 
collaborate.  Designs are not static, and under D-B can be allowed to adapt.  Competing D-
B firms bidding at the 30% design stage will be truly invested in the value engineering 
solutions they propose, though the owner should hire a representative to ensure that the 
designer’s role is not minimized by a dominant contractor.  Traditional value engineering, on 
the other hand, is usually only a speculative assessment of potential value since it is 
accompanied by no binding contract.   
 
3.3.2 Design-Build Disadvantages 
 
1. Pre-contract delays and costs2526.  The scrutiny placed on the terms of a D-B contract often leads 
to an intense negotiation period lasting several months.  Time elapsed can lead to large 
increases in costs due to market fluctuations, hopefully offset by savings later on.   
 
2. Designer marginalization.  In D-B there are instances when the builder assumes a dominant 
position, thus undermining the skills and input of the designer.  The builder has a larger staff 
and may use its influence to proceed with construction absent a rigorous design component.  
With D-B the owner tends to lose a lot of control once the contract is signed, and thus may 
be rendered powerless to ensure this situation doesn’t deteriorate.  The retention of the 
conceptual designer to lend oversight capacity can help the owner overcome this flaw.   
 
3. Lack of competition.  Sometimes D-B RFPs have difficulty attracting interested and qualified 
bidders.  Though there are a growing number of firms that specialize in D-B, still the 
majority of D-B work brings together both a designer and builder whose project portfolios 
contain mostly traditional D-B-B work.  The amount of work required to develop a D-B 
proposal may not be worth the time, effort, and cost.   
 
4. Constraints on construction industry and exclusion of small firms27.  D-B lends itself well to the largest 
internationally-recognized design and construction firms.  These companies may have entire 
                                                 
25 Vining, Boardman, and Poschmann, 215. 
26 Yescombe, 19. 
27 Ibid, 20-21. 
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departments that deal strictly in D-B.  These firms are also better-suited to secure project 
financing, the amount of which is of course much larger for megaprojects.  Small and even 
medium-sized firms express discouragement at being unable to penetrate the D-B market.   
The increased demand for construction contractors and subcontractors also tends to drive 
up costs.  The private venture may be able to offset this demand by bringing in large 
contractors from outside the region that can supply the necessary labor, but political 
pressure to rely on local providers can limit this option.  
 
5. Unbundling of bundled contracts.  A D-B team may seek to unbundle individual tasks depending 
on how the contract is written28.  There is no implicit guarantee of cooperation among 
private partners in a joint venture.  Public agencies fall into a trap of assuming that the 
private sector is self-managing.  D-B requires an apt public sector agency to provide 
oversight of the private D-B consortium. 
 
6. Loss of checks and balances.  Under traditional procurement the designer is primarily 
accountable to the owner, and may or may not remain on staff to watch over the 
construction contractor on the owner’s behalf in a kind of “Design Plus Oversight” model.  
Because the designer in a D-B contract is part of the contractor team, some owners believe 
that D-B impairs the designer’s performance and ability to produce the best design for the 
owner, thus leading to lower quality29.  The owner may employ a program manager to help 
ensure that the design and implementation is in line with the owner’s objectives. 
 
3.4 Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) 
 
Design-build contracts may also seek to achieve greater integration by including stipulations that the 
private contractor operate and maintain the facility for a set period of time following construction.  
This delivery method is known as Design-Build-Operate-Maintain, or DBOM.  A key provision with 
DBOM is the condition of the asset upon transfer back to the public sector.  Theoretically, by 
tacking on an operations and maintenance (O&M) stipulation to a D-B contract the contractor is 
forced to consider and select the best solutions that will serve the full life-cycle of the output.   
 
However, the private sector’s short-term profit orientation may offset this theoretical advantage.  It 
is often the case that the private operator will seek opportunities to renegotiate contracts after they 
have been signed.  This can shift back the life-cycle risk to the public sector if the operator is 
consistently successful in prompting these renegotiations.   
 
DBOM contracts are common on projects that have user fees, such as transit lines and toll roads.  
O&M on such projects is doubly important because the quality of the service impacts revenues.  
Public agencies can choose to retain, share, or fully transfer the risk that usage meets projections.  
The decision should rest not only on the public sector’s ability to conduct and feel confident in their 
revenue projections, but also their level of influence on future demand through service reliability and 
improvements. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Quiggin, 58. 
29 Loulakis, 544. 
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3.4.1 Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) Advantages 
 
1. Early operator involvement.  Having the operator under contract early on in the development 
process allows for coordination between the entity building the system and the entity that is 
going to be running it.  Designers are concerned more about “constructability” than about 
“operability,” so even the best designs do not ensure solidly functional products.  A DBOM 
consortium has a vested interest in both aspects. 
 
2. Higher quality.  DBOM induces the builder to internalize potential cost reductions and quality 
improvements during the operations and maintenance stages that can be brought about by 
investment during development30.  Otherwise, an inadequate design may lead to lower 
construction costs that are later offset by higher O&M costs.    
 
3. Whole life-cycle cost assessment.  DBOM requires a long-term assessment of asset value.  In many 
ways the length of the contract in DBOM is almost as important as the price paid.  If an 
asset with a 30-year lifespan only has a 15-year DBOM term, then the contractor may be less 
likely to consider asset depreciation, but a full 30-year term or longer makes for an entirely 
different set of incentives.   
 
4. Demand risk transfer.  It is common for there to be at least some demand risk transferred in a 
DBOM contract in order to incentivize the operator.  Demand is based primarily on factors 
exogenous to O&M, so if a DBOM contractor assumes this risk it will often bid a higher 
amount to cover the uncertainty of demand forecasts. 
 
5. Technological advances.  In an effort to achieve efficient operation of a facility, the DBOM 
contractor may be more inclined to use the latest technologies.  One common example that 
is proving to be quite common in the U.S. is that of electronic toll collection.  An existing 
facility still using outdated manual methods of toll collection may wish to DBOM the 
transition to electronic toll collection.  If growing pains are anticipated, the private sector 
may be better equipped to mitigate them.  However, if the new technologies provide for less 
labor-intensive methods and may lead to a loss of jobs, the public sector is often politically 
constrained from adopting them.   
 
6. Maintenance prioritization.  The public sector is hindered by annual budget limitations and as a 
result may engage in short-term opportunistic behavior to avoid properly maintaining 
existing facilities.  By delegating O&M to a DBOM entity, the public sector is assured those 
functions will be given proper attention.  Passengers will appreciate being treated not merely 
as captives, but rather as riders who have a choice in their transportation options and who 
require a good quality service to retain their loyalty.   
 
3.4.2 Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM) Disadvantages 
 
1. End-of-contract term negotiations.  The public sector agency will want to include stipulations in 
the contract that ensure the asset they receive back is in a well-functioning condition, but 
that is difficult to both define and enforce.  At the same time, weak public sector agencies 
often lack internal capacity to perform its own O&M.  It is critical that these agencies do not 
renew existing O&M contracts simply out of complacency.  These contract renewals should 
be competitively bid along the same lines as the original O&M or full DBOM contract.   
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2. Potential loss of public support.  Though certainly not endemic of all, or even most DBOM 
contracts, it is important to note that DBOM is really the first alternative delivery strategy 
along the spectrum where the casual public user of the facility comes face-to-face with the 
reality that a function they may perceive to be a core government responsibility has been 
placed in the private sector’s control.  This can have negative repercussions for policymakers 
who authorized the decision, and stoke fears of rampant government privatization. 
 
3. Possible neglect of O&M responsibilities.  Even though the DBOM structure technically requires 
the contractor to account for O&M, it is still possible for short run construction cost 
minimization techniques to dominate the decision making process.  This is especially true if 
the DBOM contract is for a relatively short period of time, which will later be described in 
the Tren Urbano case.  The public sector needs to carefully stipulate its preferred terms for 
the O&M portion of the DBOM contract, and must also have the ability to enforce those 
terms.   
 
3.5 Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) 
 
In a design, construction, finance, operations, and maintenance (DBFOM) contract, the private 
sector sponsors generally provide equity financing in the amount of 10%-30% of total project cost 
and seek debt financing for the balance of the investment31.  The debt financing is obtained from 
commercial banks, international financial institutions, or bilateral governmental lenders32.  Private 
finance can also be included as part of D-B-B and D-B contracts, though it is much more common 
on contracts that include O&M, in which the financier accepts additional risk.   
 
DBFOM does not necessarily imply that all project financing is provided by the private sector.  The 
private sector financial contribution may be only a partial one, with government picking up the rest 
of the tab.  This is commonly the case on rail transit projects, since revenues are usually insufficient 
to cover operating costs, let alone capital costs.   
 
3.5.1 Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) Advantages 
 
1. Private financing.  Projects that may otherwise never have been possible with solely public 
sector financing now become feasible.  This provides the public sector with more assurances 
about its budget, since it will not have to account for the long-term costs of deferring 
maintenance or driving away customers through poor service.   
 
2. Risk spreading33.  Private financing allows risks to be spread among government and other 
project sponsors, constructors, suppliers, and financiers.  Government will still typically 
provide the site, reduce legal uncertainties, and purchase the output upon the completion of 
the DBFOM contract.   
 
3. Filter out bad projects34.  Especially if the repayment structure is heavily dependent on user fees, 
the private sector only has an interest in backing projects for which they are virtually assured 
of their desired rate of return.  The private sector will impose more scrutiny so that they do 
                                                 
31 Levy, 1996, 17. 
32 Ibid, 23. 
33 Grimsey and Lewis, 34. 
34 Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic, 12. 
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not put themselves in the position of risking a loss.  This ultimately provides a net benefit to 
society because there is a less likely chance of underperforming projects ever being built. 
 
3.5.2 Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) Disadvantages 
 
1. Default risk.  Anytime the private sector is putting up its own capital, it does so with little 
equity and a lot of debt.  The private sector does not have the fallback position of being able 
to raise taxes to account for shortfalls.  If costs escalate or if revenue projections are gravely 
overestimated the private sector risks default.  This may leave the public sector with an 
underperforming asset that is likely to continue to lose money.   
Some argue that bankruptcy is a positive sign for the public sector because it means it can 
easily take back an asset and either re-bid it or choose to operate the facility itself35.  Others 
are much less optimistic.  The Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, in evaluating the feasibility of privatizing the Pennsylvania Turnpike, notes 
that lenders to a defaulting concessionaire have too much money at stake and will either then 
run the facility themselves or appoint a “successor” corporation36.  The Caucus contends 
that, as long as cash flows exceed O&M costs, it makes economic sense for a successor to 
take over37. 
Still others suggest that the private sector may feign financial weakness in order to get the 
public sector to renegotiate the contract, especially once a project has become “too big to 
fail” and the public sector is left with little choice.  Even the hint of default or bankruptcy on 
a high-profile project can escalate the public sector risk of political loss at the polls.     
 
2. Higher private sector interest rates.  The public sector will usually be able to borrow on better 
terms than the private sector because of its ability to rely on taxes to cover shortfalls.  Private 
sector interest rates on debt are likely to be 1%-3% higher than the public sector38.  This 
suggests that the private sector has to include at least that much contingency when bidding 
on a DBFOM to account for the higher interest it will pay on debt.  Depending on the tax 
treatment of depreciation this problem may be partially offset. 
 
3.6 Asset Privatization 
 
Privatization of transportation assets has been the subject of much debate worldwide in recent years.  
In some countries, the private sector has ample opportunity to purchase tracts of land upon which it 
may build a highway or a transit line, for example.  This was the way much of the U.S. rail network 
was developed.  With an abundance of land and growth potential, as well as a lack of regulation, the 
federal government allowed private parties to purchase lengthy rights-of-way and capture the 
increased value of the land achieved by the investment.  This approach minimized the need for 
public finance and risk, but shifted substantial value to private sector developers.   
 
Today, this extreme type of full-scale privatization from inception is rare in the U.S.  Most land is 
already in private ownership or declared for public use, so the value capture possibilities are fewer.  
The Las Vegas Monorail, the Dulles Greenway in Virginia, and the SR-91 Express Lanes in 
                                                 
35 Massachusetts Joint Committee on Transportation Hearing, November 26, 2008. 
36 Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.  “For Whom the Road Tolls:  Corporate Asset or Public Good,” 
39. 
37 Ibid, 40. 
38 Grimsey and Lewis, 132. 
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California are among the very few projects that have been completed as fully private endeavors in 
the past 15 years.  These three examples are very similar to a DBFOM with one very key distinction.  
In a DBFOM, ownership is retained by the public sector, but in a privatization ownership is 
transferred up front to the private sector for the length of the contract.   
 
More often than not, however, transportation asset privatization in the U.S. describes the sale of 
existing facilities, such as the Chicago Skyway or Indiana Toll Road (ITR).  These concessions are 
granted for a set period of time.  In Chicago and Indiana those durations are 99 and 75 years, 
respectively.  Each of these projects will be further evaluated in Chapter 8.   
 
To be clear, a transportation asset may be privatized before even being constructed, once the project 
has been completed and is operational, or at any point in-between.  A key motivation for privatizing 
an existing facility is that the public sector can avoid the political backlash from having to increase 
tolls or transit fares, as long as those future increases are perceived by constituents as being out of 
their legislators’ control.  Even though it will be the public sector that stipulates the terms of toll or 
fare increases in the contract it signs with the concessionaire, it is a one-time decision.  It is a 
decision with eventual political repercussions, but in theory will not again be an issue until later in 
the concession period. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages with asset privatization are similar to those under a DBFOM 
structure.  The main difference is that by transferring to the private sector ownership in a 
privatization agreement, the public sector may relinquish powers that it would otherwise retain 
under DBFOM.  These powers may pertain to toll rate-setting policy, asset management, and 
capacity expansion.  It is crucial that any public sector agency considering asset privatization decides 
which of these responsibilities it wishes to retain, and then stipulates those requirements in the 
contract. 
 
3.7 Public and Private Sector Responsibilities 
 
The following chart sums up the various public and private sector roles and responsibilities under 
each of the aforementioned traditional and alternative delivery strategies: 
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Delivery 
Strategy D-B-B D-B DBOM DBFOM Privatization 
Design and 
Construction 
Public and/or 
Private (Public 
may do in-house 
design) 
Mostly Private 
(Public may do 
~30% design in-
house) 
Mostly Private 
(Public may do 
~30% design in-
house) 
Mostly Private 
(Public may do 
~30% design in-
house) 
Public and/or 
Private (depends on 
whether new or 
existing facility) 
Operations and 
Maintenance Public Public Private Private Private 
Ownership Public Public Public Public Private 
Finance Public Public Public 
Public and 
Private (or only 
Private) Private 
Who Pays? Public Public 
Public sector or 
users 
Public sector or 
users 
Public sector or 
users 
Who is Paid? n/a n/a 
Public and/or 
Private (Private 
may assume 
minimal revenue 
risk) Private Private 
Who bears 
risk? Public Public & Private  Public & Private  Mostly Private Mostly Private 
Table 3.1 – Roles and Responsibilities Under ADS Models 
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Chapter 4:  The Business Case and Public Policy 
 
This chapter examines the various factors that comprise the business case upon which the decision 
to proceed is made and the delivery strategy selected.  It also introduces the ways in which the case 
can be exaggerated or misleading, and will provide potential remedies to these biases.   
 
4.1 Achieving Value for Money (VFM) 
 
“Value for Money” (VFM) is a term commonly associated with the ultimate goal of a delivery 
strategy.  It is simply “the optimum combination of whole life-cycle cost and quality to meet the 
user’s requirements39.”   
 
Based primarily on the U.K. experience, Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM Treasury) notes the following 
as key factors that drive VFM40: 
 
1. Optimum risk allocation between the various parties; 
 
2. Focusing on whole life-cycle costs, particularly for long-term contracts; 
 
3. Use of an output specification to describe the agency’s requirements; 
 
4. Sufficient flexibility to ensure that any changes to the original specifications can be 
accommodated at reasonable cost; 
 
5. Ensuring sufficient incentives within the procurement structure and also the project 
contracts to achieve on-time delivery, with appropriate rewards and deductions as may 
be appropriate; 
 
6. Competition among bidders; 
 
7. Establishing the proper length of the contract; 
 
8. Managing the scale and complexity of the procurement; and 
 
9. Sufficient skills and expertise in both the public and private sectors. 
 
Accordingly, VFM can be achieved by41: 
 
• establishing a competitive and contestable market for infrastructure projects; 
 
• incorporating private sector innovation and skills in asset design, construction techniques 
and operational practices; and 
 
• transferring key risks in design, construction delays, cost overruns, and finance and 
insurance to private sector entities for them to manage.   
 
Opponents of alternative delivery strategies say that they never offer good VFM42.  One argument is 
that the partnership arrangement bundles together a number of different functions so unique in their 
                                                 
39 Ibid, 135. 
40 Her Majesty’s Treasury.  “Value For Money Assessment Guidance,” 8. 
41 Grimsey and Lewis, 153. 
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characteristics that a joint venture will rarely, if ever, include the entities most qualified for each of 
those functions and that it is always best to unbundle them into multiple contracts.   
 
Any prudent VFM assessment must include a comparative analysis between traditional and 
alternative delivery methods.  The way agencies in the U.K. go about performing this assessment is 
by generating what is known as a Public Sector Comparator, or PSC.  These comparisons are 
common in the U.S. as well, but are generally known as in-house estimates, or simply cost estimates. 
 
4.2 Public Sector Comparator (PSC) 
 
A PSC is defined as a “hypothetical, risk-adjusted” costing by the public sector, expressed in net 
present value terms43.  It is an independent, objective assessment of project costs if delivered solely 
by the public sector, against which eventual private sector contract bids and evaluations may be 
judged.  For large projects, it is not unusual to spend several months calculating a PSC44. 
 
PSCs are generally performed before an RFP is issued and may or may not be shared with 
prospective bidders.  The decision on whether or not to release the PSC to bidders is often based on 
its perceived accuracy.  The risk in releasing the PSC to bidders on a project with uncertainty is that 
if the private sector believes the PSC is low they will be unlikely to bid, but if they believe the PSC is 
high then they can potentially increase their profit significantly by bidding a high price that still 
comes in below the PSC.  Competition will ideally help to keep bid prices down.  When bidders are 
eligible to obtain the PSC document they are often required to sign a non-disclosure agreement.   
 
4.2.1 PSCs in the U.K. 
 
The following table shows the PSC amount and winning bid amount for selected U.K. highway 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) contracts, which are akin to DBFOMs45:   
 
 
Table 4.1 – Value for Money Assessment for U.K. PFI Transportation Projects 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
42 Ibid, 129. 
43 Industry Canada.  “The Public Sector Comparator:  A Canadian Best Practices Guide,” 11. 
44 Ibid, 12. 
45 Abdel Aziz, 925. 
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On eight of these ten projects, the winning bid came in under the PSC and the savings to the public 
sector as compared to its own assessment was as high as 34.1%.  Two of the projects had winning 
bids that came in slightly higher than the PSC, but were still perceived as good PFI projects because 
the contractor provided additional output than was required by the project scope.  
 
4.3 Cost Underestimation 
 
The theory of “optimism bias” suggests that the public sector has a perverse enticement to 
underestimate costs, since a project has little chance of getting off the ground if estimates are too 
high.  Furthermore, politicians “discount the future,” implying that they are primarily concerned 
with their next election46.  If they can claim credit for getting a megaproject started they can not only 
use that success story in their campaign platform, but they may be out of the public limelight by the 
time any potential problems arise.   
 
4.3.1 Optimism Bias 
 
Danish professor Bent Flyvbjerg of Aalborg University is among the pioneers in optimism bias 
research.  Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) examined 258 large transport infrastructure projects covering 20 
countries, the overwhelming majority of which were developed using traditional D-B-B 
procurement47.  Costs were found to be underestimated in 90% of the cases.  For all projects the 
average cost escalation was 27.6%, but rail projects had by far the highest average cost escalation of 
44.7%48.   
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Prevalence of Cost Escalation in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) Optimism Bias Study 
Table 4.2 – Average Cost Escalation by Mode in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) Optimism Bias Study 
 
Flyvbjerg’s analysis suggests that in order for a public agency to accept a 50% risk for cost overrun 
in a rail project, cost estimates need to be 40% higher than they are currently49.  If willing to accept 
only a 10% risk for cost overrun, then the required uplift is on average 68%50. 
 
                                                 
46 Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic, 15. 
47 Grimsey and Lewis, 72. 
48 Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, and Buhl, 284. 
49 Flyvbjerg, 23-29. 
50 Ibid. 
Project 
Type 
Number of 
Cases (N) 
Average Cost 
Escalation (%) 
Rail 58 44.7 
Fixed-link 33 33.8 
Road 167 20.4 
All Projects 258 27.6 
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Figure 4.2 – Cumulative Distribution of Cost Overruns for Rail Projects 
 
A separate Flyvbjerg study also noted that rail passenger forecasts were overestimated by 105.6%, 
and that these trends have been unchanged over the past 70 years51. 
 
One of the hypotheses as to why rail projects are underestimated with higher frequency and greater 
degree than road projects is because public funds for rail projects are much more scarce than for 
road projects.  Highway projects in the U.S. do not go through rigorous cost-benefit studies, while 
transit projects are evaluated exhaustively.  Rail promoters must present their projects in as favorable 
a light as possible, and one of the ways to do so is to underestimate costs and overestimate 
benefits52.  Also, the uncertainty surrounding tunneling procedures may contribute to rail transit 
project cost underestimation.   
 
In another study conducted in 2002, the U.K. Treasury commissioned the consulting firm Mott 
MacDonald to review the outcome of 50 large-scale projects in the U.K. over the past 20 years53.  
This study came to similar conclusions.  On average, projects were completed 17% later than 
expected, capital costs were 47% over budget, and operating costs exceeded those estimated by 
41%5455.   
 
Don Pickrell, economist at the U.S. DOT Volpe Center, performed a study in 1990 strictly on U.S. 
rail transit projects with a total value of $15.5B in 1988 prices56.  Taking year-by-year inflation into 
account, the average capital cost overrun for these ten projects was 61%, ranging from a 10% 
savings to a 106% overrun. 
 
4.3.1.1 Optimism Bias Contributing Factors 
 
A study by Mackie and Preston (1998) of the transport sector identified no fewer than 21 sources of 
error and bias in transport projects.  Some of these include57: 
 
• failure to clarify project objectives at the outset; 
 
• political commitment coming too early, before projects can be appropriately appraised; 
 
• omission of the “do nothing” alternative; 
                                                 
51 Priemus, Flyvbjerg, and van Wee, 122. 
52 Ibid, 125. 
53 Grimsey and Lewis, 72.  
54 Ibid, 72.  
55 Ibid, 72.  
56 Pickrell. 
57 Grimsey and Lewis, 75. 
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• overestimation of external factors such as population growth and income; 
 
• overestimating asset lives; 
 
• difficulties of evaluating environmental impacts; 
 
• benefits counted twice or even three times in different parts of the appraisal; and 
 
• downplaying the risk that projects are susceptible to changing political, financial, and 
economic circumstances, especially for megaprojects. 
 
Flyvbjerg et al. explicitly reject the idea that optimism bias can be attributed to the difficulty of 
predicting the future.  Rather, they identify three contributing factors58: 
 
1. Short political tenure.  Politicians who advocate for projects are often out of office by the time 
actual viability can be checked. 
 
2. Rent-seeking behavior.  Special interest groups can promote projects at no cost or risk to 
themselves because others will be paying the costs. 
 
3. Spin.  Contractors are adept at producing overoptimistic tenders.  The potential profits often 
outweigh significantly the penalties involved.   
 
Optimism bias may also stem from an inaccurate selection of the benchmark against which final 
costs are meant to be compared.  Project evaluation tends to be narrow, user-benefit oriented, and 
may ignore other, more difficultly quantifiable metrics such as increased mobility.   
 
4.3.1.2 Optimism Bias Solutions 
 
Mackie and Preston propose three solutions59: 
 
1. Establish groups within organizations whose sole purpose is project appraisal; 
 
2. Expose projects to open scrutiny at public inquiries; and 
 
3. Spend more time learning from past successes and failures. 
 
Flyvbjerg et al. look to four remedies60: 
 
1. Increased transparency and public involvement; 
 
2. Use of performance specifications with a goal-driven approach based on outputs; 
 
3. Formulate a clear set of goals governing the project development, construction, and 
operation; and 
 
4. Include private risk capital in public infrastructure, so projects are subject to market tests.  
This is an argument, in particular, that has been undermined by recent economic failure. 
                                                 
58 Ibid, 78. 
59 Ibid, 77. 
60 Ibid, 78. 
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4.4 Reference Class Forecasting (RCF) 
 
Another potential remedy to optimism bias is Reference Class Forecasting (RCF).  RCF consists of 
taking an “outside view” of the project being forecasted, and comparing it to a class of similar 
projects built before it on an objective basis.  RCF requires the following three steps for an 
individual project61: 
 
1. Identify relevant reference class of past projects.  The class must be broad to be statistically 
meaningful but narrow to be truly comparable. 
 
2. Establish a probability distribution for the selected reference class.  This requires access to 
credible data for a sufficient number of projects. 
 
3. Compare the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to establish most 
likely outcome for specific project.  
 
One problem with RCF as it pertains to megaprojects, however, is that the reference class is often 
not sufficiently large to be statistically significant.   
 
4.5 Quantitative Cost Estimation 
 
Sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo simulation are both tools that cost estimators use to appraise 
projects.  Simply put, these simulations run scenarios thousands, or even millions of times to 
generate a distribution of possible cost outcomes.  These analyses can provide outliers that simulate 
best- and worst-case scenarios. 
 
One potentially detrimental outcome of sensitivity analysis is that it provides lower bounds; bounds 
that are at least within the realm of possibility, even plausibility.  For example, an analysis may 
suggest that there is a 50% likelihood that a project will be completed for less than, say, $100M, and 
the same likelihood that the project will come in higher than that.  But the analysis may also say that 
there is a 10% chance that the project will come in under $50M.  Depending on how the recipients 
of such information may wish to “spin” the results, you may be more likely to see public disclosure 
of a number closer to $50M than $100M.   
 
4.6 Avoiding Optimism Bias Through Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
There is a danger that optimism bias is masked in various contingency factors that are portrayed as 
protective measures to prevent cost overruns.  One of the main advantages of alternative delivery 
strategies is that they can help guard against both optimism bias and excess contingency by providing 
a much earlier market test of likely costs than traditional D-B-B.  This earlier encounter with market 
reality forces a process of identifying responsible ways to cut cost without sacrificing function, or 
identifying increased revenues to cover the costs.  In an extreme case the early market test could lead 
to project cancellation, though it is much more costly to cancel a project after final design is 
complete (as in traditional D-B-B) than after only preliminary design is complete (as in D-B). 
                                                 
61 Priemus, Flyvbjerg, and van Wee, 133-134. 
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Chapter 5:  Risk 
 
At the core of the decision on delivery strategy is identifying the various risks involved in procuring 
a transportation megaproject and determining how these risks may be reduced and best allocated.  
This chapter provides a breakdown of the risks involved in transportation megaprojects and how 
various delivery strategies seek to redefine the way these risks are apportioned. 
 
5.1 Risk 
 
The public sector is taking a big gamble even simply by proposing a transportation megaproject.  
Risks can emerge early, late, or be prevalent throughout.  Traditionally, the public sector retains 
nearly all project risks; risks that carry substantial, often unvalued, cost.  These may be risks that an 
agency is unable to effectively handle.  Fundamentally, a risk should be allocated to the entity best 
able to reduce and manage that particular risk.   
 
5.2 Risk Transfer and Risk Reduction 
 
While much of the literature on the subject of risk delves primarily into the notion of risk transfer, it 
is risk reduction that may be a more practical goal.  It is also one that can have as much, if not more 
beneficial impact on a project than risk transfer, particularly for the public sector. 
 
Every private sector entity makes its living based on taking risks and then attempting to exceed 
expectations in order to maximize return.  It is simply the way business is done by profit-seeking 
enterprises.  There is truly nothing wrong with this approach, as it is a core principle in any 
capitalistic, free-market economy.   
 
The public sector must be keenly aware of this dynamic, however.  A private sector entity wishing to 
conduct business with the public sector will always seek to exploit perceived weaknesses in the 
public sector’s own internal risk assessment.   
 
Risk transfer is difficult to execute, not to mention expensive.  Also, a risk transfer is simply that, a 
transfer from one entity to another, with no net benefit to either party given perfect information.  
Public sector agencies are better served by putting more effort into reducing the probability that a 
given risk arises, and also minimizing the potentially negative impacts of a risk if it materializes.   
 
5.3 Types of Risk 
 
There are a myriad of risks associated with transportation megaprojects.  The following is a list of 
some of the risks that will come up throughout the thesis, though this list is by no means exhaustive: 
 
• Competency/capacity/institutional risk – the risk that the public sector agency lacks the 
competence or the capacity to deliver the project; 
 
• Design risk – the risk that the design cannot deliver the services at the required 
performance or quality standards set forth in the output specifications; 
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• Construction risk – the risk that the construction of the physical asset is not completed to 
specification; 
 
• Operation/functional risk – the risk that the service cannot meet the required performance 
standards; 
 
• Demand/revenue/ridership risk – the risk that the demand for the service is lower or 
higher than expected; 
 
• Political/legislative/regulatory/legal/planning risk – the risk that changes to laws and 
regulations impact a project; 
 
• Corruption risk – the risk that either a public or private sector party has ulterior motives 
and is not acting in good faith; 
 
• Inflation risk – the risk that inflation rates are different than anticipated; 
 
• Environmental risk – the risk that the project has an environmental impact not originally 
identified; 
 
• Availability risk – the risk that the asset will not be available by the time agreed upon; 
 
• Maintenance risk – the risk that costs associated with maintaining the asset to a state of 
good repair are different than expected; 
 
• Interface risk – the risk that relationships between the project and other assets with which it 
may interact or interfere have adverse affects; 
 
• Public Relations risk – the risk that public opinion for a project is weakened; 
 
• Technological risk – the risk that technologies incorporated into a project become outdated 
or obsolete; 
 
• Residual value/life-cycle risk – the risk related to the uncertainty of the value of the asset 
at the termination of the contract; 
 
• Credit/default risk – the risk that a debtor may default; 
 
• Financial risk – the risk that the project’s costs are different than expected; and 
 
• Force majeure risk – the risk that an unnatural or natural disaster delays or destroys the 
project. 
 
• Existence risk – the risk that because some or all of the above factors, potentially valuable 
investments simply do not materialize. 
 
5.4 Risk Allocation 
 
In theory, the concept of risk allocation is straightforward.  When the government is effectively able 
to transfer a risk it then becomes the purchaser of a service or good that is risk-free in the sense that 
government does not pay if the service is not delivered, or is not delivered to specified standards62. 
                                                 
62 Grimsey and Lewis, 106. 
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In practice, risk allocation is much more complex.  Thinking back to the maxim that risk should 
always be retained by the entity best able to reduce and manage that particular risk, the question 
inevitably turns to how to determine which entity that may be.  Because the private sector does not 
accept risk cheaply, poor risk assessment by the public sector can add substantial overall cost to a 
project.  In this sense, risk transfer is a risk in and of itself.     
 
Since the government can spread risk across taxpayers, there is an argument that the government has 
an advantage over the private sector in terms of managing risk63.  Conversely, the private sector can 
spread risk across many different financial markets, thus diversifying its risk portfolio.  Private sector 
risk managers may also be more skilled than those in government.  Risk management needs to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis, making it difficult to achieve consensus about risk allocation. 
 
Generally, a risk matrix is created as an organizing framework.  It identifies all risks for a particular 
project and broadly sets out the public agency’s perception of who might be best able to manage 
each of those risks.  Some risks are straightforward and are easily delegated.  Many other risks are 
completely outside the control of either party.  In this case, the optimal risk allocation should be 
based on how the private party “prices” the risk and whether it is reasonable for the government to 
pay that price, or otherwise hope that it will be able to deliver on the task itself for less cost.  The 
uncertainty regarding most risks means that the private party will include a contingency, or premium 
on that risk as a form of insurance should that risk materialize.   
 
5.5 Risk Evolution 
 
Priemus, Flyvbjerg, and van Wee (2008) developed the following chart that shows to what degree, 
and when in a megaproject’s development certain risks arise64: 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Level and Types of Risk at Various Stages in the Development Process 
 
According to their analysis, total risk spikes throughout the middle years of the project, largely as a 
result of institutional and regulatory risks during construction.  As the project progresses, those risks 
                                                 
63 Hemming, 13. 
64 Priemus, Flyvbjerg, and van Wee, 151. 
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dissipate just as the risk of completing the project on-time emerges, as well as do market pressures.  
Finally, as the project moves closer to completion, operating risks emerge while others subside.   
 
5.6 Risk Management Plans 
  
In order to determine the optimal risk allocation, a risk management plan is first needed which 
includes the following steps: 
 
1. Identify all project risks; 
 
2. Examine the potential for risk reduction, and take steps to execute those reductions; 
 
3. Examine each risk and identify which are best able to be managed by the public sector and 
hence left in public control, and which are best transferred; 
 
4. For each risk to be transferred, price them accordingly; 
 
5. Decide whether any of the remaining risks should be shared between the public and private 
sectors and how they are to be allocated; and 
 
6. Adjust the contract terms to reflect the optimal risk allocation structure. 
 
Risks that tend to be retained by government include those related to legislation or policy changes, 
and also the risk of government wishing to alter service or quality standards. 
 
The Council of Standards Australia and New Zealand lends this diagram as a framework by which a 
public sector agency may pursue a risk management plan65: 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Sample Risk Management Plan 
 
The key to any risk management plan is the feedback loops that allow for consistent monitoring and 
reviewing of risks.  There needs to be a mechanism in place that provides for periodic reassessment 
of how a particular risk is to be treated.   
                                                 
65 Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter, 82. 
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A clear output specification reflecting government policy objectives is a pre-condition for achieving 
the desired level of risk transfer66.  Both the quality and the quantity of the service must be able to be 
evaluated using performance indicators.  There is a danger, however, in being too prescriptive in 
RFPs, thus discouraging innovation among the bids with regards to the range of service delivery 
options and pricing proposals. 
 
5.7 Risk Preference Survey 
 
Akintoye et al. did a survey in the U.K. in 1998 of contractors, clients, and lenders in Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) contracts.  Here is how each party ranked the risks posed to them in the survey (1 = 
most important)67: 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Risk Ranking From Akintoye et al. (1998) Study 
 
The variation among the groups is not surprising, though quite telling.  Contractors were most 
concerned with the risks associated with design and construction.  Clients ranked institutional and 
performance risks as the most critical.  Lenders focused on financial risks.   
 
Contractors and clients aligned their preferences similarly, and as a result the overall risk preferences 
point to those associated with delivery as being the most critical on the whole.  These included 
design and construction risks, as well as risks of delay, cost overruns, and performance. 
  
 
 
                                                 
66 Grimsey and Lewis, 177. 
67 Akintoye, Beck, and Hardcastle, 40. 
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5.8 Alternative Delivery Strategies Blurring Risk Ownership 
 
One drawback to an alternative delivery strategy like D-B is that when risks are transferred from the 
public sector to the private sector there are usually multiple firms that makeup the private sector 
consortium.  Therefore, a given risk must then be allocated among private sector firms themselves.   
 
There may be multiple prime contractors under an ADS model, such as a design firm and 
construction firm combining to form a joint venture.  The design firm more predominantly steers 
the trajectory of the project even though it is the construction firm that may be more invested in the 
long-term.  This can lead to power struggles and conflicts over who should take ownership of a 
particular risk within the team. 
 
Legally, the joint venture collectively “owns” the risk.  The problem is that the designer, being 
smaller, has less power, so the contractor makes decisions based on its short-term interests related to 
construction, while the client is rightly more concerned with performance and commissioning.  This 
requires that the client have competent representation to oversee final design, as well as engineering 
and implementation.  
47 of 175 
Chapter 6:  Management 
 
Public sector coordination with, and management of private partners is especially important when 
the public entity is entering uncharted territory in terms of the type of product being delivered 
and/or the delivery strategy to be implemented.  The public sector can protect itself by hiring 
consultants that may be able to assist them with procurement.  Though these consultants are almost 
always employees of the private sector, the relationship between them and the public agency can be 
structured in such a way that they will gain only when the public sector’s objectives are met.  This 
chapter seeks to identify some of the avenues to which the public sector may turn if its own 
management capacity is insufficient.   
 
6.1 Project vs. Program 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to point out the ambiguities in the terms used to 
describe a “project” and a “program.”  Throughout this thesis, the term “project” describes the final 
deliverable.  However, there are actually many individual tasks within the overall project framework 
that may themselves be defined by others as individual “projects,” which wouldn’t fit the definition 
used in the thesis.   
 
For this chapter only, in an attempt to mesh with conventional definitions of managerial 
responsibilities, “project” will denote any one of a smaller subset of tasks that are essentially 
combined to complete the end-product.  A “program,” on the other hand, refers to a portfolio of 
policies and strategies within which one or many “projects” may exist.  The program tends to 
encompass many of the roles noted as top priorities for the client in the Akintoye analysis from 
Chapter 5, including performance and commissioning.   
 
6.2 Program Manager/Owner’s Representative 
 
When delivering on transportation capital, an owner is traditionally responsible for: 
 
• defining the basic project scope; 
 
• selecting the delivery method; 
 
• preparing design criteria; 
 
• identifying the completion date; 
 
• evaluating financial options and providing the funding; 
 
• establishing the budget; 
 
• electing procurement options within the chosen delivery method; 
 
• selecting, contracting with, reviewing, and supervising a designer; 
 
• choosing the types of contracts to let; 
 
• preparing contract documents; 
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• selecting, contracting with, monitoring, and supervising a contractor;  
 
• selecting, contracting with, monitoring, and supervising an operator;  
 
• handling legal, accounting, auditing, permitting, and insurance services; 
 
• commissioning the facility; and 
 
• supervising startup of operations. 
 
As the list grows, it becomes evident that the owner should seek assistance in some or all of these 
areas in the form of a program manager, or owner’s representative (“rep”).  In an alternative delivery 
strategy model like D-B, a program manager will act as a liaison between the owner and D-B team.  
They will communicate the project objectives to all parties that will have contractual obligations, and 
hence accountability, to the owner.  The program manager focuses on long-term performance, thus 
ensuring construction contractors and their short-term interest in finishing the job quickly and at 
least cost does not dominate. 
 
Owners who employ program management are looking for services beyond what is traditionally 
provided by architects, engineers, and constructors.  For example, the program manager may be 
retained to provide training to facility managers and operators, or conduct ongoing maintenance 
services for the facility68. 
 
Program mangers are vital for owners who wish to use an alternative delivery process and develop a 
project to the 30% design level prior to procurement.  It is often the program manager who will 
develop that level of design and then provide oversight of the designer or D-B entity then hired to 
complete the design.  Program managers are utilized in this way to minimize the owner’s perceived 
loss of design control under D-B69.  They help keep the owner involved throughout design, and also 
help to enforce the D-B team’s culpability.  To be effective, program managers should survive 
political transition and ensure that the institutional memory of one administration is not lost during 
the shift to the next.   
 
If it is the owner’s first use of a particular delivery method, it is recommended that they employ a 
program manager from the start.  No matter how much responsibility is delegated to a program 
manager, however, the owner should always have a primary role in leadership and in making key 
decisions.  An absentee public owner is asking for problems, considering it is the taxpayer’s money, 
the owner’s budget, and the public’s interest to be preserved.   
 
The typical fee for a program manager ranges from 2%-6% of total project cost on an inverse sliding 
scale – the larger the project the lower the percentage70.  The problems that occur if the public 
agency does its own program management, especially on a megaproject, are likely to account for a 
far greater amount.  There is a grave risk of the public sector wrongly assuming that it can perform 
program management on its own.   
 
 
                                                 
68 Beard, Loulakis, Wundrum, 515. 
69 Loulakis, 575. 
70 Ibid, 562. 
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6.3 Project Manager 
 
The project manager’s role is one much different than that of program manager.  The project 
manager generally takes the lead on management of construction, human resources, and possibly 
finance.  A project manager may work on behalf of either the owner or the private sector.  The 
public agency will often hire a project manager to oversee the construction contractor, but the 
construction contractor itself may hire its own project manager to assist with the interfaces with 
subcontractors.   
 
A project manager has control over both work processes and the costs associated with that work.  
Management of a construction project can be divided into four main components71: 
 
• Final design and construction engineering.  First, developing a 30% conceptual design to a 
completed 100% design.  Then, assembling the proper materials, equipment, and systems, 
and the selection and utilization of the best construction technologies to complete the tasks. 
 
• Construction oversight and quality control.  First, establishing the most effective way to implement 
the construction process, including proper scheduling and control of the flow of labor, 
materials, and equipment to the jobsite.  Then, providing oversight at the site to ensure that 
the product is being delivered to standard.   
 
• HR management.  Control over human resources is important since labor productivity and a 
harmonious work environment are critical elements of a successful project.   
 
• Financial management.  Construction is a high-risk business with historically low profit margins.  
Control over costs, cash flow, and adequate project funding is essential. 
 
6.4 Construction Manager 
 
Construction managers (CMs) are similar to project managers and, in fact, a project manager’s role 
may encompass construction management.  However, an owner may choose to separately hire a 
manager solely for the construction stage.  This construction manager may be hired for a fixed fee, 
and be known as an Agency CM, or they may put themselves at financial risk and be known as a 
Construction Manager At-Risk (CM@Risk.) 
 
A CM@Risk assists the owner and designer in pre-construction activities and becomes at-risk for 
price and schedule performance72.  If an owner retains an Agency CM the owner will contract 
directly with contractors and be responsible for their performance.  A CM@Risk will perform the 
contracting on its own, often with the owner’s input, and be responsible for cost overruns, quality 
deficiencies, and schedule lapses.   
 
Under this strategy, the owner hires a designer under a separate contract, but rather than waiting 
until design is completed to gain input from the construction entity, the owner instead brings on a 
construction manager before design decisions have been finalized73. 
 
                                                 
71 Levy, 2006, 9. 
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There are several benefits to employing a construction manager74:  
 
• earlier involvement of the constructor; 
 
• earlier knowledge of costs; 
 
• more professional relationship with the constructor; 
 
• owner gains more familiarity about the procurement process; and 
 
• projects are usually completed quicker.   
 
Drawbacks to construction management include the fact that there are still both a design contract 
and a construction contract to manage, as well as operating concerns to integrate75.  Therefore, 
although construction management provides certain efficiencies in terms of schedule, it does not 
ensure focus on performance and commissioning.  Finally, especially if the construction manager is 
not at-risk, there is a likelihood that the constructor’s early input may not be incorporated by the 
designer.   
 
If the owner lacks technical capability, a construction management team can provide such 
expertise76.  This role is considered more significant with D-B and other alternative delivery 
strategies because the normal safeguard of the designer acting in the owner’s interests during 
construction is absent in an ADS model.  On a D-B project, the CM can involve a “shadow 
operator” on behalf of the owner, at least until such time when an operator can be procured.  
However, there is a high risk that construction issues will dominate over function and performance. 
 
Tasks for a construction manager acting in the owner’s interest under D-B include77:  
 
• advising the owner on the advantages and disadvantages of various procurement procedures 
and D-B contract forms and provisions; 
 
• developing preliminary budget and schedule; 
 
• coordinating the activities of independent inspectors and reviewing their work; 
 
• coordinating post-award scope changes and change orders; 
 
• performing general inspections and recording the design-builder’s progress; 
 
• certifying the design-builder’s periodic payment requests; and 
 
• coordinating post-occupancy performance testing and warranty claims.   
 
Opinions on construction managers vary78.  Design-builders often note that they are an unnecessary 
project cost.  They claim that construction managers interfere with the design-builder’s single point 
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of responsibility for doing their work, and that they disrupt the close and direct partnering 
relationship between the owner and the design-builder.   
 
Designers also express concerns that a CM intrudes upon the relationship between owner and 
designer79.  They believe that CMs marginalize the designer’s role and reduce the designer’s profit 
potential.  Designers note that there should only be one prime consultant to the owner on a D-B 
project and that the designer should be the entity to perform any needed CM services.   
 
Construction managers who are not design professionals are insistent that the owner still requires an 
independent body to manage certain parts of a D-B project, regardless of who the owner or D-B 
team may assign to perform these tasks in-house80.  They claim that their unique management skills 
can improve the project’s success and ensure that the owner is getting what it wants.   
 
6.5 Delivery Partner 
 
In the U.K. the preferred term for managerial roles is “delivery partner” (DP).  Delivery partner is a 
bit of a catch-all phrase that can perhaps best be described as a combination of program 
manager/technical advisor and project manager81.  Delivery partners are private consultants to the 
client, but will not be directly involved in the actual construction.   
 
Many of the firms who generally bid on these roles for megaprojects are among the largest design 
and engineering firms in the world.  Some of them are capable of doing design and/or construction 
of their own, though will forgo that opportunity on a job for which they want to be a delivery 
partner.  Still other firms were once in the business of design or construction, but have now moved 
exclusively towards management. 
 
In the case of Crossrail, TfL has chosen to procure a “project” delivery partner and a “program” 
delivery partner.  These roles are expanded upon in Chapter 13, and a synopsis of the experiences 
with delivery partners on North American rail transit projects can be found in Chapter 8. 
 
6.6 Quality Assurance (QA)/Quality Control (QC) 
 
Quality Control (QC) establishes baseline standards to which the construction or assembly of a 
component has been incorporated into the project design82.  Quality Assurance (QA), on the other 
hand, is the process that verifies whether these standards have been met83. 
 
Under traditional D-B-B, there is a role for independent oversight initiated by the owner to ensure 
that the design is incorporated into the construction properly84.  In D-B, the owner may relinquish 
that role to the D-B team.  The design-builder should be responsible for QA during the construction 
and testing phases85.  In a DBOM QA is enhanced further since the design-builder knows it will also 
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become the eventual operator and will therefore be incentivized to produce a high-quality, 
functional product.   
 
The owner’s responsibility for QA is in the performance testing of the finished project86.  All parties 
should be allowed to observe all tests and obtain copies of all testing reports.  Of course, even under 
D-B or any other alternative delivery strategy, the owner is free to perform any additional QA it 
chooses, at its own cost.  The client will often delegate that task to a construction manager87.   
 
Beard et al. (2001) contend that quality is usually better on D-B and other alternative delivery 
strategies88.  They argue that the combination of design and construction disciplines and their focus 
on common performance goals leads to improved facility procurement.  By contrast, under D-B-B, 
the designer may conservatively overdesign the facility because they are not aware of true 
construction costs and do not have a stake in the final outcome of the project89. 
 
Others argue that because D-B weakens the ethical responsibility of the designer to the client, it is 
essential to retain the services of an owner’s rep who is dedicated to providing QA and QC 
throughout delivery.   
 
6.7 Client/Management Organization 
 
Key decisions to be made by any public sector agency are: 
 
1. whether it wishes to include outside management; and 
 
2. how it wants to structure such agreements.   
 
These agencies need to have a clear understanding of the marketplace for project delivery.   
 
Client teams may be integrated into the project structure in one of several ways:  
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Figure 6.1 – Client/Management Organization Options 
 
• Client Lead:  In this case there is no outside consultancy present at all.  The client hires and 
manages contractors and subcontractors itself, usually performed by a procurement 
department within the agency. 
 
• Integrated Client/Management Team:  The client may wish to have management essentially 
“attached at the hip” to the client, with the client and managers working in tandem.  The 
delegation of tasks and payment mechanism are the critical issues in this structure. 
 
• Management Lead:  The client may wish to grant the management team broader powers in the 
procurement process.  This team may be able to structure and negotiate contracts on the 
owner’s behalf with little direct input from the owner itself.  This option would entail having 
a more independent, but strongly incentivized management scheme.  The management role 
would be substantial and require careful definition, since it will be especially difficult to 
amend tasks and delegation once underway. 
 
These three client structures define a gradation of risk that the owner may or may not be willing or 
able to transfer.  Much depends on the qualifications and experience of each respective party, and 
the level of trust that exists between them. 
 
Whereas the direct compensation let to a management team may not be of major consequence to 
the public sector in comparison to the overall project cost, the amount of power and leverage given 
to that partnership certainly is. 
 
6.8 What Managerial Strategy is Most Appropriate?   
 
Public sector agencies must first assess their strengths and weaknesses before deciding upon the 
appropriate managerial structure.  It may be that the agency has a clear idea of how the asset is to be 
integrated into a broader-scale program level and can get by without an outside program manager.   
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But the public sector should rarely keep that responsibility in-house given the high turnover of 
personnel.  Program managers are most successful if involved in the task from the beginning, or at 
least from an early stage and retained throughout.  That is why an outside consultant may be better 
suited to fulfill this role – to guard against political transition, personnel turnover, and even to 
mitigate the risk of corruption. 
 
Program managers are even more essential when the client itself is complex, as in the U.S., with 
substantial federal funding being managed by state or local entities.  Crossrail also has a complex 
client given both its national and local interests.  In these cases, a program manager plays an 
important role in enhancing the level of trust among the client’s partners that the program and 
project will be managed competently.   
 
Critical is the level of autonomy provided to these managers, and the ability and willingness of the 
public sector owner to set and enforce the terms of these relationships.  Effective program and 
project managers are allowed some latitude to act independently.  This requires a great deal of trust.   
 
There must also be open lines of communication and an audit trail that helps to foster a culture of 
public transparency and professionalism among participants.  These factors will lead to effective 
owner-manager relationships. 
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Chapter 7:  Contracts 
 
The selection of a delivery strategy is one of a lengthy series of decisions that will be made 
throughout the procurement process.  Many of the subsequent decisions relate to the nature of 
contracts.  This chapter identifies key contract-related issues, and examines how laws and regulations 
governing contracts may either preclude or encourage the use of alternative delivery strategies.   
 
7.1 Pre-qualification 
 
When the contract for a component of a transportation project is put out for a bid, it may be chosen 
based on the lowest bidder, or be based on a combination of price and other factors.  Countless 
professional associations have been supportive of a two-stage contractor selection process that first 
has a mechanism in place to determine whether a firm is qualified before price is even considered.   
 
7.2 Low-bid Selection 
 
Low-bid contracting does not always guarantee lowest ultimate price.  The owner is susceptible to 
cost increases that may arise once the full design is implemented, and also because of change orders 
and contract renegotiations.  Another disadvantage of low-bid is that the race-to-the-bottom among 
bidding contractors can cause them to not focus on exactly what the owner believed it was 
purchasing and what the contractor thought it was selling in its proposal90.  There is also the worry 
that the price of the lowest bid will be insufficient to complete the job properly.  
 
7.2.1 Variations on Low-bid 
 
Renowned economist William Vickrey is credited with another bid selection method in which the 
contract is awarded to the lowest bidder, but that the buyer actually pays the second-lowest price.  The 
theory behind this mechanism is that firms are still likely to bid closer to the true value of the work.  
If you bid higher than the true value, you only decrease your chances of winning, but you will not 
influence the price you would have to be paid91.  The price the winning bidder is paid is determined 
by the competitors’ bids92.   
 
Another option is to use the median bid, rather than the lowest or second-lowest bid.  Those who 
advocate for the selection of the median bid suggest that the median provides a more accurate test 
and avoids low-bid outliers that may have strong biases or errors.   
 
7.3 Best Value Selection 
 
A “best value” selection process is a more subjective evaluation system that allows the owner to take 
reputation and past performance of the bidder into account.  The benefit of best value is that it 
limits the competition to competent firms.  However, a risk in this approach occurs when owners 
develop long-term relationships with contractors preferential treatment may be exhibited, which is 
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clearly not in the spirit of what best value is intended to achieve.  But as long as there is competition 
among bids, this risk can be mitigated.   
 
7.3.1 Weighted Selection Criteria and Adjusted Low-bid 
 
These contractor selection methods are forms of best value selection that are intended to provide 
more transparency, though they do not necessarily eliminate subjectivity93.  Each uses a formula to 
evaluate price and qualifications to yield an “adjusted bid.”  The Design-Build Institute of America 
(DBIA) provides the following example of how adjusted low-bid might work94: 
 
 
Table 7.1 – Design-Build Institute of America Adjusted Low-bid Example 
 
In this example, the low bid is also the lowest qualified team because of its poor qualitative score.  
Conversely the most qualified firm is also the most expensive.  This leaves the middle firm, which 
was neither the lowest bidder nor the most qualified team, but comes out with the best “adjusted 
price” and thus gets awarded the contract.   
 
7.3.2 Negotiated Procurement 
 
Negotiated procurement is a variation that enables the owner to negotiate directly with prospective, 
pre-qualified firms.  This allows for an open negotiation period during which the owner may share 
one firm’s bid with another firm, and a bargaining process may ensue.  This is also called “bid 
shopping,” and can help increase competition and lower the price of the contract95.   
 
7.4 Contracting Laws 
 
Although many of these qualifications-based selection methods are proven to lead to a quality 
project, few public agencies have such broad contracting authority.  Laws governing contracts have 
generally favored low-bid.  On the face of it, this would seem to be a prudent strategy for a cash-
strapped public agency.  In practice, however, low-bid has often led to mixed results in the absence 
of a thorough qualifications assessment.   
 
7.4.1 Brooks Act of 1972 
 
Congress in 1972 passed the Brooks Act, which prohibits low-bid contracts for design services96.  
Since then, 34 states have enacted similar laws, known as “mini-Brooks Acts.” 
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Unfortunately, the Brooks Act does not extend to construction contracts, which poses problems for 
any type of contract that seeks to combine design and construction.  In government construction 
contracts, the public agency generally must use low-bid selection97.   
 
In D-B, for example, sometimes the public sector agency will first hire a construction firm that will 
serve as the builder half of a D-B team.  When the contract goes to the lowest bidder, the 
construction firm may then be more interested in choosing the least expensive design firm, rather 
than the most qualified.  As a result, the Brooks Act isn’t followed, and D-B may therefore violate 
state and federal laws.  At least one court has found that D-B based on low-bid contracts violates 
their mini-Brooks Act that governs state contracts98.  Legislation has since opened the door for 
limited use of best value on construction contracts.   
 
7.5 Contractor Selection in the U.K. 
 
HM Treasury sought comments from the construction and financial communities in 1993 on how to 
stimulate private sector involvement and innovation99.  The results, published in March 1994, show 
that a number of respondents suggested a two-stage bidding process is one aspect of good practice, 
with a maximum of three or four firms proceeding past the initial qualifications stage100.   
 
The results also suggest that firm governmental commitments to a project are essential for the 
bidder to put forth the most competitive proposal.  If a bidder is skeptical about whether or not the 
project will ever proceed, it may either find it not worth their time and money to bid, or they may 
not put as much effort into the bid proposal.   
 
7.6 Solicited vs. Unsolicited Project Proposals 
 
All of the above contract selection methods assume that the public sector is the entity that decides 
what projects are potentially worthwhile.  But who’s to say that the private sector isn’t capable of, or 
shouldn’t even be allowed to propose projects and contract structures?  
 
Several states have adopted legislation that permits consideration of both solicited and unsolicited 
proposals for projects that use ADSs101.  If the public sector does wish to proceed with a project that 
comes out of an unsolicited proposal, it is under no obligation to contract with that firm which 
submitted the proposal and will likely be required to issue a request for competing proposals.  This 
competition may further lower the price of bids.     
 
There is really no harm in allowing the private sector to submit unsolicited proposals for projects 
that could be delivered utilizing an alternative delivery strategy.  First, the private sector may provide 
some useful “out-of-the-box” thinking with regards to both project proposals and project financing.  
Second, the public sector can get a free quote for what any of these projects might end up costing.  
Finally, projects that are conceived from an unsolicited proposal can, at the very least, be added to 
the list of priorities for a public sector agency to evaluate against its other options. 
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Some say it is disadvantageous to the private sector to offer up unsolicited proposals because the 
public agency that receives the proposal will likely still put the idea out for open bidding102.  
Yescombe (2007) suggests it is not worth the time and effort of the private sector if they will still be 
in competition for the contract, assuming the public sector is receptive to the general framework of 
the unsolicited proposal103. 
 
Even if the proposal is put out for open bidding the private sector entity that came up with the idea 
will be at an advantage in terms of their prospects for winning the contract.  A private sector entity 
is unlikely to put forth an unsolicited proposal if it did not fit its own business model and skill sets.  
 
7.7 Contract Renegotiation 
 
Regardless of what delivery strategy the public sector chooses, there may be unanticipated 
disagreements about contract terms that often lead to costly, non-competitive renegotiations.  Schur 
et al. (2006) note that between 1990-2004, 40% of contracts for infrastructure projects were 
renegotiated104.   
 
Guasch (2004) found pervasive evidence of renegotiations when he analyzed over 1,000 
infrastructure concessions granted in Latin America from 1985-2000105.  Over half of the 
transportation projects, 54.7% (151 concessions of the 276 analyzed), had contracts that eventually 
had substantial changes through renegotiation106.  The average time that elapsed before the first 
renegotiation was slightly over three years107.  In over half of the cases, 57%, it was the operator who 
initiated the renegotiation.  In 27% of the cases it was the government, and in 16% it was both the 
government and the operator108. 
 
Guasch identifies three categories of political factors that could determine concession renegotiation 
and all three tested statistically significant, based on the sample data he used109.  The first was the 
affiliation variable (i.e. having a local operator increases the probability of renegotiation).  The 
second was the country’s level of corruption – the more widespread the corruption, the higher the 
probability of renegotiation.  The third factor was the election cycle, which mostly explains the 
government-led renegotiations. 
 
A challenge for the public sector in contract renegotiation is that those in charge of formulating the 
original contract may move out of their roles eventually, leaving a very weak public agency.  The 
private sector may be the only entity truly paying attention to the contract terms, and will seek to 
exploit the weak agencies through renegotiations.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms expect to 
make most of their profit through change orders and non-competitive renegotiations. 
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In 2006, 82% of the change orders on PFI projects in the U.K. cost £5,000 or less.  Although high-
value changes in excess of £100,000 were relatively uncommon, they accounted for 90% of total 
spending on change orders110:   
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Change Orders in the U.K. in 2006 by Cost 
 
7.8 Contractor Selection Criteria 
 
Whenever a subjective, best value selection method is chosen, the criteria used to evaluate proposals 
become a paramount concern.  In order to retain the integrity of procurement procedures, it is 
important for the public agency to inform the bidders about the selection process that will be used 
and the evaluation criteria that will be applied.  The more specific the public sector can be in its 
Requests for Qualifications (RFQs) and Requests for Proposals (RFPs), the more valuable 
information it will receive in return that can assist in its selection processes.   
 
7.9 Critical Success Factors (CSFs) 
 
Li et al. performed a survey in 2005 of both public and private sector participants in the U.K. to help 
rank the importance of 18 Critical Success Factors, or CSFs, in partnerships.  The following is a 
summary of their results, ordered in terms of total relative importance111: 
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Table 7.2 – Critical Success Factor (CSF) Survey Results 
 
The private sector is relatively indifferent to each of the four CSFs that the public sector ranked as 
most important:  competitive procurement process, good governance, political support, and a well-
organized public agency. 
 
This suggests that the private sector is less concerned about process than it is about content.   In one 
sense that makes sense in a world where traditional D-B-B is still dominant.  As the use of 
alternative delivery strategies continues to grow, it is likely that the process elements begin to be of 
more concern to the private sector.   
 
7.10 Contract Types 
 
Once the public sector has chosen a contracting strategy and criteria for selecting a particular 
contractor to assist in delivery of transportation megaprojects, it must then decide how to pay the 
contract.  There are many ways to structure contract payment, generally differentiated by the level of 
risk the public and private sectors are each willing to assume. 
 
7.10.1  Fixed Fee/Lump Sum Contract 
 
A fixed-fee, or lump sum contract is one in which the contractor agrees to do the specified work for 
a fixed price.  Lump sum works best when both parties are equally knowledgeable about a project112.   
 
These contracts can be problematic for megaprojects utilizing alternative delivery strategies because 
of uncertainty.  The private sector is unlikely to commit to a set price due to the high number of 
interfaces and potential hazards beyond its control.  If, however, a fixed fee can be negotiated for 
subsets of a larger project that can be monetized in isolation, then this contract structure is feasible. 
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A major problem inherent in fixed fee contracts is the lack of incentivization.  If the contractor is 
going to get the same amount of money regardless of its performance, then its goal is to finish the 
job as quickly as possible.  The rush can lead to poor quality.   
 
7.10.2  Unit Price Contract 
 
In a unit price contract, the work to be performed is broken into various parts, usually by trade, and 
a fixed price is established for each unit of work113.  Final price of the project is dependent on the 
quantities of materials used, and their respective unit prices.  In general, this type of contract is best 
suited when both parties can agree on the inputs to a contract but not on their quantities114.  Unit 
price contracts are particularly common in construction, and it is not unusual to combine unit price 
contracts for parts of a project with lump sum contracts for other parts115.  
 
7.10.3  Cost Plus Contract 
 
There are many variations on this contract type, but the basic premise is that the contractor is paid 
for all of its costs, including labor and materials, in addition to some extra fee that serves as their 
profit.  This would otherwise be similar to a unit price contract, but is distinguished based on the 
various incentivization packages116: 
 
• Cost Plus Fixed Percentage – compensation is a percentage of total costs. 
 
• Cost Plus Fixed Fee – compensation is a fixed amount independent of final project costs. 
 
• Cost Plus Fixed Fee with Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) – compensation is again a fixed fee, 
but there is a ceiling attached to the final price.  This transfers risks to the contractor and 
provides an incentive to them to avoid escalating costs.  The GMP acts as a form of 
insurance for the owner. 
 
• Cost Plus Fixed Fee with Bonus – compensation is a fixed fee, but there are also incentives in 
place for the contractor to meet certain objectives.  
 
• Cost Plus Fixed Fee with Guaranteed Maximum Price and Bonus – compensation is a fixed fee 
with an upper limit, though again there is an incentivization structure to reward a positive 
outcome and penalize a negative one.  The GMP is a risk to the contractor, but at least this 
bonus structure may allow the contractor to minimize losses if, say, the project comes in 
over the maximum price but ahead of schedule. 
 
• Cost Plus Fixed Fee with Cost Savings Sharing – compensation is a fixed amount, but the 
contractor can share with the owner a portion of any cost savings.    
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7.10.4  Cost Reimbursement Incentive Contract 
 
This contract structure starts with a negotiated fee, which is later adjusted based on a formula that 
provides bonuses and instills penalties if actual costs differ significantly from targets.  With 
minimum and maximum fees in place, both sides are protected from targets that are drastically 
miscalculated.  The minimum protects the contractor, while the maximum protects the owner. 
 
7.10.5  Present-Value-of-Revenue (PVR) Contract 
 
Present-Value-of-Revenue (PVR) contracts are increasingly common on projects that have dedicated 
revenue sources.  In a PVR contract, the owner sets the discount rate and user fee schedule117.  
Firms bid the present value of the user fee revenue they desire, and the lowest bid wins.  The key 
distinction on PVR contracts is that the contract terminates once the winning firm collects the 
present value of user revenue equal to its winning bid.   
 
When demand is less than expected, the franchise period is longer, while the period is shorter if 
demand is unexpectedly high.  The public agency may put into the contract a clause that allows it to 
buy back the asset at any time if it is willing to pay the difference between the bid price and the 
amount already paid back to the concessionaire118.  This is a sufficient estimate for the residual value 
of the contract, and thus permits the government to decide if and when it wishes to terminate the 
contract without cutting into the private firm’s profit margin119.   
 
There are several benefits to PVR contracts.  First, there is no risk of default; only the risk that the 
concession period lasts longer than expected.  PVR contracts also reduce the likelihood of “bad 
faith” renegotiations, since scenarios with losses for the concessionaire are less likely under PVR120.  
Because contracts are awarded objectively, PVR also invites new bidders that may be skilled at 
project delivery and operations but not at gaming the political system121. 
 
The U.K. has adopted several PVR contracts, including ones on its Queen Elizabeth II and second 
Severn Bridges.  The franchises will last until toll collections pay off the debt issued to finance the 
bridges and are predicted to do so several years before the maximum franchise period.   
 
PVR contracts reduce demand risk for the public sector, but also provide assurances to the operator 
since it is guaranteed a specified return.  The part that is variable, or risky, from the private sector 
perspective is how long it will take to recoup that amount.  Obviously inflation and other factors 
make a shorter contract length quite enticing to the operator.  It is estimated that PVR contracts 
lower the amount of risk premium included in a private sector entity’s bid by up to one-third122. 
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7.11 Shadow Tolls 
 
When the private sector is partially or fully financing the project, it is usually putting a significant 
amount of its investment at risk based on revenues that would come from a transit project or a toll 
road.  User fees are not the only way the private sector can be reimbursed, however.  
  
Under a shadow toll provision, the government repays the private operator a fixed fee for each user 
of the infrastructure, rather than having each individual user pay123.  From the private sector 
contractor’s perspective, this is really no different than if they are paid directly by users.  One of the 
added benefits, however, is that the private operator spends much less on revenue collection.  There 
is no need for toll takers or high-tech license plate-identifying cameras.  Sensors at entrypoints are 
really all that is needed to verify usage, unless the toll varies by distance traveled. 
 
Advocates of shadow tolls claim that the system invites developers to propose desirable highways, 
thereby attracting vehicular traffic and the revenue source required to create a viable project124.  
Shadow tolls may also be more politically palatable.  Even though the road is likely funded through 
taxes, individual users are not imposed a marginal cost for their usage of the facility. 
 
Critics of shadow tolls say that users feel as though the road is a freeway because they pay no tolls, 
which leads to congestion.  Studies prove that throughput is maximized on a highway without 
congestion, so the private party would have an incentive to reduce congestion125.   
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Flow vs. Speed Graph, Indicating Impacts of Congestion 
 
Critics also believe that government will pay more over time with shadow tolls than with user fees 
because of the increased usage of an untolled freeway126.   
 
7.11.1  Shadow Tolls in Use in the U.K. 
 
Shadow tolls had been proposed and rejected by the Department for Transport (DfT) for years, but 
in 1994 Public Transport Minister John Watts suggested that the use of shadow tolls would provide 
the proper incentive for private investment in new roadway construction127.  By 2006, the U.K. 
Highways agency had awarded ten DBFO shadow toll road projects covering 770 km and having a 
construction value of about $2B128. 
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Chapter 8:  Evolution of Alternative Delivery Strategies in 
Transportation 
 
This chapter will supply the historical context that has led to a paradigm shift towards alternative 
delivery strategies in recent decades, both in the U.S and in the U.K.  It will look at U.S. highway 
and rail transit projects, and also the U.K. Private Finance Initiative (PFI) movement. 
 
8.1 Early Use of Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
Alternative delivery strategies date back thousands of years to nearly the beginning of recorded 
history.  The Egyptians used what was then known as the “Master Builder” approach 4500 years ago 
in the construction of the pyramids, and kings worldwide commissioned Master Builders to 
construct palaces129.  It was not until the mid-1800s AD when a distinction was first made between 
design professionals and builders130.  By the late 1800s and early 1900s there began to be a clear 
separation between architects and engineers131.  Throughout the 1900s these professions grew 
enormously with little coordination among them.  As a result, most public works projects were 
delivered through a new strategy in which the design was separate from construction. 
 
8.1.1 Alternative Delivery Strategies Through the 1980s 
 
Limitations on alternative delivery strategies, and on design-build specifically, have resulted largely 
from laws that govern the issuance of contracts.  In fact, there has often been an ebb and flow in 
terms of policy on this issue.  Much of this attributes to the mood of the country during wartime 
and economic depression, as well as subsequent years when public works projects were viewed as a 
way to emerge triumphant from hard times.   
 
The post-WWII construction boom saw the emergence of D-B among a select few federal agencies.  
Some of the early uses of D-B were by the Navy in the 1940s on housing projects during and after 
the War.  NASA and HUD also used D-B on occasion.  Still, only a few federal agencies used D-B 
from the 1960s through the 1980s.  A major hurdle was the fact that Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR) didn’t explicitly allow D-B132.   
 
8.1.2 Growth of Alternative Delivery Strategies Since 1980s 
 
It wasn’t until the 1990s when D-B became a common delivery strategy for the federal sector.  For 
non-residential design and construction projects, D-B and other non-traditional methods of 
procurement went from a 17% market share in the mid-1980s to over half of all projects today133.  
The number is expected to continue to rise. 
 
D-B procurement doubled between 1986-1992, and in 1992 Congress lifted restrictions and 
permitted broader use of D-B134.  The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 explicitly permitted and validated 
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D-B as a federal project method in the FAR.  The growth in D-B has been more precipitous in 
other construction-based sectors than in transportation, but this and other legislation in the early 
1990s also began to bring D-B front and center in transportation as well. 
 
8.1.3 U.S. States with Design-Build Authority 
 
By 2007, 42 states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands had 
proposed, active, or completed design-build transportation projects135.  This authority sometimes, 
but not always extends to transit projects as well136. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 – U.S. States with Design-Build Authority 
 
8.2 Historical U.S Highway Funding 
 
When the first modern highways were built in the 1930s and 1940s, they were constructed as public 
ventures of state and local governments137.  Tolls were preferred in the eastern U.S., while western 
states used revenues from a dedicated gasoline tax to finance untolled “freeways.”   
 
Following World War II, the U.S. witnessed significant automobile growth and population shift 
away from urban metropolises towards the emerging suburbs.  Recognizing that the nation’s 
highway system was inadequate to meet growing demands, President Dwight Eisenhower called for 
passage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, which appropriated $25B to construct 42,000 
miles of interstate highways over a 10-year period138.  The system, built almost entirely as traditional 
design-bid-build, ended up costing $114B and took 35 years to complete, but also achieved 
tremendous success in terms of creating an entirely new nationwide travel network139. 
 
While existing toll roads were grandfathered into the new system, tolls were not allowed on the new 
Interstates.  Instead, a national fuel tax and a vehicle excise tax were paid into a Highway Trust Fund 
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that would pay for 90% of interstate construction costs.  State governments picked up the remaining 
10%140.   
 
With the “90-10 rule,” the construction of toll roads decreased dramatically.  From 1960-1980, only 
about 1,500 miles of toll roads were built in the U.S141.  Some states even removed existing tolls so 
that those roads would become eligible for reconstruction and widening funds142.    
 
The federal fuel tax that is used to fund the majority of the Highway Trust Fund has been increased 
only four times since 1956.  The most recent increase was in 1993 to 18.4 cents per gallon, and since 
then the real dollar value of the gasoline tax has decreased by over 30% due to inflation143.  Net 
revenues supporting the Highway Trust Fund are no longer able to keep pace with growing 
expenditures.   
 
8.2.1 Federal, State, and Local U.S. Government Infrastructure Investment 
Trends 
 
Federal sector infrastructure spending over the past half-century has indeed increased dramatically 
(as demonstrated by the darker line and left axis below), but as a share of total U.S. Federal spending 
it decreased significantly in the 1980s and is now hovering around 3% (as demonstrated by the 
lighter line and right axis below)144:  
   
 
Figure 8.2 – Federal Spending on Infrastructure in Dollars and as a Share of Total Federal Spending, 1956 to 2009 
 
As a share of non-defense spending, federal funding for infrastructure has been about 3.5%-4% 
since the 1980s.  Back in the 1950s and 1960s it was not uncommon for that amount to be well over 
10%145.  Today, the federal government contributes only one-fourth towards the total spending on 
infrastructure in the U.S., with states and localities picking up the other three-quarters146.    
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But whereas the federal government may have done the states a favor by paying for 90 cents of 
every dollar on the Interstate highway infrastructure, it has severely failed states when it comes to 
the operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of these facilities, especially now that much of our 
road and rail infrastructure is approaching the end of its life-cycle.  Federal government expenditures 
on capital have increased steadily, but its O&M contribution has remained flat.  The O&M burden 
has fallen heavily on states and localities147: 
 
            
Figure 8.3 – Federal Spending for Infrastructure Capital and Related Operation and Maintenance, 1956 to 2006 
Figure 8.4 – State and Local Spending for Infrastructure Capital and Related Operation and Maintenance, 1956 to 2004 
 
O&M accounts for two-thirds of total infrastructure spending by states and localities, but only 
slightly more than one-fourth of infrastructure spending by the federal government148.  In fact, when 
federal government O&M infrastructure expenditures is broken down further by infrastructure type, 
it is evident that O&M contributions for “Highways, Roads, and Mass Transit” is minimal, and for 
other Rail investments is non-existent149: 
 
 
Figure 8.5 – Federal Spending on the Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure, by Type, 1956 to 2006 
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It is worth noting that rail was a sizable portion of federal O&M spending from the mid-1970s 
through the late 1980s, peaking in 1981 following a settlement of litigation related to the 
government’s acquisition of the assets of Conrail150.  The federal government’s main priority for 
infrastructure O&M has been in the aviation sector, in an effort to maintain our dated air traffic 
control system151.  
 
8.2.2 U.S Highway Funding Gaps Create Interest in Alternative Delivery 
Strategies 
 
In 1991, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) enabled state highway agencies to use 
federal-aid funds to experiment with innovative contracting techniques for selected projects152.  In 
return, FHWA asked for reports on outcomes, particularly in terms of the ability to save time, 
reduce costs, or improve performance.  Largely as a result of this initiative, design-build in highway 
construction grew in the 1990s153.   
 
 
Figure 8.6 – U.S. Design-Build Highway Projects, 1992 to 2000 
 
Congress took note of these successes and in 1998 explicitly endorsed D-B for its “speed, economy, 
and efficiency154.”  Thereafter, federal aid funding has been allowed to be used for D-B projects 
contracted for by state DOTs, but only if their state and local laws also permit D-B155.  This led to a 
wave of enabling legislation at state and local levels to allow D-B, some of which was done on an 
experimental basis156. 
  
8.2.3 Alternative Delivery Strategies on U.S. Highways in 2000s 
 
The latest federal transportation authorization, SAFETEA-LU, eliminates a $50M floor on the size 
of contracts that can use design-build contracting without special approval.  SAFETEA-LU also 
permits transportation agencies to proceed with certain actions prior to receipt of final National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) approval, on a case-by-case basis.  For example, projects may be 
eligible to issue RFPs, proceed with awards of D-B contracts, and begin preliminary design work 
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before final NEPA approval is granted.  As of 2004, FHWA had approved over 300 D-B 
transportation projects worth nearly $14B157.   
 
8.3 Privatization in the U.S. 
 
A popular trend in the past several years in the U.S. has been the privatization of existing 
transportation assets.  Again, the key difference between a DBFOM and full privatization is that 
ownership is transferred to the private party in the latter.  This has been done at both the city and 
state levels.  These cash-strapped governments are increasingly looking for ways to plug budget gaps 
by selling capital assets with potential revenue streams such as toll roads.  Enter giant private firms 
with both experience in these types of concessions and strong financial footing, and it is easily 
understandable why these sorts of deals are enticing to public sector agencies. 
 
The public sector may retain the right to set toll rates on privatization deals.  But it is often 
advantageous to transfer this political risk so that future toll increases are not be subject to legislative 
votes, the outcome of which may be the equivalent of political suicide.  Besides, the private sector 
concessionaire taking the revenue risk is unlikely to want to leave the toll raising authority in the 
public sector’s hands.    
 
8.3.1 Privatization of New Facilities 
 
When the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 explicitly authorized 
privately financed toll roads in 1991, 130 years had passed since the last one had been built in the 
U.S158159.  Following the passage of this legislation, a select few public agencies have granted private 
concessionaires the rights to DBFOM and own a new, previously non-existent facility.  Two of the 
recent examples of U.S. highway privatizations are the Dulles Greenway in Virginia and the SR-91 
Express Lanes in California, while the Las Vegas Monorail is a recent example of a transit property 
privatization. 
 
8.3.1.1  Dulles Greenway 
 
The Dulles Greenway is a 14.5-mile toll road that runs from Dulles International Airport to 
Leesburg in Virginia160.  The Toll Road Investors Partnership II, comprised of local interests, the 
Italian road operator Autostrade SPA and Kellogg, Brown, and Root, raised $360M in private capital 
to finance the startup161.   
 
The highway opened in September 1995, six months ahead of schedule162.  However, ridership 
forecasts made during the economic boom of the late 1980s proved to be very high, and did not 
anticipate that it would take four years to obtain approvals, complete preliminary design, and 
assemble financing163.  When early ridership was lower than projected, the project went into default 
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in July 1996, within a year of its opening164.  The contract was eventually renegotiated and the term 
extended 20 years165. 
 
Projections had 1995 usage at 34,000 cars per day at a toll rate of $1.50166.  Initial usage ended up 
only being 10,500 cars per day, partly because public pressure led the state of Virginia to widen 
Route 7; a nearly parallel, untolled alternative167.  To increase ridership tolls were lowered from an 
initial $1.75 to $1.00168.  While trips increased, this had a marginal impact on revenues169.  Usage did 
gradually increase over the six-year period following to 60,000 cars per day in 2001170.   
 
The partnership’s losses have been about $30M per year171.  Engel contends that the concessionaire 
will still make money in the end, but that it will take closer to 25 years than the anticipated 12 years 
to become profitable172.   
 
8.3.1.2  SR-91 
 
Opened in 1995, the SR-91 Express Lanes project is a 10-mile, 4-lane, fully automated toll road 
running in the median of the existing 8-lane SR-91 freeway in southern California173.  Vehicles with 
fewer than three occupants have a choice to drive in the untolled lanes or pay a variable rate, as high 
as $9.55, to drive congestion-free in the Express Lanes174175.  Before the Express Lanes opened, the 
original untolled freeway carried 230,000 vehicles per day, and was congested more than four hours 
per day in each direction176.   
 
The developer and original operator of the project was the California Private Transportation 
Company (CPTC); a limited partnership that included the construction firm Kiewit, French toll road 
company Cofiroute, and Granite Construction177.  CPTC was granted a 35-year concession178.  Initial 
private financing amounted to $125M, though only $20M was CPTC’s capital179. 
 
The contract did not regulate toll rates, but it did stipulate that the operator could not earn a return 
in excess of 17%180.  To ensure that traffic flow remained fluid, tolls were raised four times in the 
first three years of the project181.  Volume on SR-91 increased steadily from 7.3M trips in 1999 to 
9.5M trips in 2002, while annual revenue grew over the same time from $19.5M to $29M182.   
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The agreement included a non-compete clause which restricted improvements to the freeway or 
nearby roads until 2035, except for safety reasons183184.  With no allowance for additional capacity, 
SR-91 and adjacent highways became even more congested.  The California Department of 
Transportation (Caltrans) “essentially decided to ignore the non-compete clause” and tried to 
expand capacity in 1999, claiming that safety was an issue185.  CPTC won a lawsuit against Caltrans 
when it was determined there was no critical safety issue present186.  Other lawsuits and legislative 
attempts to void the non-compete clause also failed.   
 
In 2002, the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) finally reached an agreement with 
CPTC to purchase SR-91 for $207.5M187.  The ultimate sale back to the government was portrayed 
as a win-win for both sides, though the legal and negotiation costs stemming from the four-year 
stalemate were substantial188. 
 
8.3.1.3  Las Vegas Monorail 
 
The Las Vegas Monorail is the only fixed guideway project since the 1920s with financing based in 
large part on projected farebox revenues and the private sector solely responsible for project risks189.  
This $640M, four-mile, seven-station transit system was developed by a group of local casinos to 
provide transit links between their properties190.  Project financing was raised using tax-exempt 
revenue bonds. 
 
The developer signed a 15-year, $340M contract with the Las Vegas Monorail Company, a 
consortium led by Granite Construction and Bombardier191.  Project revenues are required to first 
account for O&M costs before paying down debt service192.  The O&M agreement also contains 
significant financial penalties for failure of the operator to meet specified performance standards193.   
 
The system opened in July 2004 with an expected daily ridership of 50,000 passengers per day, but 
actual ridership was closer to 30,000194.  Operations were halted that September due to the loss of a 
guide wheel on one of the monorail cars.  When service resumed in mid-2005 ridership decreased 
significantly, and the Monorail has had difficulty attracting riders ever since. 
 
8.3.2 Privatization of Existing Facilities 
 
Cash-hungry states and localities are looking more and more at privatizing existing facilities.  These 
contracts bring with them a large infusion of funds that can be helpful in the short-term, but may 
end up costing more in the long-term.  The most cited examples in the U.S. are the Chicago Skyway 
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and Indiana Toll Road, as well as the Pennsylvania Turnpike as an example of a privatization deal 
that has initially fallen through. 
 
8.3.2.1  Chicago Skyway 
 
In 2005, the city of Chicago put out for bid the ownership for 99 years of a 7.8-mile stretch of I-90 
known as the Chicago Skyway, which until then was generating $45M in annual toll revenues.  The 
Skyway is the main link from Chicago to the southeast.  It stretches from the Indiana state line to 
the merger with I-94 just south of Downtown195.   
 
            
Figure 8.7 – Chicago Skyway Map 
 
The bidding generated a lot of attention and attracted ten initial expressions of interest196.  Five of 
those consortia were eliminated from bidding on the grounds that they lacked the financial capacity 
or the experience in operating a tollway197.  This left five bidders, each of which were provided 
information about the Skyway's rocky financial history and its vintage engineering and traffic 
history198. 
 
The concession went to a Skyway Concession Company (SCC), a joint venture between Macquarie 
Infrastructure Group and Cintra, for $1.83B.  This bid stunned the U.S. financial markets, as it was 
more than $1B higher than the second-highest bidder199.  SCC will be responsible operations and 
maintenance, but has the right to all collected revenue, subject to toll increases stipulated in the 
contract.  Maintenance, snow clearing and policing continue to be performed by the city and SCC 
billed at cost.   
 
There are no non-compete clauses in the contract, meaning the state has the right to do any 
transportation upgrades in the vicinity of the Skyway that may impact the Skyway’s revenues, though 
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new expansion is unlikely given the urban density in the area200.  Parallel highways are undergoing 
significant congestion mitigation efforts, however, that could impact the Skyway’s usage201.   
 
Public opinion was mixed, particularly as it pertains to toll rates.  Prior to the concession, the toll on 
the Skyway was $2 and hadn’t been raised in 12 years.  Immediately following the privatization the 
toll increased to $2.50 as determined in the contract.  Arguably, the Skyway was due for a toll 
increase anyway. 
 
Tolls were required to stay at $2.50 until 2008, when they went up to $3.00.  Tolls will rise to $3.50 
in 2011, $4.00 in 2013, $4.50 in 2015, and $5.00 starting in 2017202.  After 2017, toll increases will be 
the greater of 2% per year or the rate of inflation. 
 
8.3.2.1.1  Chicago Skyway Benefits 
 
The benefits of the massive financial intake to the city of Chicago as a result of the $1.83B Skyway 
concession were felt immediately203.  In a very short period of time, Chicago accomplished three 
major goals204: 
 
1. Debt repayment.  Chicago spent over $800M to pay down debt, $463M of which was 
related to the Skyway itself205.   
 
2. Rainy Day Fund.  $500M has been placed in a savings account that is currently bearing 
interest and will be available should the City fall into further financial peril. 
 
3. Bond rating enhancement.  Chicago has been able to improve its bond rating significantly, 
which will attract investment for future capital projects.  Soon after the deal was struck, 
Moody’s raised the city’s bond rating to its highest in 25 years.   
 
8.3.2.2 Indiana Toll Road 
 
The Indiana Toll Road (ITR) concession of 2006 is a very similarly structured deal for a roadway 
with characteristics much different than the Chicago Skyway.  Whereas the Skyway was a fixed-price 
eight-mile toll road with few interchanges spaced approximately one mile apart, the ITR is a 
distance-based toll road that is 157 miles long and has 20 interchanges spaced several miles apart.  
The ITR is the name for the I-90/I-80 east-west roadway that traverses the entire state of Indiana. 
 
As in the Skyway case, the concession went to Macquarie and Cintra, this time for $3.8B and 75 
years.  Their joint venture is known as the Indiana Toll Road Concession Company (ITRCC).  
Cintra and Macquarie each put up $374M of their own money, together with loans issued by a 
consortium of seven European banks in the amount of $3.25B206. 
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The toll to drive the ITR from end-to-end is $8 for cash-paying customers.  Indiana, like Chicago, 
hadn’t raised tolls in many years.  It had been 23 years since the last toll increase in Indiana207.  The 
way this contract is structured, an immediate increase of 70% went into effect.  The ITR annual 
revenue was slightly less than $100M per year as of early 2006, and following the toll increases and 
transfer in ownership is now generating over $160M per year208209.  There is a non-compete clause 
that extends for a ten-mile buffer around the ITR210. 
 
Proceeds from the $3.8B operating lease will be used to repair and rebuild highways across the 
state211.  There is about $794M to fund local transportation improvement projects in each county of 
the state, and nearly $500M will fund additional transportation upgrades in communities adjacent to 
the Toll Road corridor212.   
 
Opponents argued that tolls should be eliminated altogether since they led to excess congestion on 
the untolled alternatives, particularly at the more densely-populated western end of the route.  It is 
widely held, however, that this toll increase, or one similar, would have gone into effect around this 
time regardless of whether or not the road was privatized.  These current tolls are frozen until 2010, 
and then will be raised by an inflation-indexed formula thereafter.   
 
8.3.2.2.1  Indiana Toll Road Benefits 
 
The money the state received from the deal has been put towards its ten-year transportation plan213.  
As a result state highway spending will quadruple by 2015214.  Meanwhile, the money is earning 
$185,000 per day in interest215.  The state’s bond rating is now AAA, the highest in state history.  
The state also immediately paid off $300M in debt that it had on the ITR216. 
 
As part of the agreement, the ITRCC is implementing $770M worth of upgrades to the ITR217.  The 
upgrades include an extra lane in each direction for 21 miles from the Illinois state line to the I-80/I-
94 interchange, the reconstruction of existing pavement and bridge structures, and implementation 
of electronic toll collection218.  With the possible exception of the electronic toll collection, these 
upgrades likely would not have been possible had the state been continuing to own and operate the 
tollway itself.   
 
Since the Indiana Toll Road concession went into effect, several states have been considering 
privatization for their toll roads including Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.  
Pennsylvania was very close to signing an extremely lucrative privatization contract in 2008.   
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The debate in Massachusetts over the possible privatization of the Massachusetts Turnpike (Mass 
Pike) is still in its preliminary stages.  There is an especially forceful political backlash there for toll 
increases.  This stems largely from the fact that Mass Pike revenues go towards paying down Big Dig 
debt, even though many of the Pike’s drivers rarely utilize the Big Dig.  Toll payers argue rightly that 
this is inequitable.   
 
8.3.2.3 Pennsylvania Turnpike 
 
The main section of the Pennsylvania Turnpike is a 359-mile east-west tollway through Pennsylvania 
with 30 tolled interchanges and 18 service plazas.  There is a proposed privatization that has been 
held up by financial and legislative concerns.  Operating the Pennsylvania Turnpike also poses 
engineering challenges because of its four separate tunnels running through the Appalachian 
Mountains.  In 2006 the Turnpike generated $607M in revenues, with payments nearly split evenly 
between cars and trucks. 
  
The state spent over $100M scoping, planning, and evaluating the feasibility of a privatization deal 
for the Turnpike219.  In May 2008, a team including Citi and Abertis was preliminarily selected as the 
concessionaire in a 75-year lease of the Turnpike for $12.8B.  The three bidders for the Turnpike 
secured debt and equity totaling over $30B220. 
 
The lease would have allowed the state to cap toll increases to inflation, following an initial 25% rate 
hike.  The state planned to retain the right to set standards for maintenance and operations, detail 
the capital program, and see that the new operators abide by the labor agreements with the 
unionized workforce of the Turnpike Commission221.  The Turnpike Commission itself was highly 
against the deal, as it would have rendered the now quasi-governmental agency obsolete.   
 
Despite strong support from Governor Ed Rendell, the proposed lease faced approval from a 
skeptical state legislature.  The Citi/Abertis team extended its bid through September 2008, but the 
state legislature had yet to approve any such deal222.  This coincided with the late-2008 credit crunch 
and economic recession, and the Citi/Abertis team received word that the value of the concession 
was now around $11B, and even that may have been optimistic223.  For now, at least, the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike concession proposal is on hold.   
 
8.4 U.S. Rail Transit Funding 
 
The mass transit equivalent of the Federal Aid Highway Act was the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act of 1964 (UMTA), which shifted the policymaking for public transportation from local and state 
regulation to the federal government224.  This was particularly inauspicious timing for any mass 
transit boom in America considering automobile proliferation and the resulting suburban sprawl had 
become dominant.   
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Between 1970 and 1980, federal aid to transit increased 16-fold, from $230M to $3.9B, but ridership 
only increased 18%225.  Massive subsidies were required to keep our nation’s mass transit systems 
afloat.  The overall financial deficit of the transit sector went from $90M in 1968 to $7.8B in 1980, 
and by then the average transit operation could recover only 41% of its operating expenses through 
farebox revenues226.  Generous wage settlements led to transit operating expenses growing more 
than twice as fast as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 227.   
 
The President Ronald Reagan administration viewed federal transit aid as one of the many big 
government programs that was the problem and not the solution.  The following chart shows the 
drastic increase in government funding for highways in the U.S. since the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956, and the nominal increase in transit funding that has always lagged well behind228:  
 
 
Figure 8.8 – Cumulative Government Capital Investment in Transit and Highways since 1956 (in 2006 Dollars) 
 
A reduction in federal transit spending did convince transit’s state and local partners to increase their 
own transit subsidies significantly.  Federal transit spending dropped from $3.9B in 1982 to $3.6B in 
1992, while state and local spending rose from $7.4B to $18.4B in the same period229.  The following 
two charts from Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) show this increased federal transit commitment in 
the 1970s and then the growth of state commitment in the 1980s and 1990s230: 
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Table 8.1 – Transit Spending and Funding Sources, 1950-1999 (in 2002 dollars) 
Table 8.2 – Sources of Transit Revenues, 1950-1999 
 
8.4.1 Alternative Delivery Strategies and Rail Transit 
 
In the face of increasing funding demands and a lack of support from President Reagan in the 
1980s, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched several research and technical assistance 
initiatives to improve management of capital projects, reduce their costs and, perhaps most 
importantly, explore non-traditional funding sources.   
 
The initial transit forays in alternative delivery strategies were Automated Guideway Transit (AGT) 
systems in airports and theme parks, and expanded to people mover systems in places like Miami 
and Detroit231.   
 
Plans for two extensive projects soon followed:  full, urban fixed guideway systems in Honolulu and 
Houston232.  Though a lack of political consensus kept these latter two projects from ever being 
constructed, they are still notable for establishing a procurement strategy that included innovative 
financing, joint development, advanced technology applications, and contractor-supplied operations 
and maintenance.   
 
8.4.1.1 Turnkey Demonstration Program 
 
ISTEA in 1991 included provisions for a Turnkey Demonstration Program to “foster advanced 
technology and the introduction of delivery mechanisms that decrease the developmental costs of 
new transit systems233.”  The turnkey system was defined by Congress as “a project under which a 
recipient contracts with a consortium of firms, individual firms, or a vendor to build a transit system 
that meets specific performance criteria and which is operated by the vendor for a period of time234.”   
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The term “turnkey” is used because, theoretically, once the contract with the vendor is over the 
public sector takes back the asset and simply has to “turn the key” to keep the system functioning.  
To be precise, DBOM is often referred to as “Full Turnkey,” D-B as “Modified Turnkey,” and 
when private financing is included in the final bid the procurement may be described as “Super 
Turnkey235.”  
 
FTA received 17 letters of interest to participate in the program, from which eleven were invited to 
submit formal requests to participate.  Ten formal proposals were submitted, and in April 1993 four 
projects were selected to participate: 
 
• Baltimore Central Light Rail Transit (LRT) Phase II Extension; 
 
• Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) SFO Airport Extension; 
 
• Los Angeles El Segundo Del Norte Green Line Station; and 
 
• San Juan Tren Urbano Heavy Rail System. 
 
The L.A. selection was subsequently changed to the Union Station Gateway Project and a fifth 
demonstration project, New Jersey Transit’s Hudson-Bergen LRT system, was added in 1995. 
 
8.4.1.1.1 Successes of Turnkey Demonstration Program 
 
As with most pilot programs, the Turnkey Demonstration Program had its share of both 
achievements and lessons learned.  The following is a list of some of the successes of the program: 
 
1. Reduction in the number of contracts.  The Baltimore LRT Phase I expansion, using 
traditional delivery, required 37 contracts, compared to 3 contracts under the Phase II 
expansion done via Turnkey.  Similarly, the SFO BART extension needed 7 contracts 
compared to 49 contracts for similarly-priced East Bay extensions. 
 
2. Lower cost per track mile for both heavy rail and light rail projects236. 
 
3. Reduction in soft costs, including design, project management, insurance, and financing.  
This is partly attributable to the fewer number of contracts237.   
 
4. Flexibility in recovering schedules or budgets in response to unforeseen circumstances or 
changes in market conditions238.  For example, the Los Angeles Gateway Terminal 
Project was completed on-time and under budget despite: 
 
a) The Northridge earthquake of 1994 that necessitated re-welding of the building’s 
steel frame; 
 
b) The floods which followed shortly thereafter; and 
 
c) Administrative changes that merged two transit authorities into one. 
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5. Time savings by being able to conduct procurement in parallel with completion of the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS).  In the Hudson-Bergen project, the 
timing worked out such that notice to proceed to the turnkey contractor coincided with 
the FEIS Record of Decision (ROD).  In the Puerto Rico Tren Urbano project, the time 
lapse was only six months between ROD and notice to proceed with the turnkey 
contractor239. 
 
8.4.1.1.2 Lessons Learned From the Turnkey Demonstration Program: 
 
Some Turnkey projects had their fair share of problems.  Among the lessons learned from the 
Program are240: 
 
1. Turnkey failed to significantly reduce administrative burden of the owner. 
 
2. There was no shift of administrative costs and responsibility to Turnkey contractors. 
 
3. Excessive reliability on subcontractors led to inferior designs241.  On the first phase of 
the Hudson-Bergen LRT – the phase constructed as part of Turnkey – the D-B 
consortium subcontracted out for the design and the results were not stellar.  On the 
later Phase II, the D-B team did the design itself, and was more responsive to civil and 
systems needs, which achieved a better product more easily.   
 
8.4.1.1.3 Turnkey Project Comparisons 
 
One of the strengths of these five particular projects having been chosen for the Turnkey 
Demonstration Program is that a parallel comparison can be performed between these projects and 
similar projects previously or concurrently constructed in those locations. 
 
In Baltimore, the Phase II D-B project that was completed under Turnkey came in at $11M per 
route-mile, which was a full $2M less than the Phase I of the system, built as a traditional design-bid-
build procurement five years earlier242.  These amounts are both expressed in year 2000 dollars and 
represent a cost savings per route-mile of 18%243.    
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Maryland MTA Central Light Rail Line Comparison of Phases I and II 
 Phase I:  Design-Bid-Build Phase 2:  Design-Build 
Total Project Value $360.4M (1991$) $106.5M (1996$) 
Alignment Length 22.5 miles 7.5 miles 
Cost per Route-mile $13.0M (2000$) $11.0M (2000$) 
Number of Contracts 39 5 
Average Contract Value $5.9M $21.3M 
Schedule Duration 5 years 3 years 
Change Orders/Claims >260 26 
Total Value $124.8M $3.4M 
Average Value $478,000  $131,000  
Table 8.3 – Maryland MTA LRT D-B-B vs. D-B Comparison 
Note:  Measured in route-miles per year, Phase I was 4.5 miles per year and only 2.5 miles per year for Phase II, but FTA notes that the 
slowdown occurred because of exogenous factors related to right-of-way acquisition issues and interfaces with parallel projects.  
 
In San Francisco, a BART extension to the East Bay and to Colma were completed concurrently 
with the San Francisco International Airport (SFO) extension that was part of the Turnkey 
Program244.  The design-bid-build East Bay and Colma extensions had the same project cost and a 
longer alignment, meaning a lower cost per route-mile.  However, this is partly attributable to the 
increased difficulty in construction of the SFO extension.  Despite these increased difficulties, 
measured in route-miles per year the airport extension was completed 4% faster than the traditional 
projects245.   
 
San Francisco BART Airport Extension Compared to East Bay and Colma Extensions 
 
East Bay and Colma Extensions:  
Design-Bid Build 
SFO Airport Extension:  
Design-Build 
Total Project Value $1.5B (2000$) $1.5B (2000$) 
Alignment Length 11.8 miles 8.2 miles 
Cost per Route-mile $129.7M $184.5M 
Number of Contracts 37 6 
Average Contract Value $41.4M $252.2M 
Schedule Duration 6 years 4 years 
Table 8.4 – San Francisco BART D-B-B vs. D-B Comparison 
 
On the Hudson-Bergen LRT project, a cost estimate was created for both the traditional design-bid-
build and the Turnkey design-build options.  Design-build provided a savings of $265M, or 30%, 
over the cost estimate of the traditional option246.  D-B was also slated to save half the amount of 
time, but key issues arose after the D-B contract was underway related to the right-of-way (ROW) 
not being fully available that slowed the environmental and permitting processes and led to changes 
in the alignment.  These delays, of course, would have also added time to the design-bid-build 
projection.  However, under traditional D-B-B, this would have led to a non-competitive contract 
renegotiation, under which the contractor could stand to gain more than under the D-B model that 
had already locked in the contract terms247.   
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Hudson-Bergen Initial Operating System Comparison of Design-Build Estimates to Original 
Design-Bid-Build Estimates 
 Design-Bid-Build Design-Build 
Total Project Value $877M (1999$) $612M (1999$) 
Alignment Length 9.5 miles 9.5 miles 
Cost per Route-mile $92.3M (1999$) $64.4M (1999$) 
Number of Contracts ~60 3 
Average Contract Value $14.6M $193.0M 
Schedule Duration 8-10 years 4-5 years 
Change Orders/Claims ~250 ~5 
Total Value $80M $11.0M 
Average Value $320,000  $2,200,000  
Table 8.5 – Hudson-Bergen LRT D-B-B vs. D-B Comparison 
 
The FTA’s interim report on Turnkey confirms that many cost overruns on these projects were not 
related to D-B248.   
 
8.4.2 FTA New Starts Program 
 
Since the 1990s, the FTA New Starts program has been the federal government’s primary financial 
resource for locally-planned, implemented, and operated transit guideway capital investments.   
 
The goal of any project being proposed through the New Starts program is to obtain what is known 
as a Full Funding Grant Agreement (FFGA).  An FFGA is the federal government's commitment to 
support a transit project over the course of several fiscal years, up to a maximum amount, 
contingent upon the availability of funds.  As funds are appropriated, the full funding projects 
receive priority consideration.   
 
8.4.2.1 Funding Levels Under New Starts 
 
Under New Starts, 80% of a project’s capital cost can be covered, and in some unique cases 
Congress has authorized a full 100% share249.  In practice, however, the average New Starts project 
receives about half of its funding from the program.  The share has averaged around 50% over the 
last ten years and has been trending lower due to increasing demand250.  
  
8.4.2.2 Growth of New Starts since 1990s 
 
Before passage of ISTEA, there were fewer than ten New Starts projects being implemented 
through active FFGAs251.  ISTEA broadened the criteria that FTA uses to evaluate projects, perhaps 
leading more sponsors to believe that they might successfully pursue New Starts funding252.  
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By 2001, FTA had entered into 32 FFGAs for New Starts projects under ISTEA and its successor, 
TEA-21, with a total federal commitment for these 32 projects of $10.1B253.  The total number of 
projects with existing, pending, and proposed FFGAs grew from 26 in 1994 to 68 in early 2001254. 
 
SAFETEA-LU authorized $6.6B for New Starts through fiscal year (FY) 2009255.  It also created 
new categories for New Starts known as Small Starts and Very Small Starts, intended to provide 
funding for much smaller projects such as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT).   
 
Funding for New Starts has never been higher, but neither has the demand for such funding.  
SAFETEA-LU includes funding for over 330 projects that have proposed, pending, or existing 
FFGAs256. 
 
8.4.2.3 Environmental Issues Under New Starts 
 
Under NEPA, until the record of decision (ROD) is issued on the EIS, the public sector cannot do 
anything that would “limit choice of reasonable alternatives257.”  Unless a special exception applies, 
agencies are precluded from acquiring right-of-way, proceeding to final design, and applying for an 
FFGA, until issuance of a ROD.   
 
8.4.2.4 New Starts Hurdles to Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
FTA’s process for evaluating projects under its New Starts program does not bode well for fast-
tracking and innovative project delivery such as D-B.  In practice, significant design detail is required 
to satisfy FTA’s requirements prior to execution of an FFGA.  State agencies have noted that there 
have been proposals requiring as much as 80% design258.  With D-B the design is generally 
developed to a maximum of about 30% before issuing the D-B contract259.   
 
Considering that FFGAs are the primary source of FTA funding for large capital transit projects, it 
is clear that there is a need to modernize the New Starts program.  This is an issue that will hopefully 
be addressed administratively in the reauthorization of SAFETEA-LU.     
 
8.4.3  Alternative Delivery Strategies in Rail Transit post-Turnkey 
 
These hurdles have not fully prevented ADSs under New Starts.  Since 2000, New Starts transit 
projects that have been procured using D-B include260: 
 
• Denver RTD Southeast Corridor LRT; 
 
• South Florida Commuter Rail Upgrades; 
                                                 
253 Ibid, 1. 
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255 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Introduction to New Starts.”   
256 Ibid. 
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• Minneapolis Hiawatha LRT; 
 
• NJ Transit Hudson-Bergen LRT Phase II; and 
 
• Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Largo Metrorail Extension. 
 
In total, 28% of the costs of major transit capital projects approved under the FTA New Starts 
program have been, or are being delivered as alternative delivery strategies since 2000261. 
 
In addition, two non-New Starts fixed guideway projects funded in part by federally-approved 
airport Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) have been delivered using D-B262:  
 
• Portland MAX Airport Extension; and 
 
• JFK Airtrain. 
 
A number of local transit agencies have also used D-B since the FTA Turnkey program.  Los 
Angeles did traditional D-B-B for most of its metro, but after its Pasadena extension was transferred 
from the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) to the Pasadena 
Light Rail Authority, the new authority elected D-B263.  The new authority felt that D-B would help 
remedy a number of the major problems that plagued LACMTA, including major cost overruns 
from both owner-directed and contractor-requested change orders264.  The Authority also 
appreciated D-B’s single point of responsibility for project development and ability to accelerate the 
project schedule to help reduce the final cost of this project that had been held up for years265.  
 
8.4.3.1 North American Rail Projects Using Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
North American rail projects that have utilized alternative delivery strategies have ranged in size and 
scope from relatively small, at-grade light rail extensions with minimal disruption, to much larger 
heavy rail projects that involved significant tunneling, risk, and environmental remediation.  A 
summation chart for projects with capital costs over $100M follows.  Short synopses of all of these 
projects may be found in Appendix A.   
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Project 
Cost  
($ million) 
Project 
Type 
Procurement 
Method* 
On-
time? 
Under 
Budget? 
Alameda Freight Corridor $2,500 Heavy D-B-B & D-B Y Y 
Puerto Rico Tren Urbano $2,250 Heavy D-B & DBOM N N 
NJ Hudson-Bergen LRT 
Phases 1 & 2 $2,200 Light DBOM Y Y 
New York City JFK 
Airport Airtrain $1,900 Light 
D-B-B & 
DBOM N Y 
Denver Transportation 
Expansion (T-REX) $1,620 Light D-B Y Y 
San Francisco BART SFO 
Extension $1,500 Heavy D-B & D-B-B N N 
Vancouver Skytrain 
Canada Line $1,410 Light DBFOM Y# Y# 
NJ Transit RiverLine $998 Light DBOM N N 
L.A. Metro Gold Line 
Eastside Extension $900 Heavy D-B-B & D-B Y# Y# 
Minneapolis Hiawatha 
LRT $680 Light D-B & D-B-B Y Y 
Las Vegas Monorail $650 Light DBFOM N Y 
Washington, DC Blue Line 
Extension  $610 Heavy D-B & D-B-B Y Y 
Greenbush Commuter Rail $512 Commuter D-B N N 
South Florida Commuter 
Rail Upgrades $240 Commuter D-B Y Y 
Portland MAX LRT 
Airport Extension $125 Light DBFOM Y Y 
Baltimore LRT Extension $110 Light D-B Y Y 
Table 8.6 – North American Rail Transit Projects Utilizing Alternative Delivery Strategies 
* When more than one contract type was used, the predominant one is listed first 
# Anticipated 
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Figure 8.9 – Map of North American Rail Transit Projects Utilizing Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
8.4.3.1.1  Delivery Partners on North American Rail Projects  
 
Evidence on delivery partners from North American rail projects utilizing alternative delivery 
strategies is mixed.  Slightly less than half of these 16 U.S. and Canadian projects used a designated 
delivery partner.  
 
Delivery Partner No Delivery Partner 
Alameda Corridor Vancouver Canada Line 
Tren Urbano Denver T-REX 
NJ Hudson-Bergen LRT San Francisco BART SFO Extension 
JFK Airtrain NJ Transit RiverLine 
Las Vegas Monorail L.A. Metro Gold Line 
Washington, DC Blue Line Extension Minneapolis Hiawatha LRT 
Portland MAX LRT Airport Extension Greenbush Commuter Rail 
 South Florida Commuter Rail Upgrade 
 Baltimore LRT 
Table 8.7 – North American Use of Delivery Partners in Rail Megaprojects  
 
Most significant is the fact that each of the four largest projects in terms of final capital costs – 
Alameda Corridor, Tren Urbano, Hudson-Bergen LRT, and the JFK Airtrain – had a delivery 
partner.  The U.S. and Canadian cases suggest that delivery partners can be beneficial, and perhaps 
necessary, on megaprojects with many direct interfaces, like Crossrail.   
 
Among those seven projects to use a delivery partner are three of the six projects that were delivered 
late and one of the four that was over budget.  This evidence is inconclusive to suggest any causal 
relationship.  Although the inclusion of a delivery partner is intended to help streamline 
procurement and ideally expedite a project’s completion, it also adds another layer of personnel and 
potential bureaucratic hurdles.  Those agencies that have hired delivery partners, however, often find 
that the added expense yields better results.   
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The following is a synopsis of delivery partner structures from the North American cases: 
 
Alameda Corridor:  The Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (ACTA) created the Alameda 
Corridor Engineering Team (ACET) as the lead program manager.  ACET was a joint venture of 
four firms:  DMJM Harris; Moffatt & Nichol Engineers; Jenkins/Gales & Martinez; and 
TELACU266267. 
 
Tren Urbano:  The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) moved into project 
implementation in 1994 by contracting with a General Management and Architectural/Engineering 
Consultant (GMAEC) to complete the environmental process, develop a 30% design, and manage 
the bidding and the final design and construction.  The GMAEC was led by DMJM Harris, along 
with two local firms and 22 subcontractors268. 
 
NJ Hudson-Bergen LRT:  Project advisors included Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB), Booz Allen Hamilton, 
and Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott, LLP269.  NJ Transit awarded a $1M contract to Booz Allen 
Hamilton for consulting services.  Nossaman was retained by NJ Transit to assist in structuring 
procurement and contract documents.  PB's role in the project was to serve as the general design 
consultant.  PB developed the preliminary design and bid documents, and served as an extension of 
NJ Transit staff throughout construction270271272273. 
 
JFK Airtrain:  Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) provided conceptual and general engineering consultant 
services.  PB prepared the RFQ and RFP documents for the DBOM contract, assisted the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) in managing the procurement, and supported 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) EIS process.274 
 
Las Vegas Monorail:  The Las Vegas Monorail Company (LVMC) entered into a management 
contract with Transit Systems Management – a joint venture (JV) of Bombardier Transit and 
Granite Construction – for the DBOM275.  Project Advisors included Booz Allen/G.C. Wallace, 
Public Resources Advisory Group, Orrick Harrington, Broadbent & Walker, Nossaman, Guthner, 
Knox & Elliott, LLP, Public Financial Management Consultants, URS Greiner, Carter & Burgess, 
Stradling Yocca Carlson Rauth, and Wilbur Smith276277278. 
 
Washington, DC, Blue Line Extension:  WMATA completed the preliminary engineering for the project 
and prepared the bid documents in conjunction with Capital Transit Consultants (CTC).  AECOM 
was a senior partner in CTC, a JV providing a full array of planning, engineering & construction 
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278 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  “PPP Case Studies:  Las Vegas Monorail.”   
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services to WMATA279.  WMATA performed “over the shoulder” reviews of the major structural 
elements of the project while the design was being advanced.  The WMATA reviews helped to 
identify potential design issues early in the process so that the design team could address the issues 
prior to making actual design submittals.  The rapid resolution of these issues allowed the design 
team to immediately begin advancing the design while addressing the changes required by the review 
comments280. 
 
Portland MAX LRT Airport Extension:  Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB) provided program management 
support to the Port of Portland for the $500M airport capital improvement program, which included 
the 5.5-mile Portland MAX LRT extension281282. 
 
8.4.3.2 FTA PPP Pilot Program (Penta-P) 
 
In January 2007 FTA outlined a new pilot program known as Penta-P, which was authorized by the 
2005 SAFETEA-LU federal transportation bill.  The pilot program is intended to allow U.S. DOT 
to study whether, in comparison to conventional procurements, DBFOMs achieve benefits in terms 
of risk, delivery acceleration, improved cost reliability, and project performance.  It is important to 
note that a project is eligible to be part of Penta-P only if state and local laws permit non-
conventional procurement for all stages of delivery283.    
 
As of March 2008, three Penta-P projects had been selected: 
 
• Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Oakland Airport (OAK) Connector; 
 
• Houston METRO LRT and bus rapid transit (BRT); and 
 
• Denver Gold Line LRT and East Corridor LRT. 
 
8.4.3.2.1  BART OAK Connector 
 
The BART OAK connector Penta-P project provides a look at how planned projects have suffered 
as a result of the economic recession that began in 2008284.  The project calls for a driverless, 
automated people mover to close a 3.2-mile gap between the airport terminal and the nearest BART 
station.  Currently that trip is served by the AirBART bus route with 20-30 minute headways285.    
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Figure 8.10 – BART OAK Connector Map 
  
The capital cost of the project is $380M.  A combination of local bridge tolls, a county sales tax, and 
a contribution from the Port of Oakland were expected to provide $260M, leaving the project 
$120M short. 
 
In 2004-2005 the Oakland International Airport (OAK) was experiencing tremendous growth.  Two 
of the nation’s largest “low-cost” carriers, Southwest and Jetblue, had set up hubs there, and OAK 
came to be a viable alternative to the San Francisco International Airport (SFO) across the Bay and 
Mineta San Jose International Airport south of the Bay.  OAK captured 48.5% of the market share 
in the Bay Area in 2004286.   Revenue projections were quite strong given the airport’s recent growth.   
 
BART hired its own financial advisor, Ernst & Young, to perform a revenue analysis, and based on 
expected growth it was believed that if the current $3 fare on the AirBART bus was increased to $5-
$6 for the new people mover then revenues could fund all of the operations and even some of the 
capital costs.   
 
This environment was enticing to the private sector, and as such BART investigated DBFOM 
options in 2004-2005.  BART first drafted a concession to procure the people mover system along 
with a 35-year operations and maintenance contract.  The following table shows the key 
components of the risk allocation in the original RFP287: 
 
 
Table 8.8 – BART OAK Connector Risk Allocation 
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As the table demonstrates, both the concessionaire and BART were to put up $190M up-front for 
capital costs.  The concessionaire is responsible for all capital reinvestment and refurbishment costs 
over the life of the 35-year contract, and the concessionaire is repaid its capital investment almost 
exclusively based on its performance.  BART estimated that it could afford approximately $18M in 
annual payments, of which about $11M was to go to pay back capital costs and $7M to fund O&M.  
BART insisted that the concessionaire assume a 10% risk for ridership.  The prospective bidders 
balked at the notion of being held even slightly liable for ridership given that they had virtually no 
control over ridership and didn’t trust the ridership projections to begin with.  As a compromise, 
every two years the projections were to be recalculated to limit ridership risk long-term.  
 
In 2006 BART pre-qualified three prospective concessionaire teams.  In 2007 BART put the 
concession out for proposal.  One team dropped out early on, and another eventually dropped out 
as well, citing cost concerns.  This left the “Airport Connector Team” joint venture as the sole 
concessionaire. 
 
While detailed negotiations were ongoing with the Airport Connector Team in advance of a signed 
final contract, several developments occurred that drastically altered the aviation landscape in the 
Bay Area and led to legitimate concerns about costs, ridership, and revenue projections. 
 
First, in 2007, Virgin America Airlines announced intentions to move into SFO with 40-50 flights 
per day.  Southwest Airlines, which previously had only been at OAK in the Bay Area decided to 
move a similar amount of its business to SFO in order to compete with Virgin.  SFO benefited from 
already having a direct BART connection constructed several years prior.   
 
Business at OAK plummeted drastically by 20%.  Other issues related to airline consolidation, fuel 
cost instability, and increased competition completely doomed the project as planned.  The Airport 
Connector Team dropped out in October 2008.  The following table shows how dramatically 
ridership projections have dropped288: 
 
 
Figure 8.11 – BART OAK Connector 2007 vs. 2008 Ridership Projections 
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BART, having now admitted that the original cost estimations are no longer accurate, is back to the 
drawing board.  They are hoping to find ways to cut costs to still entice interest in the project as a 
DBFOM. 
 
8.5 Emergence of the Private Finance Initiative in the U.K. 
 
During the 1980s, the provision of private finance for public projects was governed by the Ryrie 
Rules.  Enacted in 1981, the Ryrie Rules established that public sector projects should be privately 
financed only if they are demonstrated to provide more value for money over public financing, and 
that privately financed public investment should still be treated as a public expenditure289.  The 
rationale was that there was little economic difference between the government borrowing and 
private sector borrowing to finance public projects.  The Ryrie Rules were seen as an obstacle to the 
use of private financing and were abolished in 1989. 
 
The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) movement began in the early 1990s amid growing concern for a 
lack of public investment and maintenance spending290.  While the generic term PPP has been 
increasingly adopted in the U.K., PFI still predominates291.  PFIs transform the government’s role in 
infrastructure provision towards being the purchaser of services from the private sector292.   
 
There are three types of PFIs:  Turnkey, DBFOM, and Joint Venture (JV), the latter of which is 
when the repayment is made by a combination of user fees and government subsidies to account for 
beneficial social and economic externalities.  The Docklands Light Railway in London is an example 
of a JV293. 
  
PFIs were slow to develop, however, due to a complicated institutional structure.  A provision 
known as the Universal Testing Rule (UTR), which required that PFI be considered for all public 
sector projects, led to significant delays294.   
 
Labour had generally been opposed to the Margaret Thatcher Conservative government-led 
privatization movement of the 1980s and 1990s295.  This perspective changed with the election of 
Tony Blair’s “New” Labour government in 1997296.  PFIs emerged as a middle ground between the 
Conservative privatization movement and Labour’s socialist policy that has historically promoted 
public ownership of key industries, including transportation.   
 
New Labour quickly abandoned the UTR, and support of PFIs ultimately became a key 
distinguishing feature between Old and New Labour297.  In May 1997, Malcolm Bates, a senior 
industrialist, was asked to identify the obstacles hindering successful PFI projects and to make 
specific proposals to streamline the process298.  This first Bates Review included 29 specific 
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recommendations concerning institutional restructuring, improving the PFI process, and measures 
to reduce bidding costs299. 
 
The overall experience with PFIs in the U.K. has been extremely positive.  Several studies have 
quantified the average cost savings for PFIs over public provision to be 10%-20%300.  Mott 
MacDonald (2002) and the National Audit Office (2003) also found the PFIs are delivered on-time 
more often than traditional public procurement301.  It is no surprise, then, that the number of PFIs 
executed in the U.K. steadily increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  HM Treasury in 2005 
reported that the U.K. government had committed £42.7B for 667 PFIs by the end of 2004302.  
Growth had been particularly significant after 2000 and then stabilized at a still sizable 11% share of 
total public investment303.   
 
Transportation, and specifically rail, is one of the major sectors of PFIs, especially as a share of total 
PFI investment304.  At the end of 2004, 51% of the total value of PFIs was in the railway sector 
alone, while the health care sector was second with 11%.  Three London Underground (LUL) 
projects, as well as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL), accounted for a significant portion of this 
railway PFI investment305.  
 
PFIs are not without their critics.  One of the key drawbacks is the high cost of procurement. 
Tender costs for PFI projects range from 0.48%-0.62% of total project costs, compared to 0.18%-
0.32% for design-build projects and only 0.04%-0.15% for traditional projects306.  The long lead 
times and high costs associated with the PFI bidding process make PFIs not appropriate for projects 
with low capital costs, but arguably quite appropriate for megaprojects307. 
 
8.5.1 PFI Balance Sheet Implications 
 
A key motivation for PFIs in the U.K. is to move large, expensive capital projects off the public 
sector financial roles, or “off balance sheet.”  Off balance sheet status represents a type of “back 
door” financing, as payments under an off balance sheet provision correlate to the year in which 
they relate, rather than in full upon the signing of the agreement308.  This allows government to 
spread the costs of a project across its lifespan, rather than as a lump sum.  In so doing, the public 
sector can preserve its credit rating and expand the number of services it can provide309.   
 
Getting a project off balance sheet helps ensure compliance with two key U.K. provisions:  the 
Golden Rule and the Sustainable Investment Rule (SIR).  The Golden Rule states that government 
will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending310.  Therefore, over the economic cycle 
the current budget, net of investment, must be in balance or carry a surplus.  The SIR is a 
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component of the Golden Rule and restricts aggregate public debt to 40% of GDP311.  Both of these 
rules are meant to avoid many potential problems stemming from government borrowing, notably 
higher debt interest payments and also inflation.   
 
Off balance sheet PFIs do bring higher contract charges than their on balance sheet counterparts, 
however, since a project done on balance sheet is seen as having a stronger financial footing.  A 
decision to do a large-scale project on balance sheet may provide greater value for money, but it will 
ultimately reduce delivery options since the PFI option will likely be rejected in favor of an inferior 
one.    
 
8.6 North American/European Comparison 
 
In many respects, North American and European attitudes towards alternative delivery strategies 
were similarly aligned in the early 1990s before diverging quite significantly312.  In 1993, for example, 
there were 59 transportation infrastructure DBFOMs already under development in the North 
America versus 50 PFIs under development in Europe.  One distinct difference at the time was the 
sheer size of these projects.  The North American projects had a total cost of $23.4B, or $397M per 
project, while Europe’s projects came in at a total cost of $49.2B, or nearly $1B per project.  Since 
then, however, the European investment in PFIs has clearly outpaced the North American 
investment in alternative delivery strategies, especially the U.S.’s investment. 
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Chapter 9:  Alternative Delivery Strategy Public Funding 
Mechanisms 
 
Changes in law and innovations in financing have created a wide array of options for transportation 
projects that complement and enhance existing pay-as-you-go funding sources313.  These techniques 
range from fairly modest strategies that permit states greater flexibility in satisfying the standard 
matching requirements for receipt of federal funds to very ambitious credit enhancement strategies. 
 
Cynics will argue that these funding mechanisms merely offset inadequate funding that has prevailed 
in the past 15 years, and that it is unclear whether the money would have been better spent if simply 
distributed in a grant or formula structure.   
 
This chapter identifies several of these new approaches to financing projects that are applicable to 
alternative delivery strategies314. 
 
9.1 TIFIA Credit Program 
 
The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) of 1998 offers three types 
of credit assistance to large-scale transportation projects of regional or national significance315: 
 
1. Direct loans from the government; 
 
2. Federal guarantees for payments on debt service; and 
 
3. Standby lines of credit available to projects should their project revenues fall short of 
projections.   
 
The fundamental goal of the program is to leverage federal funds by attracting substantial private 
and other non-federal co-investment316.   
 
Certain stipulations are included in the legislation317: 
 
• funds received cannot exceed one-third of the total capital cost of the project; 
 
• loans must be repaid with user fees or special state and local taxes (as opposed to future 
federal funds); and 
 
• projects must be expected to cost $50M or more, with the exception of ITS projects, which 
must be $15M or more.  
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TIFIA funds are available for both highway and transit projects, and for projects utilizing either 
traditional or alternative delivery strategies318319.  This enables both the public and private sectors to 
improve their balance sheet situations in procuring transportation projects320. 
 
To date, the TIFIA program has provided nearly $5.8B in assistance to 18 projects whose total 
project costs are nearly $21.8B321.   
 
 
Figure 9.1 – TIFIA Credit Program Project Map 
 
However, the TIFIA program was slow to develop, and as a result Congress rescinded $257M 
originally allocated to the program322.  Only $610M was allocated to TIFIA from 2005-2009323. 
 
As interest in alternative delivery strategies has grown, TIFIA has become more popular.  As of late 
November 2008, there were seven TIFIA applications being evaluated by U.S. DOT and six more 
letters of interest pending324.  Not all of these projects can be funded.  In fact, just two months into 
FY 2009, all TIFIA funds had been committed for the year.    
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9.1.1 TIFIA Benefits 
 
TIFIA credit assistance has many features that make it attractive to private investors325: 
 
• Revenue leverage.  TIFIA can leverage revenue streams that otherwise might be considered too 
risky to obtain needed capital market financing.  This is particularly useful for user fee-based 
projects with uncertain revenues. 
 
• Interest cost savings.  For projects that must access the taxable debt markets, borrowing rates 
are typically well above the comparable U.S. Treasury yield.  Because the DOT lends TIFIA 
funds at the U.S. Treasury’s borrowing rate, with no premium for credit risk, it can provide 
an attractive interest cost.  Even for projects able to access the tax-exempt municipal market, 
TIFIA direct loans may prove cost-effective. 
 
• Payment flexibility.  TIFIA provisions aim to facilitate financings backed by user charges by 
allowing debt service to be structured according to project cash flows.  Often this entails 
deferral of interest not only during construction but also during the project’s ramp-up of 
operations, which private investors may be hesitant to accept.  In addition, the TIFIA 
program allows borrowers to prepay at any time without penalty.  This same flexibility, 
through the municipal bond market, could add as much as 0.5% to the borrowing cost, 
depending on market conditions. 
 
• Project acceleration.  TIFIA can expedite financing and accelerate the public benefits flowing 
from a completed facility.  In many cases, TIFIA assistance is viewed as essential in 
advancing the project more quickly and at a lower cost. 
 
• Long terms of maturity.  The final maturity date of TIFIA credit can be as much as 35 years 
after the date of completion of the project. 
 
9.2 GARVEE Bonds 
 
A Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicle, or a GARVEE bond, is a debt financing instrument that 
enables a state to pledge future federal funds for debt service and related financing costs326.  Costs 
eligible for reimbursement include interest payments, retirement of principal (including any 
capitalized interest), issuance costs, and credit enhancement fees, such as bond insurance 
premiums327.  Sponsors must be willing to reserve a portion of future Federal-aid highway funds to 
satisfy debt service requirements. 
 
GARVEEs enable states to generate up-front capital for major highway projects that the state may 
be unable to construct in the near term using traditional approaches.  Transit agencies use a similar 
mechanism known as a Grant Anticipation Note, or GAN.  Candidates for GARVEE or GAN 
financing are typically projects, or a program of projects, that are large enough to merit borrowing 
                                                 
325 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  “Manual for Using Public-Private Partnerships on 
Highway Projects,” 11-12. 
326 U.S. Department of Transportation.  GARVEEs. 
327 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  “Manual for Using Public-Private Partnerships on 
Highway Projects,” 19. 
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rather than pay-as-you-go grant funding, with the costs of delay outweighing the costs of 
financing328.   
 
Between 1997 and November 2005, fourteen states plus Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
issued GARVEE bonds, totaling $4.8B329. 
 
Figure 9.2 – GARVEE Bond Project Map 
  
GARVEEs can be especially helpful for states seeking to fund a local matching requirement for 
transportation megaprojects.   
 
9.3 Private Activity Bonds (PABs) 
 
The Private Activity Bond (PAB) prevision in SAFETEA-LU allows the private sector to tap into 
the tax-exempt bond market330.  Under PABs, the federal government has set aside $15B for surface 
transportation projects that have private partners, including privately financed toll roads331.  Funds 
are allocated based on a review of formal applications by FHWA332.   
 
Passage of the PAB legislation reflects the government’s desire to increase private sector investment 
in U.S. transportation infrastructure333.  Providing private developers and operators with access to 
tax-exempt interest rates lowers the cost of capital significantly, making investment opportunities in 
transportation infrastructure more attractive for private sector partners. 
 
The impact of PABs has been felt on projects nationwide.  In June 2008, nearly $600M worth of 
PABs were issued for the Capital Beltway High Occupancy Toll (HOT) project in Virginia, along 
with a TIFIA loan for a similar amount334.  This accounts for more than half of total project costs, 
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and the interest rate on this senior debt is only 4.97%335336.  The proposed privatization of the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike also secured PABs in the amount of $2B337. 
 
9.4 Section 129(a) Loans 
 
U.S. tax law allows states to loan some of their Federal-aid funds to pay for projects with dedicated 
revenue streams338.  A state may directly lend apportioned Federal-aid funding to projects generating 
a toll or that have some other dedicated revenue such as excise taxes, sales taxes, property taxes, 
motor vehicle taxes and other beneficiary fees339.   
 
The way the loan program works, in theory, is that a state can lend out the money and then recycle 
that money into future projects later on340.  Loans can be in any amount, up to 80% of the project 
cost, provided that a state has sufficient obligation authority to fund the loan. 
 
Borrowers must begin to repay the loans within five years after the project is completed, and the 
loan must be wholly repaid within 30 years from the date federal funds are authorized for the loan341.  
States have discretion to set interest rates, so long as the rates are at or below market rates and 
improve the financial feasibility of the project receiving the loan.   
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Chapter 10:  Review of Studies on Alternative Delivery Strategies 
 
Over the past 20 years there have been a number of formal studies, both in the U.S. and U.K., that 
have sought to achieve consensus on the industry’s impressions of alternative delivery strategies, 
especially design-build.  This chapter will convey the major findings of those studies.   
 
10.1 FHWA Design-Build Effectiveness Study 
 
Between 1990-2002, about 300 projects representing $14B were proposed for D-B contracting 
under Special Experimental Project Number 14 (SEP-14) on Innovative Contracting, which was 
established by the FHWA to enable state transportation agencies to test and evaluate alternative 
delivery strategies strictly on highway projects342.  Of this total, 140 projects representing $5.5B were 
completed by the end of 2002343.   
 
10.1.1  Study Participants 
 
The FHWA Design-Build Effectiveness Study included both a “program” survey and a “project” 
survey.  The “program” survey compiled transportation agency managers’ impressions of D-B and 
the extent to which D-B had or had not been successful on agency projects.  It sought input from 
the 32 state agencies (and the District of Columbia) that had administered D-B projects at the 
time344.  Of those 32 states, 27 of them, including two local toll agencies as well as the District of 
Columbia completed the D-B program survey, for an 85% response rate345.   
 
The “project” survey looked at the results of specific projects, rather than the administration of any 
of the state programs.  A sample of 86 projects out of the 140 that had been completed by 2002 
were selected for the project survey, representing 22 states and a broad cross-section of completed 
projects in terms of type and size346.  Among the 22 states receiving surveys, 19 states submitted a 
total of 69 project surveys, representing an 80% response rate347. 
 
10.1.2  Comparability 
 
Respondents were asked to identify a comparable project using D-B-B for each D-B project 
surveyed, where a truly comparable project could be identified.  This turned out to be a challenging 
effort due to the difficulty in determining comparability.  Seven states submitted surveys for 17 
comparable D-B-B projects.  This represented 37% of the states and 25% of the D-B projects348.  Of 
the 17 returned, eleven contained sufficient data to be included in the detailed analysis349. 
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10.1.3  D-B Project Type and Cost 
 
Of the 140 projects completed as D-B under SEP-14 by 2002, 49% of them were bridge/tunnel 
projects, 18% road rehabilitation and reconstruction, and 16% new or widened roads350.  New and 
widened roads accounted for over half of total project costs351.  
  
 
Table 10.1 – SEP-14 Design-Build Projects Completed by 2002, by Type 
 
Among the same 140 projects, six were projects with capital costs over $100M352.  These six projects 
accounted for 72% of the costs for all projects, or almost $4B out of the $5.5B spent under the 
program on D-B projects between 1990-2002353.  The average cost for each of these six projects was 
$662.4M354. 
 
 
Table 10.2 – SEP-14 Design-Build Projects Completed by 2002, by Size 
 
10.1.4  D-B Program Costs 
 
The responding agencies with D-B programs completed 73 D-B projects in calendar year 2002, 
representing $1.2B in costs355.  This compared to 3,034 total projects completed in the same year, at 
a total cost of $7.4B356.  Notably, over half of all costs on bridge/tunnel projects were part of D-B 
contracts357. 
 
                                                 
350 Ibid, D-6. 
351 Ibid, D-6. 
352 Ibid, D-6. 
353 Ibid, D-6. 
354 Ibid, D-6. 
355 Ibid, IV-2. 
356 Ibid, IV-2. 
357 Ibid, IV-2. 
$million $million/Project 
$million $million/Project Type 
100 of 175 
 
Figure 10.1 – D-B Project Costs as a Proportion of Total Projects Completed in 2002 
 
10.1.5  Amount of Design Before Issuing D-B Contracts 
 
Among the D-B projects surveyed, design averaged 27% completion prior to the awarding of the D-
B contract358.  For 81% of the projects, the percentage completion was 30% or less359.  An earlier 
survey of six state agencies found a broad range from 15%-50% design completion before issuance 
of the D-B contract, with the average being 31%360.   
 
Results suggest that “no more than 30% of preliminary design (should) be completed before D-B 
contract award, with lower percentages as the agency gains more experience with D-B361.” 
 
The following chart shows not only the level of design completed before the issuance of a D-B 
contract from among the 69 projects surveyed, but also the amount of right-of-way acquisition, 
permit acquisition, and environmental clearance performed prior to the D-B contract being 
signed362.   
 
   
Figure 10.2 – Level of Project Completion at Awarding of D-B Contract 
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In most cases acquisitions and clearances were nearly complete by the time of the D-B contract, 
while design generally hovered around the 15%-40% stage.  Right-of-way acquisition averaged 89% 
completion, permit acquisition 83%, and environmental (NEPA) clearance 99%363.  Under D-B-B, 
each of these four functions would have to be complete before the tendering of construction 
contracts.   
 
10.1.6  Contracting Methods Used 
 
For D-B, low-bid procurement still dominates.  The design community has been far more receptive 
to best-value contracting, but the construction industry is often still bound by low-bid as a result of 
state and local laws364.   
 
 
Figure 10.3 – Procurement Methods for D-B Contracts 
 
10.1.7  Impact on Small Businesses 
 
Agency respondents noted that the percentage of D-B project costs going to small businesses was 
about the same on average as for D-B-B projects, with only a very small reduction for D-B.  This 
suggests that small businesses were not disadvantaged when projects were developed through the D-
B process, according to agency D-B program managers.  The survey also suggests that D-B spreads 
more of the work among subcontractors than comparable D-B-B projects365. 
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Design-
Build     
Design-Bid-
Build   
 
Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum Minimum 
Percent of Project 
Costs Provided by 
Small Firms 31.3% 55.0% 5.0% 33.0% 55.0% 15.0% 
Percent of Project 
Costs Provided by 
Small Firms on Local 
Competing Teams 32.3% 75.0% 5.0% 32.9% 75.0% 15.0% 
Table 10.3 – Impact of Delivery Strategy on Small Businesses 
 
10.1.8  Change Orders and Claims 
 
The subset of D-B projects had fewer change orders than the comparable D-B-B projects.  The cost 
per change order was greater for the D-B projects.  However, the study notes that this could be 
attributed to the greater size of the D-B projects, which is confirmed by the fact that change orders 
represented roughly the same share of total project costs for both types of projects366.   
 
The D-B projects also had fewer claims per project.  The largest claim among all projects, both D-B 
and D-B-B, was for $6M on a D-B-B project367. 
 
 
Table 10.4 – Change Orders and Claims for D-B Projects 
 
 
Table 10.5 – Change Orders and Claims for D-B-B Projects 
                                                 
366 Ibid, IV-25. 
367 Ibid, IV-24. 
103 of 175 
 
Respondents noted that change orders were the biggest reason that led to cost increases, but that 
change orders still only represented 5% of the project’s total costs368.  
 
10.1.9  Impact on Project Schedule 
 
D-B had an overall positive impact on project duration.  The impacts of delivery strategy on project 
schedule varied widely, ranging from a 63% reduction to a 50% increase369.  On the average, D-B 
resulted in a 14% time savings over D-B-B.  Out of the 62 responses, 45 projects came in ahead of 
schedule and only seven were delivered late370.   
 
Program survey respondents estimated an average of 15% increased procurement time due to D-B, 
suggesting that D-B projects take longer to set up, but once awarded require slightly less time for the 
project to be built371.   
 
 
Table 10.6 – Impact of D-B on Project Schedule 
 
10.1.10 Impact on Project Cost 
 
D-B had mixed implications for project cost.  The results varied from a 62% reduction to a 65% 
increase relative to D-B-B, with an average cost savings of 2.6%372.   Out of the 48 responses, 20 
respondents believed costs were less under D-B than they would have been under D-B-B, 17 
believed there was no difference, and eleven believed costs were higher for D-B than they would 
have been for D-B-B373. 
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Table 10.7 – Impact of D-B on Project Cost 
 
10.1.10.1  Expected Versus Actual Costs 
 
Costs on the D-B projects, both during the construction phase and in total, were less than expected.  
On average, total project costs came in 4.2% less than expected, with cost savings as high as 42.5% 
and cost overruns only as high as 23.1%374.   
 
Costs on the comparable D-B-B projects, on the other hand, were more than expected.  On average, 
total project costs came in 4.8% above expectations, with cost overruns as high as 30.6% and cost 
savings only as high as 20.9%375.   
 
For the construction phase alone, costs averaged 11.6% more under D-B-B, and 1.2% less under D-
B376.  This suggests significant cost savings during construction under D-B377.  
 
 
Table 10.8 – Average Percent Change in Expected Versus Actual Project Cost for Similar D-B and D-B-B Projects 
 
10.1.11 Impact on Project Quality 
 
The project surveys indicated that D-B had no differential impact on the quality of the product.  
Three percent of the surveyed projects noted a small increase in project quality while a similar small 
percentage noted a small decrease in quality, and 93% of projects noted no discernible difference in 
project quality378.   
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Table 10.9 – Impact of D-B on Project Quality 
 
However, since D-B is often used on particularly difficult, robust, and risky projects, one may 
surmise that issues related to quality are more likely to occur on the whole on D-B projects than on 
D-B-B projects.  Therefore, this question may be a bit skewed and may understate the potential 
quality enhancements that D-B provides.     
 
10.1.12 Perceived Suitability of D-B 
 
Respondents were asked to rank the suitability of D-B for each of the five different highway project 
types, broken down by size of the project.  The ranking was performed on a scale from 1 to 6, with 
1 being not suitable and 6 being highly suitable379.  
 
 
Figure 10.4 – Survey Results on the Suitability of D-B for Various Project Types and Sizes 
 
D-B ranked especially high for large projects.  In fact, for each project type, the suitability of D-B 
grew for each increasing classification of project cost.  For projects considered as “mega,” or having 
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capital costs of $100M or more, D-B got scores ranging from 5.1-5.5; the highest scores for any 
project type or size.   
 
10.2 New York State DOT D-B Practice Report 
 
In an effort to survey the D-B landscape before considering enabling legislation of its own, the New 
York State DOT in 2002 drafted a questionnaire that was sent to 18 state agencies that had already 
implemented or were currently in the process of implementing D-B projects under SEP-14380.  This 
was a much more qualitative survey than the FHWA D-B Effectiveness Study, though there was a 
lot of consensus among the ten respondents.  The following lists some of the major findings381: 
 
• The majority of respondents use a two-stage process for procurement that first involves a 
pre-qualifications stage. 
 
• There is no single generally accepted approach to determining “best value.”  Many agencies 
adopt formulas, while some prefer descriptive comparison.   
 
• The majority of agencies strongly endorse an industry review process that allows draft RFPs 
to be shared with industry representatives. 
 
• A number of agencies have offered stipends to bidders as a means of reducing the cost to 
industry, as well as providing partial compensation for agency ownership of concepts.   
 
• Stipends also tended to increase competition.  Compensation ranged from $50,000 on a 
$22M project in Washington State, to a $1M reimbursement for bids on the T-REX 
combined LRT-Interstate reconstruction project.  The Arizona DOT was the lone 
respondent that reimburses based on a percentage of bid amount.  The reimbursement is 
0.2% of the bid amount. 
 
• Appropriate level of design prior to issuing the D-B contract varied, but centered in the 
15%-35% range.   
 
• In some cases, the agency hires a program manager.  In other cases, the owner provided its 
own staff to perform that function.  
 
• Regarding incentivization, many agencies provide bonus payments for early completion, and 
two agencies provide award fee payments at three-month intervals for progress exceeding 
that shown on the contract schedules. 
 
• Most agencies require submittal of schedules with the proposal, though the amount of detail 
required in initial schedule submittal varied.  Generally, preliminary schedules were requested 
at proposal and early in the project, with more detail required as work progressed.  
 
• Most agencies had a systematic process for identifying and allocating risks.  The majority of 
these agencies conduct workshops to identify risks, and then often use the industry review 
process to gather input as to how to best allocate those risks. 
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• The process for change orders is generally the same for D-B and D-B-B, with the one 
notable difference being that the design firm will usually be involved in implementing the 
change under D-B.  
 
• Many agencies require 100% payment and performance bonds, but for larger projects 
agencies are often willing to accept reduced bond amounts, with the amount based on the 
potential cost overruns resulting from the “worst-case” scenario.  The decision to accept a 
reduced amount is based in part on the surety industry’s reluctance to issue 100% bonds for 
megaprojects, and in part on the fact that only a handful of contractors have sufficient 
bonding capacity to provide such bonds.  Requiring a 100% bond would therefore be likely 
to reduce the pool of interested contractors and could therefore have a significant impact on 
the contract price. 
 
• All agencies cited accelerated project delivery as a major factor in the decision to use D-B.   
 
• Almost all of the agencies place quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) 
responsibility with the designers and builders, though agencies will retain a level of QA 
oversight in the form of small on-site monitor staffs, auditing, and independent testing.  The 
biggest challenge was in transferring quality responsibility by maintaining a “hands-off” 
approach, while still ensuring public due diligence.   
 
• Cost certainty was another reason to do D-B.  The single point of responsibility was cited as 
the main reason why that is the case.  For example, claims against project owner for design 
defects are eliminated. 
 
10.3 University of Colorado/National Science Foundation Study 
 
This study collected survey data from 108 respondents representing 90 owners and agencies382.  The 
respondents had combined experience on 1,683 projects with a value in excess of $12.75B, though a 
large majority, 83% of the projects, were from the building sector.  The survey asked the owners to 
rank seven primary reasons for choosing D-B.  The results are shown below: 
 
Average Selection Factor Ratings For Choosing Design-Build
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Figure 10.5 – Selection Factors for Choosing Design-Build 
 
Shortening the duration of the project was the overwhelming first choice of all owners.  This choice 
was validated by a survey performed by the Design-Build Institute of America (DBIA) as well.  Cost 
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certainty, cost reduction, and constructability/innovation followed.  The only major difference noted 
between the public and private sectors was that private owners were more concerned about 
shortening duration and public owners more concerned about reducing claims.   
 
In stark contrast to the FHWA survey, very few owners of these mostly vertical projects chose D-B 
to help manage them.  This may suggest an increased willingness to experiment with alternative 
delivery strategies for transportation and other horizontal infrastructure projects than on vertical 
building structures.   
 
10.4 ZweigWhite Design/Build Survey of Design and Construction Firms 
 
The architectural, engineering, and environmental consulting firm ZweigWhite has long been 
conducting industry surveys of design-build.  ZweigWhite’s 2005 Design/Build Survey of Design 
and Construction Firms details the responses of a 7-page questionnaire from among 98 architecture, 
engineering, environmental, consulting, construction, and design-build firms.  ZweigWhite makes 
the following distinction among the firms: 
 
• Integrated D-B:  Firm has both design and construction capabilities in-house. 
 
• Design services/Consulting:  Firm only does design and consulting, but not construction. 
 
• Construction:  Firm only does construction, but not design. 
 
The threshold for inclusion as a candidate in the survey was that each participating firm had to use 
design-build for at least 10% of its work383.   
 
10.4.1  Firm Portfolios 
 
Not surprisingly, the integrated design-build firms specialize in design-build construction more so 
than firms that do only design or only construction.  The design community is the one that has the 
least experience in design-build.   
 
Integrated Design-Build Firms
56%
26%
12%
6%
  
Design Services/Consulting Firms
17%
62%
11%
10%
  
Construction Firms
39%
44%
12%
5%
 
Design-Build
Traditional Design-Bid-Build
Construction Management
Other Delivery Methods
 
Figure 10.6 – Composition of Firms Participating in ZweigWhite Design/Build Survey 
 
10.4.2  Barriers to Entry into the D-B Marketplace 
 
Each type of firm identified state laws as being the most common barrier to D-B.  Interestingly, 
design firms encounter different obstacles than construction firms and Integrated D-B firms.  
Design firms are stymied more so by procurement regulations and their firm’s size and type than 
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they are by market-related issues.  Also, municipal laws were a major barrier to firms that perform 
construction, but less so for designers.   
 
Question:  If your firm has encountered barriers, for which of the following reasons (check all that apply)? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
State laws 64% 63% 53% 
Market-related issues 40% 19% 47% 
Municipal laws 40% 13% 33% 
Procurement regulations 28% 38% 33% 
(Our) Firm Size 20% 31% 7% 
Client Resistance 16% 6% 13% 
Federal laws 8% 6% 7% 
(Our) Firm Type 4% 31% 0% 
Other 4% 19% 13% 
Table 10.10 – Barriers to D-B 
 
The legal barriers were confirmed in a follow-up question that asked whether laws had effectively 
shut out firms from acquiring D-B work.  About half of the firms had reported that they had.   
 
Question:  Do procurement laws in your state ever effectively shut you out of acquiring public sector design-build work? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
Yes 57% 50% 40% 
No 40% 42% 57% 
Table 10.11 – Impact of Procurement Laws on Ability to do D-B Work 
 
This makes bi-state and other multi-jurisdictional D-B projects particularly problematic, since all 
localities will have to explicitly allow D-B for a D-B project to proceed.  
 
10.4.3  Design Development 
 
On projects where the client has retained its own owner’s representative, most are only developed to 
the 0%-10% design stage by the time the project is handed over to the D-B team.  Only 7% of 
projects had been developed beyond 30%.   
 
Question:  If the client hires an owner’s representative, how much design is developed before it is issued to the D-B 
team? 
0% (pre-design)  8% 
1%-10% (program requirements)  45% 
11%-20% (conceptual design)  20% 
21%-30% (conceptual design)  20% 
More than 30% (design/development)  7% 
Table 10.12 – Level of Design Completed Before Issuance of D-B Contract 
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Respondents generally believe this level of design is about right, and only 6% believe that this 
relatively low-level of design work is too little.  In all, D-B teams seem quite satisfied having a 
project turned over to them early on in the design stage. 
 
Question:  In your opinion, is this amount too much, too little, or just right? 
Just Right 63% 
Too Much 21% 
Too Little 6% 
Table 10.13 – Firms’ Perception of Level of Design Completed Before Issuance of D-B Contract 
 
10.4.4  Project Management/Integration 
 
Integrated design-build firms are more likely than other firms to report that, in their experience, the 
designer and constructor share project management tasks equally, despite often unequal risks.  These 
integrated firms are also significantly more likely to report that their processes are extremely well-
defined.  
 
Question:  Do designer and constructor members share equally in management, even though they may not share equally 
in risks? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
Yes 48% 27% 20% 
No 50% 65% 80% 
Table 10.14 – Designer and Constructor Management Responsibility 
 
Question:  How well are your project management processes for D-B defined? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
Extremely Well 45% 4% 17% 
Somewhat Well 50% 65% 70% 
Not Very Well 5% 19% 13% 
Table 10.15 – D-B Team Program Management Processes 
 
One of the appeals of design-build to the private sector is that it gains more control over how a 
project is managed.  But the survey results suggest that power struggles can arise when construction 
firms seek to join with a design firm to form a D-B venture, especially when one or both respective 
firms is relatively inexperienced at delivering D-B projects.  
 
10.4.5  Transportation as a Viable D-B Sector 
 
Question:  On scale of 1-5, what markets do you feel are most appropriate for D-B (1 = completely inappropriate, 5 
= the best method)? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
Roads, Bridges, Mass 
Transit, and Rail 3.6 3.4 3.9 
Airports 3.4 2.9 3.2 
Table 10.16 – Feasibility of Transportation as a Viable D-B Sector 
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These numbers may seem positive given that they’re rated highly on the 1-5 scale.  However, among 
thirteen markets, these two rated 11th and 13th, respectively.  Markets rated higher include 
commercial projects, parking garages, industrial complexes, and power and communications 
infrastructure. 
 
10.4.6  D-B Advantages 
 
All three types of firms agree that there are three major benefits to D-B:  single-source 
responsibility, shorter schedule, and cost savings.  Construction firms are also much more convinced 
than design firms that quality is better under D-B.   
 
Question:  What are the biggest advantages and benefits of D-B (check all that apply)? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/ Consulting Construction 
Single-source responsibility 98% 85% 100% 
Shorter schedule 95% 77% 77% 
Cost savings/best value 79% 23% 47% 
Increased quality 57% 15% 50% 
Other 12% 12% 20% 
Unspecified 0% 8% 0% 
Table 10.17 – D-B Advantages 
 
Designers come from a tradition of ethical identification with the owner.  Therefore it is 
understandable that they may be a bit more reluctant to support D-B since, as a member of a D-B 
team, the designer is now jointly accountable along with the construction contractor to whom the 
designer may be forced to cede power.   
 
10.4.6.1 Profitability 
 
Question:  Are D-B projects more or less profitable than traditional design-bid-build projects? 
More 84% 
Less 12% 
Table 10.18 – D-B Profitability 
 
It is remarkable that the survey respondents were seven times more likely to suggest that D-B 
projects were more profitable for them than D-B-B.  One of the main reasons firms cite as to why 
design-build is more profitable is because it gives the builder more control over the final product384. 
 
10.4.7  D-B Disadvantages and Risks 
 
There is strong consensus among each type of firm that risk, generally, is the biggest disadvantage to 
D-B.  Notably, the firms that do D-B exclusively appear to have mitigated risk through experience.  
While over half of design and construction firms listed risk as a disadvantage, D-B firms were about 
20% less likely to do so.   
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Designers, in stark contrast to constructors, are convinced that the quality is diminished, not 
enhanced by D-B.  This says a lot about the potential for marginalization of the designer in a D-B 
team, especially when the design and construction entities are either less experienced in D-B and/or 
haven’t worked together on such projects previously.  Having an owner’s rep present should help 
mitigate this.   
 
Question:  What are the biggest disadvantages and risks of D-B? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
Risk (general) 36% 54% 57% 
Decreased Quality 17% 42% 10% 
Increased Costs 2% 15% 13% 
Less Control 2% 4% 13% 
Longer Schedule 2% 8% 7% 
Other 26% 23% 23% 
Table 10.19 – D-B Disadvantages and Risks 
 
10.4.8  Overall Owner Satisfaction 
 
Owners seem quite pleased with the overall results of D-B, especially results from firms that 
specialize in D-B.  Satisfaction decreases for firms that join D-B teams as designers or construction 
contractors but do not operate solely as design-builders.   
 
Question:  Do owners seem more, less, or equally satisfied w/ D-B vs. other delivery methods? 
  Integrated D-B Design services/Consulting Construction 
More satisfied w/ D-B 88% 31% 67% 
Equally satisfied 10% 46% 33% 
Less satisfied 2% 15% 0% 
Unspecified 0% 8% 0% 
Table 10.20 – Owner Satisfaction with D-B 
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Chapter 11:  The Big Dig 
 
The Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) project, known worldwide as the Big Dig, was an engineering 
marvel plagued by extreme cost, schedule, and quality delivery problems.  The Big Dig entailed 
replacing an elevated highway by building a tunnel through Downtown Boston, while reinforcing 
and continuing to operate the elevated highway during tunnel construction.  It also included the 
construction of a third Boston Harbor Tunnel to Logan Airport.  The project was procured entirely 
as traditional D-B-B, as alternative delivery strategies such as D-B were prohibited by law in 
Massachusetts until 2004385386387.   
 
            
Figure 11.1 – Big Dig Before and After Photos 
Figure 11.2 – Big Dig Map 
 
No discussion on the genesis of the Big Dig is complete without a brief look back at the original 
Central Artery itself and the climate that led to its elimination.   
 
11.1 Central Artery 
 
The Central Artery construction began in 1949, and was well ahead of its time388.  The Interstate 
Highway System had yet to even be adopted, so Massachusetts spent its own money to build a six-
lane superstructure through Downtown.  The Artery was intended to improve mobility and allow 
Boston commuters to live further away from Downtown.  
 
Financial failure of the Old Colony commuter rail system and generally inadequate transit service 
quickly led to the roadway becoming overburdened389.  The projected 75,000 vehicles per day 
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became 150,000 per day, and extreme congestion set in390.  By 2003 the Central Artery was 
accommodating 200,000 cars daily391. 
 
11.2 Highway Revolt 
 
Partly in reaction to the social isolation created by the elevated Central Artery, there grew in Boston 
a powerful movement to prevent the growth and expansion of the region’s highway system that 
became known as the Highway Revolt.  In 1970, Governor Frank Sargent ordered the Boston 
Transportation Planning Review, a review of all proposed freeways around Boston.  Once the 
Review was complete and the public backlash against highway expansion had grown into a sizable 
coalition, several highway projects were cancelled392: 
 
1. The Inner Belt was a proposed 7.3-mile loop around the city that would have cut huge 
swaths of land and required many takings in the neighborhoods of Roxbury, Brookline, 
Cambridge, and Somerville. 
 
2. The proposed Northwest Expressway to Burlington was replaced by the MBTA Red Line 
extension to Alewife station. 
 
3. The Southwest Expressway was a proposed extension of Interstate 95 through Downtown 
Boston, which was replaced by the relocated and upgraded MBTA Orange Line and 
improved commuter rail. 
 
11.3 Dukakis Administration 
 
The first priority of new Governor Michael Dukakis in 1974 was implementation of transit and 
commuter rail improvements.  Dukakis was also supportive of depressing the Central Artery, but 
not keen on building the third Harbor Tunnel which, at the time, was a completely separate project.  
Dukakis was concerned about the impacts of a third Harbor Tunnel on the residents of East 
Boston.  Four years later, Dukakis lost his re-election campaign to Ed King, who wanted to shelve 
the Central Artery depression, but proceed with the third Harbor Tunnel. 
 
It was during this time when Dukakis’s once and future Secretary of Transportation, Fred Salvucci, 
became convinced that not only could the Central Artery and third Harbor Tunnel projects be 
combined into a single project, but also that there was an alignment for the Harbor Tunnel that 
would both alleviate impacts to East Boston and provide opportunities for significant economic 
development in South Boston as well.  In 1982, Governor Dukakis returned to the State House and 
proceeded to work in earnest on getting both approvals and funding for the CA/T. 
 
11.4 Federal Funding 
 
Massachusetts has long had powerful allies in Washington, perhaps none more so at the time than 
House of Representatives speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, who was originally skeptical of the 
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tunnel to East Boston because of impacts on his constituents there.  But as early as 1976, Rep. 
O’Neill began advocating for statutory language that clarified the Central Artery depression’s 
eligibility for 90% federal funds under the Interstate Highway Act393.  Rep. O’Neill eventually 
became an even stronger advocate for the CA/T once the East Boston issues were resolved.  
Beginning in 1983 the Reagan administration withheld funding on the project, but Tip O’Neill 
planned to re-enact the 1976 statutory language and get Massachusetts its federal funding for the 
project before his retirement in 1986394.   
 
However, reauthorization of the Transportation bill that included the CA/T’s funding was delayed 
until 1987.  Rep. O’Neill had since retired, and although the reauthorization overwhelmingly passed 
through Congress, President Reagan vetoed the bill, identifying his concerns about the CA/T.  In a 
very close vote, and thanks in large part to the arm-twisting of Massachusetts’ senior senator, 
Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy, the U.S. Senate voted to override the President’s veto.  The bill became 
law in April 1987, and the CA/T finally had its funding395.   
 
In a parallel administrative effort, Massachusetts had filed a Final Environmental Impact Statement 
(FEIS) on the CA/T in September 1983396.  Unfortunately, the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) held up its comments for two years, and then required further environmental studies.  
These studies resulted in further expansion of the project, so that by the time the FEIS was 
approved in 1991, the cost of the Big Dig was estimated at $6B.  It was over the next decade when 
costs escalated, or at least became publicly disclosed to be closer to the final cost of roughly $14.6B.  
 
11.5 Weld Administration and Scheme Z 
 
Among the most contentious debates surrounding the Big Dig focused on the design of off-ramps 
and on-ramps north of the Big Dig tunnel in Cambridge.  Shortly before leaving office, Salvucci 
settled on one of the 29 proposals known as Scheme Z397398.  With Final EIS approval coinciding 
with a change in state government, the Governor William Weld administration began construction 
on the third Harbor Tunnel, but re-opened the environmental process on the Charles River bridge 
section connecting Boston to Cambridge and Charlestown.  Salvucci pleaded with Governor Weld 
not to reopen the EIS, not only because he was convinced Scheme Z was the best option, but also 
because reopening the EIS would set the project back years399.  By reopening the EIS, not only 
would work on the bridges over the river be halted, but so would much additional enabling work as 
much as a half-mile away.  
 
The record of decision on the new EIS wouldn’t come until more than three years later.  Salvucci 
notes that for every month construction was delayed, the project incurred $18M in costs as a result 
of inflation alone400.  In the end, the modified Scheme Z was not even too dissimilar from the 
original design.  It continued to include the signature cable-stayed bridge, which has become an icon 
of the city, and park esplanades on both sides of the river.  But it also required substantial additional 
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tunneling under rail tracks at North Station to make ramp connections to I-93 more direct, which 
caused traffic weaving conflicts and congestion on some of the redesigned ramps401. 
 
Not coincidentally, on the same day that Weld’s Secretary of Transportation James Kerasiotes 
declared the Scheme Z issue resolved, he announced that Big Dig costs had increased $1.3B402.   
 
Considering the ripple effect the reopening of the EIS had on the rest of the project, the cost 
increases as a result were likely much more than publicly stated.  Contractors were allowed to begin 
work on some parts of the Big Dig before design for other key parts was complete403.  This 
approach was part of the project’s philosophy of “getting things done now and asking questions 
later404.”  This fast-track strategy is perfectly logical when there is no direct interface among these 
various elements and when there are very few unknowns.  But in the case of the Big Dig, interfaces 
were quite prevalent and no one knew how the Charles River crossing would be modified.  
Paradoxically, the much less complex work to be done in East Boston had no engineering 
relationship to Scheme Z and the Charles River crossing, and yet was also held up while the EIS was 
being revised, leading to unnecessary inflation costs405. 
 
11.6 Delivery Partner Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff  (B/PB) Role 
 
Back in 1985, a full two years before federal funding was approved for the Big Dig, the state already 
began to form the team that would eventually deliver the project.  The planning and engineering that 
led to the earlier EIS had been underway since 1978, but the next phase, which was expected to be 
final design and construction maintenance, required a new selection process.  Five groups competed 
for the first Big Dig contract; a 4-month, $1.3M consulting contract406.  Nine highway officials 
unanimously chose the joint venture of Bechtel and Parsons Brinckerhoff (B/PB). 
 
The choice was a rather easy one.  Bechtel was the largest construction firm in the world, and 
Parsons Brinckerhoff was the 17th-largest design firm.  The two companies had worked together on 
several megaprojects previously, including the San Francisco Bay Area BART metro and Atlanta’s 
MARTA metro system.   
 
The Big Dig included the largest use of slurry walls anywhere in North America.  Slurry is a clay-
water mixture pumped into an excavation to give a structure stability until concrete can be poured407.  
Up to that point, B/PB had done 90% of all slurry wall construction in the U.S., and the state 
perceived them to be well suited to implement the many new and innovative technologies that the 
Big Dig required408.   
 
The B/PB contracts were short-term but oft-renewed.  In 1993, the 12th contract with B/PB was in 
effect, and by now B/PB was the manager of design and construction on the Big Dig409.  By 
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project’s end, the sum of B/PB’s contracts was over $2.2B410.  B/PB’s total profit from the Big Dig 
is estimated at $150M411.  However, due to settlement agreements with the Commonwealth in excess 
of $450M, B/PB actually lost their entire profit and $300M more (see section 11.16).   
 
B/PB was to develop basic design, oversee other companies completing the final design, oversee 
selection of contractors, and manage and inspect the construction to be sure bid documents were 
followed and specifications met412.   
 
Over the years, B/PB’s role continued to expand, particularly during periods of political transition 
when turnover of key public employees led to a loss of institutional memory and increased reliance 
on B/PB.  The perception was that B/PB’s 1,000-plus employees dwarfed their few dozen public 
counterparts and effectively ran the Big Dig itself413.  The state even went so far as to designate 
B/PB as its own representative in some areas414.  B/PB did ultimately provide essential continuity 
throughout the project, but the lack of oversight capacity created a vacuum, and led to B/PB being 
excessively in control of designers, contractors, and information.   
 
11.7 B/PB Obligation to the Client 
 
The state made a major blunder in allocating much responsibility to B/PB and expecting B/PB to 
act solely on behalf of the state’s interests without adequate public sector oversight.  In 1994, 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) director and Big Dig project manager James Kerasiotes 
said that B/PB’s incentive in the Big Dig was its reputation415.  One could argue that, as two of the 
most successful engineering and design firms in the world, respectively, Bechtel and Parsons 
Brinckerhoff had already established a reputation that even some major errors on the Big Dig would 
not significantly harm.  The state may have overstated the reputational risk being assumed by B/PB.  
B/PB, as a multinational construction conglomerate is, first and foremost, out to protect its own 
corporate interests, including its business volume and profit.  The fact that Bechtel has now won the 
Project Delivery Partner role for Crossrail (see Chapter 13), and that PB was a finalist is clear 
evidence that the reputational risk theory was overstated.   
 
As B/PB’s longtime Big Dig director Keith Sibley stated, “Our responsibility as management 
consultant was to deliver a standard of professional care, not to guarantee the contractor’s work416.”  
This is a critical distinction, that B/PB was not out to promise perfect results, but to be professional 
in its advisory and management work.   
 
In 1994, B/PB compiled analysis that the Big Dig would cost roughly $14B in completion year 
dollars417.  They brought their findings to the state, but the state kept this information hidden from 
the public.  This alarmed Bechtel executives so much so that they flew to Boston to see Governor 
Weld.  According to a 2001 report by the Office of the Inspector General, the Weld administration 
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directed state and B/PB staff to maintain “the fiction” of an $8B project, despite the warnings from 
Bechtel418.   
 
Subsequent to B/PB performing this due diligence, one could argue that it would have been 
unreasonable for B/PB to attempt to override the policy direction of its client and assume the role 
of defining the public interest.  As a result of the state’s stubbornness and inaction, several years 
would pass before the numbers became public that cost was indeed $14B.  In the meantime, the 
state still approved costly additions, including the rebuilding of the tunnel section under Dewey 
Square to increase the speed limit there from 35 mph to 45 mph419.    
 
Even after becoming aware of the $14B estimate, the state effectively took no action to reduce cost 
through a serious value engineering approach, nor did the state increase its direct funding.  Instead, 
the state relied on increased borrowing. 
 
11.8 Big Dig Privatization Option 
 
The Dukakis administration back in 1988 commissioned a report by the firm Lazard Freres that 
looked at the financial feasibility of delivering the Big Dig as a fully private venture420.  The 
privatization option was based in theory on the notion that the owner could potentially “capture” 
some of the real estate value from being able to develop the air rights above the Big Dig tunnel.   
 
The Lazard Freres report ultimately suggested that the project was too big to be privatized, and that 
there was too much risk involved421.  Since the Big Dig air rights would not be available for another 
10 years or so, the potential fluctuations in real estate values made privatization risky.  Ultimately, 
the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA), the city planning agency of the city of Boston, argued 
successfully for the air rights to be primarily open space, which meant that the increased real estate 
value would occur on privately owned adjacent land, not over the actual air rights above the tunnel.   
 
11.9 Delay in Ownership and Operations Designation 
 
When the Weld administration took over from Dukakis in January 1991, the record of decision 
(ROD) on the Big Dig’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) had just been delivered, and 
logically it would have made sense to anoint an official owner and eventual operator of the soon-to-
be-constructed roadway422.  This was in fact a major recommendation emerging from the Lazard 
Freres finance study. 
 
Despite MassHighway (MHD) being the conduit through which federal funds for the Big Dig 
arrived in Massachusetts, few people thought that MassHighway was the appropriate entity to be the 
owner.  This created the inauspicious situation of an agency that knew it would not be accountable 
for the maintenance presiding over the design and construction of the facility423. 
 
Logical candidates for Big Dig owners included: 
                                                 
418 Ibid, 5. 
419 Interview with Fred Salvucci. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Pioneer Institute.  “Driving Questions:  A Forum on Transportation Strategy in Massachusetts,” 12.  
119 of 175 
 
• the Massachusetts Port Authority (MassPort), which was already in charge of Logan Airport, 
its parking facilities, the seaport, South Boston real estate, and the Tobin Bridge; and 
 
• the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), which owned and operated the Massachusetts 
Turnpike (Mass Pike), as well as the first two Boston Harbor Tunnels and the tunnel under 
Boston’s Prudential Center.   
 
In Secretary of Transportation Fred Salvucci’s lone transition meeting with Weld’s staff, he 
advocated for immediate selection of the operating agency.  Salvucci feared that, without operator 
oversight, the engineers assigned to the project design and construction might embed numerous 
mistakes and inoperable features, so as to simplify construction and cut costs424.   
 
But instead, the project languished for several years without an operating agency looking out for the 
project’s well-being.  The MTA, which was finally designated in 1997, had no role in reviewing the 
B/PB design or in providing construction oversight during the critical early years of engineering and 
construction425.   
 
11.10 Federal Funding Cap 
 
In multiple statutes in the 1970s and 1980s, the administration had successfully argued that since 
Massachusetts built the Central Artery itself, without federal funds, that the state should be eligible 
for “90-10” on CA/T, which consists of two Interstate highways, I-90 and I-93.  This victory for 
Massachusetts meant that the federal government was essentially accepting the risk for 90% of the 
cost of the Big Dig426. 
 
Unfortunately for Massachusetts, that all changed in November 1991.  With the Interstate Highway 
System nearly complete, the federal law changed and the federal government officially limited 
funding for the Big Dig in 1991 to the then-current estimate of $6B.  Subsequent costs would be 
borne solely by the state without Interstate highway funds.  As a result, Massachusetts’ share of the 
costs in the Big Dig, which were originally at 10%, will end up at closer to 50%427.  With the eventual 
addition of some formula-based funds (which were eligible to be used on other projects in 
Massachusetts) the total federal contribution on the Big Dig ended up being $8.6B428. 
 
The shift of cost risk from the federal government to the state government also significantly altered 
the federal government’s view on the project.  When the federal government was reimbursing 90% 
of the final cost it was focused on cost control, but once the federal guarantee was lifted, the federal 
government turned into a strong advocate for additional costly features.  With the federal 
government already invested for several billions of dollars, but with no risk beyond that amount, it 
began to push for bigger and more expensive designs to be employed.   
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The following chart from Altshuler and Luberoff shows the evolution of Big Dig cost estimates 
over the years, including the precipitous drop in the federal government’s share429: 
 
 
Table 11.1 – Big Dig Historical Cost Estimates 
 
11.11 Ownership, Operations, and Maintenance 
 
Whatever federal funding the Big Dig was eligible to receive, one caveat to the 90-10 rule was that it 
only provided for construction, not operations funding.  A key justification for transferring the Big 
Dig to the MTA was that it would provide a guaranteed, user-based revenue stream for operations 
and maintenance that did not require legislative approval430.  The legislative angle is an important 
one because Massachusetts legislators from outside the Boston area, and particularly those from 
western Massachusetts whose constituents pay taxes but rarely use the Boston facilities, would be 
unlikely to support taxes for maintaining a tunnel that they would rarely utilize.   
 
In 1990, a toll increase on the Mass Pike was justified based on its own deferred maintenance.  The 
timing seemed to work out well for the Big Dig, since those Mass Pike repairs were set to be paid 
off by the time the Big Dig was complete, and the excess revenues could go towards the Big Dig’s 
expected annual operations and maintenance tab estimated at $80M-$100M per year431.   
 
The 1991 capping of federal funds clearly dealt a huge increase in risk to the financial plan for the 
Big Dig given that the state would now be paying closer to all of the increased project costs, not 
even accounting for O&M.  Moreover, when the legislation was presented in 1997 to transfer 
oversight of the Big Dig to the MTA, the anticipated operations and maintenance costs were 
publicly stated to only be $25M per year and were left to the annual appropriation legislative process, 
while the Mass Pike tolls were dedicated to bonds to help deal with the cost increases432.  Back 
during the Dukakis administration, in 1990, the O&M costs were projected to be at least three times 
more than the later $25M annual estimate, and that 1990 estimate has proven to be accurate433.   
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11.12 Management Structure 
 
As early as 1991, the Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General (OIG) warned of long-term 
dependency on a consultant whose contract had an open-ended structure and inadequate 
monitoring.  Later OIG reports noted that B/PB essentially played the following roles434: 
 
• Preliminary designer and oversight of final designer; 
 
• Design coordinator; 
 
• Construction manager, including packaging the bids and overseeing construction contracts; 
 
• Contract administrator; 
 
• Claims negotiator; and 
 
• Change order negotiator. 
 
The state OIG was consistently critical of the multiple roles B/PB was playing.  This structure 
theoretically helped keep B/PB accountable for the outcome, but the risk of schedule slippage and 
cost increases was to the state, so it was the state's responsibility to vigilantly review these aspects.   
 
The state should have known that it was going to be in a vulnerable position considering that B/PB 
was perhaps the only consortium capable of delivering the Big Dig given its size, scope, and 
innovative technologies used.  The state would have been wise to have included the operations 
entity early, so as to provide some checks and balances along the way in a transparent system, rather 
than cede full control to B/PB and hide information from the public.   
 
11.13 Managing Project Risks 
 
An alternative way to manage the risks would have been for the state to split up the work of B/PB 
into smaller parts.  One way to do this is to have separate consultants for preliminary design and for 
project management work435.  The preliminary designers would have had primary responsibility at 
the beginning of the project, with the project management team providing oversight and working to 
integrate preliminary design with future stages that were dependent on the design outcome.   
 
Another option is to keep some or all of the project management in-house, though this is generally 
infeasible and to be discouraged for megaprojects.  Though this would have meant that the state 
retained all risk, at least it would have forced the state to be more aware of the risks and their 
implications.   
 
In hindsight, perhaps the biggest failure of the state was not in risk allocation, but in ineffectively 
monitoring the risks for which B/PB was meant to be held to account.    
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11.14 Independent Project Organization (IPO) 
 
By the late 1990s it finally became apparent to all parties that the Big Dig was suffering from a 
severe lack of transparency.  The solution to this problem came in the form of an Integrated Project 
Organization (IPO), comprised of both MTA and B/PB staff mixed in at various levels into one 
single organization436.  Upon creation of the IPO, the position of project director was designated to 
be an employee of the MTA who reports directly to the MTA Chairman437.   
 
The IPO gave the impression of transparency and cooperation, but this ultimately weakened the 
long-term planning, legal, financial, and contractual obligations of B/PB, and left B/PB with little 
consequence for their actions438.  Combining the roles of oversight and management resulted in a 
lack of cost recovery and accountability on the project.  The IPO ultimately reinforced the 
responsibility of the state for the entire outcome.  On the positive side, the coverup of cost overruns 
had poisoned relationships, so the IPO did help reestablish collaboration, though perhaps too little 
too late.   
 
A Massachusetts Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight report of December 2004 was 
critical of the IPO439.  The Committee noted in the report that the benefits of IPOs had been seen in 
the private sector, but never realized on a public project that rivaled the scope or the cost of the Big 
Dig.   
 
This was a criticism aimed at the wrong body.  The Big Dig problems arose well prior to the 
creation of the IPO.  For the IPO to have even had a chance to work, it needed to be implemented 
from the start of the project.  The IPO structure certainly would not have prevented each of the 
mistakes on the Big Dig, but certainly it would have created a mechanism through which problems 
could have been identified and rectified much sooner.  The state had the authority to establish 
transparency many years earlier, but only did so once the project had already incurred significant 
problems, and by then had passed the point of no return on expensive changes made in the early 
1990s. 
 
11.15 Cost Recovery 
 
The Boston Globe conducted an investigation in February 2003 that detailed the mismanagement of 
the Big Dig to date.  The Globe alleged that B/PB had profited from design mistakes and poor 
decisions to the tune of $1.6B440.  The Inspector General would later concur.   
 
Following these revelations, the MTA Chairman announced the creation of an Independent Cost 
Recovery team in 2003441.  Between 2003 and 2004 the team secured $3.5M in settlements, but had 
                                                 
436 National Research Council.  Transportation Research Board.  “Completing the Big Dig:  Managing the Final Stages of Boston’s 
Central Artery/Tunnel Project,” 31. 
437 Ibid. 
438 Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  “Road Blocks to Cost Recovery:  Key Findings and Recommendations on the Big Dig Cost 
Recovery Process:  A Report of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight,” 12. 
439 Ibid. 
440 Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  Office of the Inspector General.  “Analysis of Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff's Reply to The 
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several larger lawsuits pending.  The team ultimately pursued 300 claims against Big Dig 
contractors442.    
 
B/PB should not be exonerated for its efforts on the Big Dig which, at times, were lackluster.  But 
what must be underscored is the lack of oversight that led to a culture of corruption, scope creep, 
and mission creep on the Big Dig.  That is what ultimately led to the major cost overruns. 
 
Because responsibility and accountability was so poorly defined on the Big Dig, the state has 
recovered very little money as a result of change orders.  The Massachusetts Senate Committee on 
Post Audit and Oversight report notes that the Big Dig had incurred over 11,000 change orders, but 
the state had only recovered $35,707 from those changes443.   
 
This limited cost recovery highlights the fact that it is a trap to believe that the public sector will be 
triumphant at recovering costs in the long run.  Cost recovery should certainly never be an objective 
of the public sector; it should be a last resort.  The objective is to get the project done correctly, so 
as to not require a laborious and often unsuccessful cost recovery effort. 
 
11.16 Ceiling Collapse 
 
These claims preceded a horrific tragedy in 2006 when a ceiling collapse led to the death of Milena 
Del Valle.  In that case, B/PB and project designers settled with the state for $458M.  The deal with 
the state and the U.S. Justice Department enabled the firms to avoid possible prosecution and 
debarment from federal and state contracts.  Under the deal, Bechtel paid $352M, PB $47.2M, and 
about 24 design firms $51M collectively444.   
 
The ceiling collapse and the subsequent legal battle over liability should serve as caution for private 
consultants and construction managers445.  Massachusetts threatened B/PB with indictments in 
order to get B/PB to settle with the state.  The public sector, with its power to indict, may use the 
criminal justice system to deflect its own accountability.  The subpoena power is armor for the 
public sector to pull out of its back pocket if and when mistakes are made.   
 
The lack of clear accountability in the IPO structure undermined B/PB’s legal liability for the ceiling 
collapse, but the state’s criminal accusation forced B/PB to settle for a much larger amount.  Just 
prior to the ceiling collapse, a settlement of $100M was under discussion446. 
 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that there was plenty of blame to go 
around.  First, the epoxy used wasn’t suitable for long-term loads of any type, and the company that 
made the glue, Powers Fasteners, didn’t warn clearly that the epoxy wasn’t interchangeable with 
another epoxy that it made447.  The state subsequently sued Powers for criminal negligence.   
 
                                                 
442 Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  Office of the Inspector General.  “Analysis of Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff's Reply to The 
Boston Globe's Investigative News Series Concerning the Big Dig,” 1. 
443 Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  “Road Blocks to Cost Recovery:  Key Findings and Recommendations on the Big Dig Cost 
Recovery Process:  A Report of the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight,” 3. 
444 Rubin, 1. 
445 Gelinas. 
446 Interview with Fred Salvucci. 
447 Gelinas, 6. 
124 of 175 
The NTSB’s report also noted that neither the ceiling’s designer, Gannett Fleming, nor B/PB had 
thought about the ceiling’s long-term performance448.    
 
However, it was the state of Massachusetts, annoyed by cost overruns and cleanliness problems on a 
similar ceiling, that chose to fit this section of tunnel with a cheaper ceiling, which turned out to be 
heavier449.  What’s worse is that it would later become public that the ceiling was only installed in the 
first place for aesthetic purposes and served no real function450.  The NTSB report points out that, 
once the tunnel opened in 2003, Massachusetts was supposed to conduct regular inspections, which 
likely would have revealed the ceiling panels’ displacement long before the collapse.  This tragedy 
highlights the failure to shift to a culture that was adequately cognizant of O&M issues.   
 
11.17 Non-Delivery of Transit Commitments 
 
The Big Dig was part of a much larger citywide movement to curb congestion and gridlock, started 
in the 1970s.  Among the transit commitments that were to be completed as part of that plan are: 
 
• Connection from the MBTA Blue Line to the Red Line at the Charles/MGH station; 
 
• Extension of the MBTA Green Line north to Medford; 
 
• Third phase of the MBTA Silver Line bus service to Logan Airport and Dudley Square; 
 
• Restoration of the commuter rail line to Scituate, MA; 
 
• Restoration of the Arborway branch of the MBTA Green Line; and 
 
• Increased frequency of bus service. 
 
Also among the commitments that were part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Salvucci 
signed with the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) in 1990, just before leaving office, were 20,000 
new parking spaces at commuter rail and rapid transit stations, a regional system of high-occupancy 
vehicle (HOV) lanes, a limit on transit fare increases to the rate of inflation, and more stringent 
limits on the number of parking spaces in Downtown Boston451. 
 
To date, very few of these commitments have been fulfilled as promised.  On the rail capital side, 
only the commuter rail restoration to Scituate has been completed, and even that took until 2007 to 
complete.   
 
There is a strong constituency of transit advocates in the Boston area for these projects, but the 
arguments are often couched in language that suggests the commitments are serving the purpose of 
“mitigating” the impacts of the Big Dig.  This mitigation argument has a negative connotation, as if 
to suggest that these projects are to correct a problem caused by the Big Dig.  In actuality, they are 
part of the same package of commitments that are intended to complement the Big Dig to achieve 
the congestion reduction projected in the EIS.   
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These transit projects have also suffered from a narrow, short-term viewpoint that often plagues 
these megaprojects.  Seldom are these commitments considered as part of the broader program of 
transportation improvements that included the Big Dig and were intended to help retain the 
economic vitality of the Boston region over the long-term. 
 
11.18 CM@Risk as a Possible Management Alternative 
 
When B/PB was hired as an Agency CM rather than a CM@Risk, it reduced B/PB’s accountability 
and left B/PB with less incentive to do a stellar job beyond its ethical responsibility to act in good 
faith.  Of course, this begs the question of how much of a risk premium B/PB would have included 
in its bid if it were bidding as a CM@Risk rather than as an Agency CM.   
 
The state was ultimately in a weak bargaining position given the fact that B/PB was among very few 
consortia with the skills necessary to deliver the Big Dig.  B/PB very well could have recognized this 
weakness and leveraged it in order to avoid having to accept project risks.  This is a way in which the 
public sector is put at a significant disadvantage when procuring a highly specialized project, and the 
potential for risk transfer may be illusive.   
 
11.19 The Big Dig as a Design-Build Project 
 
Though the Big Dig was conceived, planned, and built in an environment that did not allow 
alternative delivery strategies at the time, it is worth considering whether the project would have 
turned out any differently were those options available.  It is generally agreed upon that the Big Dig, 
much like Crossrail, was too big to be delivered under any single D-B contract.  Therefore any 
discussion of D-B needs to take into account the fact that multiple contracts would have been 
necessary. 
 
If the Big Dig had been managed with early involvement of the operator and in a transparent 
manner, the outcome might also have been much better.  However, the comparison of D-B to D-B-
B on the Big Dig may be misleading because of a poisonous culture of secrecy that would likely have 
prevailed regardless.  On balance, it appears D-B could have helped, but it is difficult to “prove” that 
based on the observation of this one case. 
 
11.19.1 Potential Advantages of Design-Build for the Big Dig 
 
B/PB performed 30% design and then approved the final design that had been contracted out to 
section designers.  This put B/PB in the strong position of approving designs that were of its own 
conception, but completed by other design entities.  It gave B/PB the leverage to not sign off on 
changes made to its conceptual design that it did not approve of and allowed B/PB to blame section 
designers for mistakes. 
 
Under D-B, there still may have been a structure in place by which the state’s consultant, B/PB, 
would sign off on final design completed by a design-builder.  In this case there would have been 
clear accountability of the design-builder to B/PB, and of B/PB to the state of Massachusetts.   
 
Value engineering changes after 100% design almost never were accepted on the Big Dig because it 
implicitly criticized B/PB’s design.  In D-B the design-builder would have been entitled to propose 
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value engineering solutions, but they also would have been responsible for delivering value for 
money on their own final design at the contract price. 
 
In the actual traditional D-B-B process, the initial market tests for construction did not come until 
after all of the engineering had been performed, which occurred several years later than they may 
have under D-B.  If D-B contract approval came at or prior to 30% design, with requirements for 
review and approval at 50%, 75%, and 100%, there would be early feedback not only on cost but 
also constructability.  The B/PB $14B cost estimate in the early 1990s that was ultimately 
sequestered by the state for several years surely would have been forced to become public much 
sooner under D-B.  D-B allows for course corrections, fast-tracking, and more realistic management 
of contingency funds. 
 
D-B would have required and allowed for B/PB to focus on its core responsibilities for which it was 
most qualified, such as managing the many interfaces involved in the project.  Instead, because of 
the latitude provided to them by the state, B/PB was responsible for each and every decision.  D-B 
would have ensured that B/PB was not excessively micromanaging the project. 
 
The eventual owner and operator would also have likely been selected much earlier than 1997 under 
D-B, and therefore could have had influence in reviewing and overseeing the B/PB design and 
construction during the critical early years.   
 
Finally, D-B would have eliminated the need to create the Independent Project Organization (IPO) 
in 1998, which let B/PB off the hook for many of the mistakes and cost overruns it may have been 
at least partially responsible for prior to the IPO’s creation.  Under D-B the state would have 
understood better its relationship with its consultant B/PB and would likely not have had to 
perform a complete restructuring halfway through construction.  
 
11.19.2 Potential Disadvantages of Design-Build for the Big Dig 
 
D-B implemented on a project as large as the Big Dig, and in a region where D-B was and still today 
is not commonplace, would have significantly reduced competition for D-B contracts.  This would 
have led to a few number of large firms inflating their price quotes to cover the many risks posed 
simply by the inexperience in doing D-B, let alone the risk of substantial design changes.  
 
Since Massachusetts found itself unable to provide oversight over its partners and contractors under 
a traditional D-B-B structure, it arguably would have been even more difficult under an alternative 
delivery model.  At least traditional D-B-B was familiar.  D-B relies heavily on the contractor’s own 
quality control, and though B/PB had the capacity to perform that function, transferring that 
responsibility does not ensure it is being handled properly.  This applies even more pressure on the 
public sector to hold their design-builders accountable for quality deficiencies, and there is no 
guarantee that Massachusetts could have handled that task properly on the Big Dig. 
 
Lastly, the best value approach to letting D-B contracts raises issues about the potential subjectivity 
of contract awarding.  Under traditional D-B-B’s predominant low-bid rules there is a clear, if 
imperfect, rubric by which contractors are selected.  “Best value” only provides better value in 
theory, but it is a highly subjective selection method sometimes accompanied by biased selection 
criteria.   
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Chapter 12:  Tren Urbano 
 
Tren Urbano is a 10.7-mile (17.2-km) heavy-rail metro system in San Juan, Puerto Rico, which 
opened in December 2004.  It has 16 stations, 10 of which are elevated, four at-grade or in open 
cuttings, and two underground.  This chapter describes how the project evolved throughout 
procurement, and how alternative delivery strategies used on this project impacted the final result. 
 
 
Figure 12.1 – Tren Urbano Map 
 
12.1 Purpose and Need 
 
The San Juan Metropolitan Area (SJMA) alone has 1.3M inhabitants, which is over one-third of the 
population on the island452.  Population densities in central San Juan are among the highest in the 
U.S., rivaling even New York City453.  While the average density in San Juan is 8,500 persons per 
square km, in some areas it exceeds 20,000 per square km454.   
 
As this chart of journey-to-work behavior of Puerto Ricans from the 2000 census indicates, 
transportation in Puerto Rico had long favored the automobile much like in the rest of the U.S.  
Nearly 87% of journeys to work are in single-occupancy vehicles455: 
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Total: 908,386 
Car, truck, or van: 790,157 
Drove alone 626,578 
Carpooled 163,579 
Public transportation: 48,322 
Bus or trolley bus 15,749 
Streetcar or trolley car (publico in Puerto Rico) 31,131 
Subway or elevated 117 
Railroad 9 
Ferryboat 269 
Taxicab 1,047 
Motorcycle 970 
Bicycle 2,249 
Walked 36,834 
Other means 13,890 
Worked at home 15,964 
Table 12.1 – Puerto Rico Journey-to-work Census Data, 2000 
 
Based on the dramatic growth rates in and around San Juan, and the capacity issues on existing 
roadways, Puerto Rico decided to construct Tren Urbano; the first rail system built on the island in 
over 50 years456.   
 
12.2 Shift to Transit Mindset 
 
In March 1991, the Puerto Rico Highway Authority (PRHA) was officially renamed the Puerto Rico 
Highway and Transit Authority (PRHTA) to reflect this new focus on mass transit.  The fact that 
Tren Urbano was the first modern transit project in Puerto Rico, coupled with a concerted effort to 
include local contractors caused significant problems.  Years later, while the project was under 
construction, highway specialists who did not have a stellar performance record of their own 
became responsible for inspection of major portions of transit infrastructure.   
 
12.3 Procurement 
 
Tren Urbano was procured as a design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) project, but with many 
elements that were strictly design-build (D-B).  The civil work, comprising the permanent right-of-
way and building acquisition was split into seven “alignment sections.”  A D-B contract was let for 
each of the seven sections.  One of the seven contracts includes the overall operations and 
maintenance (O&M) function for five years, with a government option for a five-year renewal.  Five 
years was the maximum contract length allowed at that time under U.S. tax regulation457.   
 
In 1994, PRHTA signed a $42M contract with a General Management and Architectural and 
Engineering Consultant (GMAEC), led by the firm DMJM Harris458.  The GMAEC was an Agency 
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CM, not at-risk, set up to develop the 30% design and be the first point of accountability and 
owner’s representative on implementation459.  It was to be responsible for the EIS, procurement 
documents, and selection and oversight of the eventual DBOM partner460.   
 
The entire systems portion, comprising track, signaling, vehicles, and communications, was awarded 
to the single DBOM contractor, Siemens Transportation Partnership Puerto Rico.  PRHTA was not 
required by law to choose the lowest bidder, but the bid eventually chosen was also the lowest 
cost461. 
 
The Siemens joint venture included three partners462: 
 
• Siemens Transportation Systems, Inc., of Delaware, USA; 
 
• Juan R. Requena y Asociados of Puerto Rico; and 
 
• Alternate Concepts, Inc., of Massachusetts, USA. 
 
Siemens was also responsible for coordinating the work of the remaining alignment section 
corridors to ensure adequate integration with Siemens’s system design463.   
 
Siemens is paid an inflation-indexed base compensation ranging from $27.3M to $34.4M per year 
for operating the system464.  Compensation is also dependent on the quality of service, with a 
deduction for service shortfalls and a bonus for improved performance and high ridership.  PRHTA 
sets the level of service and the fares, though they are collected by Siemens465.  PRHTA may require 
changes in the level of service with appropriate adjustments in compensation paid to Siemens. 
 
Long-term functionality is a key reason for procuring a DBOM contract since it shifts much of the 
performance risk to the private operator.  PRHTA believed Siemens’s O&M responsibility would 
lead to a better quality product.  However, Siemens had only a short-term perspective since the 
DBOM contract was only for five years with the one five-year renewal option.  Because much of the 
infrastructure has a lifespan well in excess of five or ten years, Siemens was not properly incentivized 
to be cognizant of the whole life-cycle costs of the asset.  
 
12.4 Revenue Risk 
 
PRHTA’s EIS predicted 110,000 rides per day, but the agency agreed that a prudent bidder would 
probably discount that number in its bid466.  The final contract stipulated that all fares from the first 
100,000 rides per day go to PRHTA and any extra would be shared between PRHTA and Siemens. 
 
Ridership was significantly less than expected, largely because an extensive bus feeder system plan 
was never implemented nor was there a university ridership program to help capture the large 
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student population in the areas surrounding Tren Urbano stations.  Tren Urbano averaged only 
24,000 trips per day after nearly a year of operation467.  If Siemens thought the ridership estimate was 
optimistic from the start, the incentivization package likely did not lower its bid price as intended.   
 
12.5 Tren Urbano Construction Management 
 
Because Tren Urbano was a completely new type of project in Puerto Rico, coordination among the 
owner, contractors, and subcontractors was critical.  In a transit project, there are many systemwide 
elements being delivered by contractors at different intervals. 
 
The GMAEC was tasked with developing the design and providing oversight during the 
construction period.  Unfortunately, the GMAEC was consistently undermined by the PRHTA468.  
PRHTA put their own highway specialists in key roles that only people with a background in transit 
could perform adequately.  This left the GMAEC to perform only residual QA/QC functions rather 
than full construction oversight. 
 
PRHTA also neglected to properly oversee the Siemens operations contract.  Transferring 
construction risk to Siemens backfired because PRHTA attempted to manage Siemens’s 
subcontractors directly, violating the contract and weakening Siemens’s accountability469.      
 
Many of these consequences came to light on contracts with one Puerto Rican-based contractor in 
particular.  This contractor was granted work on four of the seven design-build contracts and 
frequently extracted escalation fees to fast-track task completion 470.  This may have been a 
contributing factor in the deaths of three workers during Tren Urbano construction471.  Siemens 
never performed extensive reviews of the contractor’s work and acted as though the contractor was 
accountable to PRHTA472.  PRHTA, however, should have challenged this claim and should have 
been holding Siemens accountable for the shoddy work of its subcontractors. 
 
PRHTA made a fundamental error in transferring a risk for which it did not hold its private sector 
partner accountable.  Perhaps in deference to the fact that the contractor was local and provided lots 
of jobs to native Puerto Ricans, PRHTA consistently relented.  
 
Given PRHTA’s unwillingness or inability to hold Siemens accountable for the work of its 
subcontractors, PRHTA had two options.  It could either let the subcontractors continue to deliver 
poor work that was often late, or it could perform its own oversight and inspection of the 
subcontractors.  Either way, the accountability always fell on PRHTA.  
 
PRHTA inspectors were also quite blatant in their disregard for any input provided by the GMAEC 
on construction management and quality control.  The oversight that was to be provided by the 
GMAEC and by Siemens was disregarded when PRHTA dealt directly with subcontractors.    
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12.6  Benefits of Early Operator Involvement 
 
This is not to say that Siemens’s early involvement was all not worthwhile.  One example came in 
the development of the Tren Urbano maintenance facility.  The delivery partner GMAEC had 
partially designed the facility prior to Siemens being selected as the operator.  Since Siemens was 
hired as the operator early enough in the design phase of the facility so that their input could be 
incorporated into the final design, Siemens was able to work with the GMAEC on the final plans.  
The maintenance facility has proven to be one of the most successful elements of Tren Urbano473.   
 
12.7 Inclusion in the Turnkey Demonstration Program 
 
The PRHTA was opportunistic in its approach to securing funding for Tren Urbano.  FTA was 
encouraging experimentation with design-build techniques, so Puerto Rico applied to become part 
of FTA’s blue-ribbon Turnkey Demonstration Program design-build initiative as a means to attract 
favorable consideration from FTA for federal funding474.  The FTA executed a Full Funding Grant 
Agreement (FFGA) for the construction of Tren Urbano with PRHTA in March 1996.  At the time, 
Tren Urbano was originally scheduled to open in July 2001 and at a cost of $1.25B.   
 
PRHTA also sold bonds that would eventually amount to $2B and received substantial funding from 
local sources including gas taxes, diesel oil taxes, motor vehicle license fees, and highway tolls475476.  
 
12.8 Scope Changes, Delays, and Amended Federal Commitment 
 
The cost of Tren Urbano grew to $1.68B by August 2000477.  Through an amended FTA FFGA 
signed in 1999, the federal government’s financial contribution to the project grew from about 
$300M to $700M.   
 
Notably, the additional funds were formula-based and did not come directly from the New Starts 
program.  Therefore, these funds could have been used to fund other transportation improvements 
not related to Tren Urbano.  In essence, the gap funding being filled by formula funds meant that 
Puerto Rico had to divert funds away from its highway improvements to make up for shortfalls on 
Tren Urbano.   
 
The amended FFGA reflected several scope changes – the addition of two stations, additional 
vehicles, and enhancements to station finishes and community facilities – as well as some cost 
increases478.  The schedule in the amended FFGA projected a revenue operating date of 2002; 10 
months later than estimated when the original FFGA was signed in 1996479. 
 
By 2003 the project had not yet been completed and its cost had risen to $2.25B.  In May of that 
year the FTA approved yet another amendment to the FFGA.  Again, the federal commitment 
increased without any additional New Starts contributions.  This time, the formula-based funds 
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added to Tren Urbano were $125M, bringing the federal government’s total contribution to 
$833.3M.  The following chart shows the amount and source of funding, as well as the scheduled 
date of completion at the time each of the three FFGAs were signed480: 
 
Tren Urbano Historical Cost, Funding, and Schedule Estimates ($ millions) 
    
 
March 1996 
FFGA 
July 1999  
Amended FFGA 
May 2003  
Amended FFGA 
Federal Funding    
New Starts $307.4 $307.4 $307.4 
Capital Funds $0 $0 $5 
Formula Funds $0 $141 $181 
Federal High Flex 
Funds $0 $259.9 $339.9 
Subtotal Federal $307.4 $708.3 $833.3 
Local Funding $942.9 $945.3 $1,416.7 
Total Funding $1,250.3 $1,653.6 $2,250 
Scheduled Project 
Completion July 1, 2001 May 31, 2002 June 30, 2004 
 Table 12.2 – Tren Urbano Historical Cost, Funding, and Schedule Estimates 
 
12.9 D-B-B Cost Estimates Versus D-B 
 
The National Transit Institute (NTI) D-B Project Development training course performed a 
comparison study between Tren Urbano D-B-B cost estimates versus D-B cost estimates481: 
 
Tren Urbano Comparison of D-B-B Estimates to D-B Estimates 
 Design-Bid-Build Design-Build 
Total Project Value $2.0B (1999$) $1.7B (1999$) 
Alignment Length 10.7 miles 10.7 miles 
Cost per Route Mile $186.9M $158.9M 
Number of Contracts ~75 8 
Average Contract Value $26.7M $212.5M 
Schedule Duration 8-10 years 5.5 years 
Change Orders/Claims ~250 ~15 
Total Value $750M $450M 
Average Value $3.0M  $30.0M 
Table 12.3 – Tren Urbano D-B-B vs. D-B Cost Estimate Comparison 
 
Despite the project eventually having come in at $2.25M due to scope increases and market 
conditions, PRHTA’s data predicted that D-B still saved 15% in costs per route mile, 30% in overall 
project duration, and took two years off the project’s timeline482483.   
 
 
                                                 
480 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Audit of Tren Urbano Rail Transit Project,” 2. 
481 Loulakis, 102. 
482 Ibid. 
483 Dieterich, 83. 
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12.10 Federal Audit 
 
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) kept a close eye on the project and performed several 
audits, the third of which was released in September 2004.  According to FTA, 40% of the cost 
increase is due to scope changes, such as the addition of rail vehicles and two stations484.  The 
remaining 60% is attributed to rising costs, schedule slippages, and construction quality problems.   
 
12.10.1  False Inflation Assumptions 
 
The FTA audits exposed PRHTA for using an arbitrarily low inflation adjustment.  PRHTA 
accounted for inflation simply by adding $200,000 per year485.  For example, it determined the 
amount of capitalized expenditures for 2008 by taking the figure from 2007, $85M, and increasing it 
to $85.2M.  This is equivalent to an annual inflation rate of less than 0.25%.  By comparison, for the 
10-year period from 1995-2004, inflation in Puerto Rico had never been below 1.33% and was as 
high as 6.36%486.   
 
This may have been the result of a careless inaccuracy, or may be an egregious example of optimism 
bias.  Regardless, as a result of this extremely low inflation projection, it is estimated that PRHTA 
understated capitalized expenditures by approximately $378M in 2003 present value terms487.   
 
12.10.2 Bus Feeder System Abandonment 
 
Perhaps the most notable omission was the elimination of not one, but two bus feeder system plans 
which were intended to provide the access to Tren Urbano for a large majority of its intended 
ridership.  Roughly 55% of Tren Urbano’s riders were expected to arrive at metro stations by bus488.  
The FTA review noted that the cost of this single omission alone could reach $1.269B in 2003 
present value terms489. 
 
This elimination of the bus system plan represented an explicit neglect for the long-term 
functionality of Tren Urbano as a whole.  Political posturing may have had a lot to do with this, as 
Puerto Rico had just undergone a transition of political parties.  The new administration may not 
have wanted to proceed with a bus plan developed by the previous administration490. 
 
On megaprojects, especially, it is important that the owner or its designated manager or 
representative is consistently looking out for the project’s long-term viability.  In the case of Tren 
Urbano, both political transition and also the weakening of the GMAEC role led to an excessive 
focus on short-term interests.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
484 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Audit of Tren Urbano Rail Transit Project,” 3. 
485 Ibid, 20. 
486 Ibid, 20. 
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488 Peña-Mora, Sosa, and McCone, 231. 
489 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Audit of Tren Urbano Rail Transit Project,” 21. 
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12.11 Costly Change Orders and Inadequate Cost Recovery Plan 
 
The “fast-tracking” strategy in Tren Urbano that allowed work to start on certain elements while the 
final designs and plans for seemingly unrelated elements were still being conceived had unintended 
consequences.  It allowed contractors to claim that previously completed work hindered their ability 
to fulfill their responsibilities, even though this was a risk that was legally theirs to manage.  This led 
to numerous and costly claims, change orders, and renegotiations. 
   
Since PRHTA lacked in-house expertise to determine whether or not their contractors were telling 
the truth and not trying to extrapolate additional funds, there was little recourse but to take the 
contractors at their word.  Someone has to determine when to fast-track and when there genuinely 
isn’t enough information to do so.  PRHTA did not adequately analyze the interfaces of the 
contracts and identify which elements had too many dependencies to be fast-tracked, nor did 
PRHTA legally enforce contractors’ risks. 
 
From 1997 through 2004, PRHTA executed 759 contract change orders491.  FTA’s audit found that 
377, or nearly half of these change orders were irregular, suggesting that contractors may have been 
overpaid for their work.  The irregularities in the change orders were of three types492: 
 
1. 207 change orders valued at $186.1M were executed without PRHTA first obtaining a fair 
cost estimate, as was required by the FTA.  For example, a 2002 change order to redesign 
and relocate utilities for the Hato Rey contract had a contractor-proposed value of $281,162 
and was settled for $888,000.    
 
2. 167 change orders were executed for more than 15% above the value of their fair cost 
estimates.  In the most extreme case, one change order was settled for 2189% above its cost 
estimate.  The amounts paid above 15% over the fair cost estimate totaled $15.3M493.   
 
                                                 
491 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Audit of Tren Urbano Rail Transit Project,” 5. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Ibid, 17. 
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Figure 12.2 – Tren Urbano Change Order Costs 
 
3. 8 change orders were executed for accelerating construction, even though FTA warned 
PRHTA that the dates were not achievable.   
 
FTA noted that PRHTA showed a “flagrant disregard” for its requests494.  As a result, these 377 
change orders added $226.5M to the cost of the project.  
 
In November 2003, FTA completed a review of 167 of these change orders and declared 52 of 
them, valued at $130M, ineligible for federal funds because supporting documentation was missing 
to validate the rationality for the contractors’ proposals and the value of the work performed495.  
PRHTA had not provided the documentation related to the 52 change orders a full ten months after 
the request by FTA was made. 
 
12.12 Safety Delays 
 
With 93% of the project complete, PRHTA had identified 241 safety and performance issues yet to 
be resolved496.  In July 2004, PRHTA and FTA determined that 77 of these issues were safety-critical 
and PRHTA submitted a plan to FTA for resolving these issues.  However, the plan did not 
establish timeframes or identify actions to address all safety-critical issues prior to the start of 
passenger service.  By September 2004, only seven of the 77 issues had been resolved.    
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12.13 Litigation 
 
Delays in construction led to a bitter dispute between Siemens and PRHTA.  Originally scheduled 
for a September 2003 completion date, Tren Urbano was still not operational several months later.  
PRHTA fined Siemens $3M and imposed a penalty of $100,000 per day in damages for not 
completing the project on-time497. 
 
Siemens claimed that it had no control over their contractors since it believed that they were to be 
supervised by PRHTA.  Also, Siemens noted that PRHTA granted extensions to these other civil 
contractors without granting the same extensions to Siemens.   
 
Siemens contended that the delays were not its fault, but rather that of other contractors whose own 
failures meant that Siemens couldn’t complete its work on-time.  Again, these other contractors were 
actually subcontractors to Siemens for whom Siemens should have been held accountable.   
 
In February 2004, the Siemens Partnership sued PRHTA seeking a 284-day extension to complete 
Tren Urbano and $50M498.  Siemens arrived at the $50M amount based on $10M for work already 
undertaken to accelerate the project, a $3M judgment against PRHTA for not complying with a 
change order request, and $37M in damages499.  Siemens and PRHTA are still in litigation500.   
 
12.14 D-B Contract Success Story:  Rio Piedras 
 
Despite many of the problems in the procurement and delivery of Tren Urbano, there was one 
contract in particular that, by all accounts, was a resounding success.  It just so happens that this 
contract also included the lone subterranean sections of the project and hence had the most difficult 
engineering and logistical hurdles to navigate.  This one of the seven alignment section-based 
design-build contracts for Tren Urbano was the Rio Piedras contract.  Rio Piedras consists of a 1.5-
km tunnel with two underground stations:  University of Puerto Rico and Rio Piedras.   
 
The contract was advertised in June 1996 and awarded in April 1997 to the KKZ/CMA joint 
venture, which comprises three construction contractors:  Kiewit Construction Company, Kenny 
Construction, and H.B. Zachry Company501.  The managing designer was the Puerto Rican firm 
CMA Architects & Engineers.  The bid of $225.6M was the highest of the three bidders, but was 
deemed to be of the best value, in part because of the consortium’s stellar health and safety 
record502. 
 
The KKZ/CMA JV had to assume more risk for their alternative design, which was quite different 
than the one PRHTA had been developing in-house503. 
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Sections of the guideway and the University of Puerto Rico station were constructed by cut-and-
cover methods.  The remainder was done by various tunneling methods, including the use of an 
earth pressure balance tunnel boring machine for both guideway tunnels.   
 
12.14.1 Risks Specific to Rio Piedras 
 
For the Rio Piedras subterranean contract, the owner did a significant amount of geotechnical 
research prior to requesting proposals for the design-build contract504.  Subsequently, this research 
was shared with prospective bidders and helped to foster an open dialogue about these delicate 
engineering obstacles.   
 
First, a geotechnical data report was generated by the owner and shared with bidding teams.  
Second, bidding teams were allowed to submit requests for additional geotechnical information prior 
to them submitting their best and final offer.  Finally, bidding teams were invited to meet with the 
owner’s team members to discuss their interpretation of the data.   
 
In urban areas, especially old urban areas, there are always many unknowns when it comes to existing 
utilities.  This causes delays and disputes and is considered a high risk for a contractor.  To eliminate 
this risk in Tren Urbano, the owner decided to provide a “stipulated lump sum” amount as a bid 
item505.  All utility work was paid for under this item, eliminating the risk to the contractor, and the 
D-B contractor was paid a fee for administering the utility subcontractor’s work.  This created a very 
proactive environment for the project team.   
 
The amount of design performed before issuing a contract, design-build or otherwise, should 
depend on the amount of uncertainty that can be eliminated through a more thorough preliminary 
analysis.  Utility relocation is one such element that should be executed to a higher level of design 
than others due to the potential delays and additional costs associated with this type of work.  
Ideally, utility companies are involved actively in the design and scheduling of major construction 
work, but this is difficult to achieve.  In Rio Piedras, because leaks from water and sewer pipes could 
weaken soil stability during tunneling, an early action renewed and repaired most utilities in the area. 
 
12.15 Lessons Learned from Tren Urbano as a DBOM Project 
 
Tren Urbano perhaps suffered most from the “cultural” shift in mindset that it required.  There had 
not been a transit project built in Puerto Rico in 50 years, so the PRHTA experience was solely in 
road projects.  In addition, because of the scarcity of competitive contractors, a culture of accepting 
poor quality work and paying extra for remediation had developed.  The PRHTA was therefore 
poorly prepared to oversee construction of a transit project with much higher quality requirements 
than most highway projects.   
 
Under D-B-B the project likely would never have happened or would have resulted in an inferior 
asset.  Given the extremely close relationship between PRHTA and local contractors, none of whom 
had experience in rail transit, the project likely would have been very poorly constructed.  At least 
with DBOM, the civil contractors were to be held accountable to future operator Siemens.   
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With one contractor having been given the majority of D-B alignment section contracts (four of 
seven), however, the project exhibited many of the same characteristics of D-B-B.  This strategy 
provided greater opportunity for the contractor to extract additional funds by causing delay on one 
contract and then claiming that the delay had an adverse impact on its other contracts, which led to 
costly claims and change orders.   
 
The culture of low quality and safety standards that existed in the Puerto Rican procurement and 
construction communities made the project management function so critical in DBOM all the more 
difficult to perform.  The GMAEC/delivery partner structure was probably the proper one 
considering the large number of interfaces that the multiple D-B contracts created.  Unfortunately, 
an ineffectual client in PRHTA usurped the GMAEC’s role and also chose to manage the operator 
Siemens’s contractors rather than hold Siemens itself accountable.   
 
The broad scope of PRHTA’s role partially undermined both the project and program management 
efforts.  As a result of this failure in management there was virtually no one looking out for the long-
term viability of the program.  This led to the eventual abandonment of the plan to integrate bus 
feeder systems and plans to attract university students, which contributed significantly to low 
ridership. 
 
Tren Urbano may have ended up as a DBOM partly because of the funding streams that the 
Turnkey Demonstration Program provided.  But the substantive reason for choosing DBOM, rather 
than simple D-B, which would have been adequate to be included in the FTA Turnkey Program, 
was to have the operator, with a stake in high quality, in charge.   
 
Siemens was involved early, but perhaps not early enough.  Contributing to some of the failure was 
the fact that the Siemens O&M contract was only for five years.  This was well short of what was 
needed to entice Siemens to play a proactive role in quality enhancement and also to account for 
whole life-cycle costs.  Although tax law initially prevented longer contracts, this law was eventually 
overturned to allow for early extension of the contract, but no extension was ever executed.  
Siemens’s contract is set to expire in late 2009, and it has not yet been renewed, nor is there any 
indication of a successor.     
 
Despite all of the hurdles that needed to be overcome in order to bring Tren Urbano to completion 
as a DBOM, it is still believed that DBOM saved two years over D-B-B, and there is no evidence to 
suggest that the project would have turned out any better if it had been delivered traditionally506.  
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Chapter 13:  Crossrail 
 
This chapter will introduce the reader to Crossrail, including the business case to support its 
development, and its funding and governance structures. 
 
13.1 Crossrail 
 
Crossrail is a proposed east-west rail line spanning nearly 120 km and traversing central London via 
a 21-km tunnel through the heart of the city507.   
 
 
Figure 13.1 – Crossrail Regional Map508 
 
Crossrail will support economic growth, reduce congestion into and within London, improve 
intermodal connections, and provide regeneration opportunities throughout the region509.   
 
13.2 Crossrail Timeline 
 
Crossrail obtained the key parliamentary approval known as Royal Assent in 2008, and with a 
£15.9B funding package in place is set to proceed with procurement and construction, to commence 
in 2009.  Crossrail is expected to open for passenger service in 2017.  The following diagram 
indicates the projected timeline of key benchmarks510: 
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Figure 13.2 – Crossrail Timeline 
 
13.3 Crossrail Route 
 
Crossrail’s route has four distinct sections: a central tunnel section (CTS) and western, northeastern, 
and southeastern branches.  In the west, Crossrail will use the existing Great Western Main Line rail 
corridor to its terminus in Maidenhead511.  The CTS will consist of a twin-bore tunnel beneath 
central London.  On the northeast route section, Crossrail will use the existing Great Eastern Main 
Line to Shenfield.  Crossrail will emerge from the central tunnel to serve a reconstructed station at 
Custom House, as well as stations at Woolwich and at its southeastern terminus at Abbey Wood. 
 
Figure 13.3 – Crossrail Route Connections Map512 
 
Crossrail includes the construction of seven central area stations – providing interchange with 
London Underground (LUL), Network Rail (NR), and London bus services – and the upgrading or 
renewal of existing stations outside central London.  Crossrail is designed to connect to various 
                                                 
511 Crossrail.  “Environmental Statement.”  Volume 1.  Chapter 2, pages 12-13. 
512 Crossrail.  “Route Connections Map.”  
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other elements of the London transport network, thus providing a more seamless and more reliable 
transportation system513.   
 
            
 
13.4 Crossrail Operations 
 
Crossrail’s rolling stock will be reminiscent of a commuter rail or intercity rail service, but with 
frequencies through the central section comparable to the London Underground or any other Metro 
system.  Though still susceptible to change, the expected frequencies are 24 trains per hour in each 
direction during peak periods514.  Fourteen of the 24 peak-hour trains will terminate at Paddington 
Station in the west.  Two trains will terminate in West Drayton, four at Heathrow Airport, and four 
at Maidenhead.  Eastbound trains will be split evenly between the Shenfield and Abbey Wood 
branches515516: 
 
 
Figure 13.4 – Crossrail Trains Per Hour Per Direction in the Peak Period  
 
Station platforms will be designed to accommodate 10-car trains that are 200 meters long517.  Each 
10-car train will have a capacity of at least 1,500 passengers.  However, the tunnels will be 
constructed to allow for a future upgrade of platforms to 245 meters to be able to handle 12-car 
trains518.   
 
When Crossrail opens, joint sponsors Transport for London (TfL) and the Department for 
Transport (DfT) expect 160,000 daily rush-hour passengers between 7:00-10:00 in the morning519.  
Sections of the central tunnel will carry up to 55,000 passengers hourly in a single direction520.  The 
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following diagram shows projected passenger loadings in the central area during the morning peak 
period521: 
 
 
Figure 13.5 – Crossrail Projected Passenger Loadings Along Select Segments in the AM Peak 
 
Crossrail will provide significant reductions in journey times between many key destinations 
currently underserved by the London Underground522.  Journeys that may previously have required 
at least one, if not multiple transfers, will now be able to be made in a single-ride, thus reducing 
congestion at many Underground stations.   
 
Journey Times and Time Savings with Crossrail (in minutes) 
  Before Crossrail After Crossrail Savings 
Abbey Wood to Isle of Dogs 30 9 21 
Isle of Dogs to Paddington 29 18 11 
Ealing Broadway to Farringdon 25 17 8 
Hayes to Tottenham Court Road 34 24 10 
Southall to Custom House 58 36 22 
Paddington to Liverpool Street 17 11 6 
Table 13.1 – Time Savings Associated with Crossrail 
 
Crossrail’s Business Case determined that 58% of its user benefits come in the form of time savings.  
Other benefits include crowding relief and highway decongestion523: 
  
 
Figure 13.6 – Crossrail User Benefits 
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13.4.1  Crossrail Operator Involvement 
 
Rail for London (RfL), a TfL subsidiary, has been selected as the “shadow operator” for Crossrail, 
meaning that it will assume the operator role until such time when a full-time operator can be 
procured.  RfL has experience in rail operations as the operator of the relatively new London 
Overground services.  RfL also manages the operations of the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and 
the Croydon Tramlink.   
 
Though RfL’s qualifications are unquestioned, it is still unclear whether RfL will be the Crossrail 
train operating company (TOC).  Presumably, when the current Network Rail concessions are re-
bid, the new structure may incorporate the new Crossrail operation.  These sorts of issues 
surrounding the integration of existing Network Rail services into Crossrail are yet to be fully 
resolved.   
 
It would be in TfL’s best interests to procure the operator as soon as possible.  This way, there can 
be an early market test of the operating costs, and the operator can have input during construction.  
The lack of early operator involvement proved to be disastrous on the Big Dig.  Tren Urbano 
achieved moderate success from the early involvement of the operator Siemens, at least in terms of 
Siemens being able to provide input into the asset’s final design. 
 
13.5 London Transport2025 Vision 
 
London businesses consistently rank transport constraints among their greatest concerns.  There are 
extreme cost implications associated with people being late for work and missing meetings due to 
crowding, uncertainty, and delays524.  With expected growth comes new challenges for an already 
overburdened system.  The City’s transport vision and investment strategy is intended to help 
accommodate 900,000 more jobs and 800,000 more people by 2025525.  Transport for London (TfL) 
is preparing to move 1.4M people a day in and out of the central area by 2025; an increase in rail 
demand of 40%526. 
 
 
Figure 13.7 – Projected Growth of London Population and Employment Through 2025 
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Job growth is expected to concentrate in an east-west corridor stretching from White City through 
the City of London to the Isle of Dogs and Thames Gateway, including Paddington and King’s 
Cross527.  The current transport network in London is lacking in east-west thoroughfares.  As the 
following diagrams from TfL’s Transport2025 Vision indicate, two-thirds of the expected 
development hotspots are outside the central City, and are mostly concentrated east of London in 
areas poorly served by public transit currently, but will have improved and direct links to and 
through London via Crossrail528:    
 
 
Figure 13.8 – Map of Projected London Population Growth Through 2025 
 
 
Figure 13.9 – Map of Projected London Employment Growth Through 2025 
 
13.6 Crossrail Role in London Transport2025 Vision 
 
Crowding is projected to increase on the Underground (“Tube”) and Network Rail by about 40% 
during peak hours by 2025529.  This is on top of 2006 levels, when over one-third of the network was 
already overcrowded, defined on the Tube as there being more than one person standing for each 
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person seated.  Bus demand could also grow by around 30%.  This increase in demand will 
significantly outpace capacity improvements absent Crossrail530: 
 
 
Figure 13.10 – London Public Transport Demand and Capacity Gap 
 
Crossrail is the key mass transit link to deliver the capacity needed.  Crossrail is expected to provide 
a 10% boost to capacity in some of the most congested parts of the network531.  It adds 5.8M 
passenger-km to peak capacity, and when combined with the full London Underground system 
upgrades will be able to reduce crowding on the Tube and DLR by 45% as compared to the base 
case scenario of the completion of TfL’s Investment Program through 2010532533534. 
 
Changes in London Underground Boardings and Crowding with Crossrail 
Line % Change in Boardings % Change in Crowding 
Bakerloo -8 -29 
Central -9 -27 
District -4 -21 
Metropolitan/Hammersmith & City/Circle -8 -25 
Jubilee -6 -18 
Northern +2 -2 
Piccadilly -3 -12 
Victoria -3 -8 
Waterloo & City -14 -31 
London Underground Total -5 -17 
Docklands Light Rail Total -8 -30 
Table 13.2 – Changes in London Underground Boardings and Crowding with Crossrail 
 
Changes in National Rail Boardings and Crowding with Crossrail 
Service Group % Change in Boardings % Change in Crowding 
Paddington -10 -9 
Liverpool Street (Great Eastern) -35 -36 
Liverpool Street (West Anglia) 15 -12 
Total National Rail (excluding Crossrail) -5 -11 
Table 13.3 – Changes in National Rail Boardings and Crowding with Crossrail 
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Crossrail supports development potential in excess of 260,000 jobs and 70,000 people within the 
opportunity areas of the Isle of Dogs, Lower Lea Valley, and Paddington.  Crossrail is vital if the Isle 
of Dogs is going to support 200,000 jobs by 2026535.  Employment accessibility is significantly 
enhanced by Crossrail, with an additional 90,000 people now able to access jobs within 45 minutes 
by public transport536.  Crossrail alone would help generate net benefits of nearly £20B to U.K. 
GDP over 60 years537. 
 
Crossrail will also serve no fewer than eleven designated regeneration areas538: 
 
 
Figure 13.11 – Map of Crossrail’s Role in London’s Regeneration Efforts 
 
13.7 Crossrail History 
 
Crossrail was among three new projects proposed in the Central London Rail Study of 1989, along 
with a line from Wimbledon to Hackney via Chelsea (known as Crossrail Line 2), and the Jubilee 
Line Extension539.  Crossrail was initially rejected by Parliament in 1991 following the start of the 
early 1990s recession.  In 2000, the London East-West Study brought Crossrail back to the forefront 
of discussion, and development funding was allocated in the 2002 Government Spending Review.  
Following extensive lobbying by TfL and the business community, funding was finally agreed in the 
2007 Comprehensive Spending Review as part of a ten-year funding settlement for both the 
Department for Transport (DfT) and TfL.   
 
13.8 Crossrail Cost and the Montague Review 
 
In July 2003, an expert team set up by the Secretary of State for Transport and led by Adrian 
Montague was asked to review Crossrail’s business case540.  This review came to be known as the 
Montague Review, and found that Crossrail’s cost at the time was roughly £10B in 2002 prices, 
which included £3B in contingency.  When adjusted for inflation the Montague £10B estimate from 
2002 is only slightly shy of today’s £15.9B estimate.   
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Montague found understatements and overstatements that largely cancelled each other out.  
Montague concluded that Crossrail’s business case represented “acceptable” value-for-money541.  
The following chart outlines the £7B cost allocation noted in the Montague Review542: 
 
  
Table 13.4 – Crossrail Business Case Capital Cost Estimate  
 
Project management costs were assumed to be around £500M, which Montague found to be grossly 
underestimated by up to £1B, or 200%.  In fact, project management was the area in which 
Montague found the biggest underestimation543. 
 
The Crossrail Heads of Terms (HoT), which was released several years after Montague, was more 
comfortable with the current £15.9B estimate.  The HoT considered this estimate to have 
“appropriate” allowances for contingency and expected inflation.   
 
The £15.9B present day cost estimate equates to about US$23B as of April 2009.  A current 
breakdown of Crossrail capital expenditures is outlined below: 
 
Crossrail Capital Costs (£ million)  
On-Network Works         2,309  
Isle of Dogs Station           496  
Old Oak Common Depot           502  
Tunneling          3,361  
Stations         4,973  
Systems            619  
Land & Property         1,426  
Indirect Delivery & Programme Level Contingency         1,846  
Others            376  
Total        15,907  
Table 13.5 – Crossrail 2008 Capital Cost Estimate 
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13.9 Crossrail Funding 
 
DfT is responsible for £5.6B of funding with the Greater London Authority (GLA), via TfL, 
responsible for £7.8B.  Canary Wharf Group (CWG) and Berkeley Homes (BH) will also contribute 
towards the construction of new stations at the Isle of Dogs and Woolwich, respectively.  A £230M 
funding package with the British Airports Authority (BAA), the owner of seven British airports, was 
confirmed on November 4, 2008544.  The contribution will be paid by Heathrow Airport Limited, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of BAA which owns and operates Heathrow.  Network Rail is also 
delivering £2.3B of upgrades across the rail network.  
 
A Business Rate Supplement levied on London largest businesses will support another £3.5B of 
Crossrail funding.  The Government is introducing legislation to enable top-tier local authorities to 
introduce these Business Rate Supplements545. 
 
Additionally, a portion of Crossrail’s financial support will be supplied by developer contributions in 
the amount of £350M.  London Mayor Boris Johnson commenced consultation with stakeholders 
on an amendment to the Mayor’s London Plan planning framework that will enable this funding 
stream to be realized.  On December 4, 2008, a deal with the City of London Corporation 
confirmed this full contribution546.  The Corporation will provide £200M directly and will seek 
contributions of businesses of £150M. 
 
A breakdown of funding, including contingency, as noted in the Crossrail Heads of Terms (HoT), is 
outlined below547: 
Table 13.6 – Crossrail Funding Contributions 
 
The private sector funding element stems largely from the fact that Crossrail is too large to be put in 
the ordinary budget548.  Cost with inflation will average about $2B per year over an eight-year 
delivery stage549.  Debt levels in the U.K. have recently threatened to violate the Sustainable 
Investment Rule, which stipulates that public debt cannot exceed 40% of GDP.  If entirely debt 
financed, Crossrail’s debt would have peaked at about 0.8% of GDP550.   
                                                 
544 Crossrail.  “Major Boost for Crossrail as BAA Agrees £230 million Funding - Joint DfT & BAA Release.”   
545 Crossrail.  “Full Speed Ahead for Crossrail.”   
546 Ibid. 
547 Crossrail.  “Heads of Terms in Relation to the Crossrail Project.”  Section 4.1.3. 
548 Gomez-Ibanez, Jose.  “Crossrail (A):  The Business Case,” 9.  Cited with permission from the author. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid. 
Funding Source £ billion Notes 
DfT Underwritten 5.6 Includes contributions from BAA and City of London 
Corporation. 
 
TfL Underwritten 
 
7.8 
 
Includes proceeds of £3.5B of borrowing by the Greater 
London Authority against Supplementary Business Rates 
(underwritten by DfT if necessary legislation not in place). 
Other 
 
2.5 Includes Network Rail contribution towards On Network 
Works (ONW), a depot operating lease, and an additional City 
Corporation contribution. 
Total Available Funding  15.9  
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13.10  Crossrail Expense Schedule 
 
The following table provides an estimation of when the main DfT and TfL contributions will be 
spent over the next decade551: 
 
 Year ended 
31 March 
 DfT 
Contribution 
 TfL Base 
Contribution 
 TfL 
Contingency 
Contribution 
 TFL LUL 
Contingency 
Contribution 
 Total TFL 
Contribution 
             2,008 
                   120 
2,009            500                     500                    
2,010            172                   522                     522                    
2,011            220                   832                     832                    
2,012            622                   788                     788                    
2,013            1,250                799                     799                    
2,014            1,313                1,124                  100                      1,224                 
2,015            1,142                920                     150                      1,070                 
2,016            800                   681                     150                      831                    
2,017            549                     549                    
2,018            22                       600                622                    
5,639                6,737                  600                400                      7,737                 
 
Table 13.7 – Crossrail Expense Schedule 
 
According to the current schedule, costs will ramp up throughout the early part of the 2010s and will 
dissipate towards construction completion. 
 
13.11 Crossrail Government Stakeholders 
 
On a project of Crossrail’s size, there are bound to be many stakeholders.  The governance structure 
in the U.K. and in London pertaining to transportation is such that Transport for London and all its 
subsidiaries play a role that is on par with even the national government.  Crossrail, being both a 
national project and a project for London, has joint and equal sponsorship by TfL and by the 
national DfT.  Specific roles of these entities and several others with direct involvement during the 
Crossrail procurement process are described in the following table552: 
                                                 
551 Crossrail.  “Heads of Terms in Relation to the Crossrail Project.”  Section 4.1.3. 
552 Ibid. 
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Table 13.8 – Crossrail Stakeholders and Roles 
 
13.12 Crossrail Limited (CRL) 
 
Crossrail Limited (CRL), until January 2009 named Cross-London Rail Links Limited (occasionally 
noted in charts and diagrams as CLRL), is Crossrail’s delivery agent and is jointly owned by TfL and 
DfT.  Established in January 2002, CRL’s role is to design, procure, and deliver Crossrail according 
to the sponsor’s requirements553.  In meeting these ambitious goals, CRL is expected to: 
 
• Develop an organization, management, and delivery strategy for executing the design and 
construction of Crossrail; 
 
• Work with the Program Delivery Partner (DP) to define and manage program interfaces 
with industry partners and third parties; 
 
• Take full responsibility for railway requirements and systems integration;  
 
• Manage communications with stakeholders and the public; 
 
                                                 
553 Ibid, Section 3.3. 
Stakeholder Role 
Department for Transport (DfT) 
Co-sponsor.  Main interface to national government and HM 
Treasury 
Transport for London (TfL) 
Co-sponsor.  Main interfaces to local government, the Greater 
London Authority (GLA), and the Mayor of London's office.  
Owner of the central section. 
Crossrail Limited (CRL); previously 
Cross-London Rail Links Limited 
(CLRL) 
Delivery agent.  Formerly a 50/50 joint venture of TfL and DfT, 
now a wholly-owned subsidiary of TfL.  Main interface to the 
delivery supply chain, including both the Project and Program 
Delivery Partners (DPs). 
Network Rail (NR) 
Industry Partner.  Responsible for the operations, maintenance, 
and renewal of the National Rail network.  Infrastructure manager 
of Crossrail end-to-end rail systems.  Main interfaces to Train 
Operating Companies (TOCs) and Freight Operating Companies 
(FOCs). 
London Underground (LUL); a TfL 
subsidiary 
Industry Partner.  Responsible for the operations, maintenance, 
and renewal of the London Underground transport system.  
Infrastructure manager of the central section stations, except 
Paddington.  Main interface to the PPP and PFI LUL contractors.   
Rail for London (RfL); a TfL 
subsidiary 
Operator franchising authority, or "shadow operator," of 
Crossrail.  Infrastructure manager of Crossrail stations at 
Paddington, Isle of Dogs, and Woolwich. 
Docklands Light Railway (DLR); a 
TfL subsidiary  
Industry Partner.  Responsible for the operations, maintenance, 
and renewal of the Docklands Light Railway transport system, and 
for providing Crossrail Limited (CRL) with access for proposed 
modifications of the DLR. 
British Airports Authority Owner of the Heathrow Spur. 
Canary Wharf Group (CWG) and 
Berkeley Homes Group (BH) 
Developers that have agreed to make contributions towards the 
cost of stations at the Isle of Dogs and Woolwich, respectively. 
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• Develop management incentive arrangements, based on the model used in the Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) project, but compatible with TfL’s chosen processes; and 
 
• Take the lead on bill compliance, technology, legal issues, finances, and human resources.   
 
CRL will control part of the delivery of Crossrail but only influence other parts.  In particular: 
 
• Network Rail will have a separate budget for the On Network Works (allocated from within 
the £15.9B total) and will have considerable freedom over how those works are procured 
and delivered. 
 
• Canary Wharf and Berkeley Homes will have contracts negotiated by the sponsors to 
construct the Isle of Dogs and Woolwich stations. 
 
• TfL, through Rail for London (RfL), will have a major role in supporting CRL procuring 
rolling stock and operations contracts. 
 
• TfL, through LUL, will also have a significant role over how station works are procured and 
delivered. 
 
CRL will be downsized in phases.  A small core team is expected to remain throughout construction 
and until the project is completed and handed over to the eventual operator.   
 
13.13 Crossrail Board Structure 
 
DfT and TfL appointed a new CRL Board in July 2008.  The Board is chaired by a non-executive 
Chairman and includes three executive directors:  the CEO, Finance Director, and Program 
Director.  There are also four non-executive directors, and TfL and DfT each have the option of 
appointing an additional non-executive director.  CRL requires the approval of both sponsors to 
change the composition of its Board.   
 
The non-executive Chairman and CEO have six key areas of management:  resources and talent, 
development, finance, program, legal services, and corporate affairs.  
 
There is also a separate Executive Committee (ExCom), which includes CRL executive directors, 
chaired by the CEO.  Even though CRL is now a subsidiary of TfL, DfT retains the right to appoint 
a project representative and will have access to all information, but has no executive authority on the 
ExCom.  The ExCom is beneath the Board and does day-to-day management.   
 
CRL is coordinating delivery of its wider program role through a Program Board (also known as the 
Programme Board).  The principal function of the Program Board is to provide a forum for 
interface management.  The Program Board is chaired by the CRL CEO with NR, LUL, RfL and 
CRL members.  CWG and BH will attend when necessary.  The Program Board will be supported 
by various specialist panels and groups. 
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Figure 13.12 – Crossrail Board Structure 
 
13.14 Crossrail Contracting Strategy 
 
Crossrail’s draft contracting approach includes four generalized options: 
 
• Option A – Large Geographical Contracts, CRL Transfers Risk; 
 
• Option B – Large Functional Contracts, CRL Transfers Risk; 
 
• Option C – Mixed Size Functional Contracts, CRL Shares Risk; and 
 
• Option D – Mixed Size Functional Contracts, CRL Retains Risk 
 
One final sub-option is to separate signaling from other rail systems elements and transfer signaling 
responsibility to NR so that Crossrail can more easily be integrated with other railway projects in the 
region.   
 
These options revolve around three main features:  contract value, risk transfer, and whether to 
divide up contracts by location or function.  The tradeoffs among these various options are outlined 
in the following chart: 
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Key Criteria for Developing Options 
Perspective Choices available and their Characteristics 
1.  Scope of Work Geographical (where contractors are 
responsible for all works within their 
allocated area) 
• Contractor manages interfaces within 
the area 
• CRL manages interfaces between areas 
 
Functional (where contractors are 
responsible for their work element within 
an allocated area) 
• Contractor manages the interfaces within 
the function 
• CRL manages the interfaces between 
functions 
2.  Contract Value One/few large value contract(s) 
• Potential for increased leverage and 
better value 
• Will attract major international 
contractors 
• Requires high level contract definition 
from the outset 
• Trade interfaces are managed by 
contractor 
• Moves control from CRL to contractor 
• Increases the risks (CRL and supplier) 
associated with contract failure 
 
Many smaller value contracts 
• Provides more opportunities for small 
companies 
• Will attract wide range of contractors 
• Can spread procurement to suit 
programme 
• Requires a high degree of management, 
including interface risks 
• Retains a high degree of control with CRL 
management 
• Minimizes the risks arising from individual 
contract failure 
3.  Risk Allocation CRL transfers risks as far as possible 
to contractors  
• Private finance contracts 
• Lump sum fixed price contracts 
• Target price contracts 
• CRL design warranted by contractors; 
some ability to prepare own design 
 
CRL accepts risks as far as possible 
and introduces management and 
incentive mechanisms to assure 
efficient working 
• Cost reimbursable contract with incentives 
Table 13.9 – Key Criteria for Developing Crossrail Procurement Options 
 
13.14.1 Geographical Versus Functional Contract Packaging 
 
Geographical packaging would combine all of the works in a given area for delivery by a single 
supplier.  For the Crossrail central area this would require packaging together the tunnels, stations, 
station systems, and possibly the railway systems.  Geographical packaging introduces a high degree 
of risk and complexity at the interfaces between packages.  Therefore, the most practical approach 
to geographical packaging would be to create a very limited number of large contracts. 
 
Functional packaging may include separating: 
 
• tunnels from stations; 
 
• tunnels from railway systems; 
 
• the railway systems into their components (signaling, track, power); 
 
• stations from station systems; or  
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• the rolling stock and depot from everything else. 
 
The advantage of functional packages is that it is much easier to create contracts of the right size for 
particular supplier markets and for suppliers to achieve economies of scale within their specialized 
area.  The main disadvantage is that each division creates another interface for CRL and the delivery 
partners to manage. 
 
13.14.2 Evaluating Crossrail’s Contracting and Risk Allocation Options 
 
Large geographical contracts would include some level of design responsibility and may also include 
some maintenance obligations.  The main advantage is that it minimizes complex interfaces at site 
boundaries.  There would probably be between 3-5 large contracts under this option.   
 
Large functional contracts would include packaging all of the railway systems elements (signaling, 
track, communications, ventilation, etc.) together, or breaking them down by individual system.  
There would be consideration to doing these contracts as D-B.  The number of contracts can vary 
depending on whether the systems elements are packaged together or separately.   
 
Larger contracts will attract major contractors that can deliver excellent value.  They can also reduce 
overhead costs and provide efficiencies in terms of contract management and administration 
processes.  However, larger contracts will also limit competition as the number of prospective 
bidders will be reduced.  Another drawback is that CRL will have to relinquish much control to large 
contractors who will be unlikely to bid on such a risky project if they feel as though the final 
outcome is largely out of their hands.   
 
Mixed size functional contracts that include risk sharing would include a range of contract packages 
valued anywhere from around £25M to £800M.  This would allow both small and large contractors 
to penetrate the market.  For the main civil work (utilities, portals, tunnels, shafts), contractors will 
be working with an engineer’s design, but they will also provide their own design input.  D-B will be 
considered for non-civil work.  Smaller contracts will increase CRL’s level of control over each 
contractor, but the more contracts needed increases the number of interfaces to be managed.    
 
Mixed size functional contracts with CRL retaining risk would have the same characteristics as 
above, except that contractor will be paid on a cost-plus basis with a heavily incentive-laden 
compensation scheme.   
 
The sub-option that isolates signaling is compatible with each of the four options listed above, 
although it would make risk transfer more difficult, particularly in large geographical contracts.  
Signaling proved to be a major headache in delivering the Jubilee Line Extension; the last major 
extension to the London Underground network. 
 
13.14.3 Design-Build Options for Crossrail 
 
Crossrail has long weighed the D-B option for at least part of its delivery.  If contracts are divided 
up into several alignment sections, for example, there will be consideration to completing at least 
one of the sections as D-B.  There is a tremendous amount of both support and skepticism for D-B 
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on such a large project, especially given the enormous level of uncertainty surrounding so many of 
Crossrail’s key elements.   
 
The most relevant lesson learned in both the Big Dig and Tren Urbano case studies is that the early 
market test provided by D-B can be tremendously valuable in verifying technical feasibility and cost.  
Especially in combination with early operator designation and participation, D-B can substantially 
improve transparency, leading to better outcomes.  D-B plus early operator involvement may 
provide timely collaboration while it is still particularly opportune for Crossrail.   
 
If D-B is to have a solid future in the U.K. it would be an incredibly valuable test case to do at least 
one of these alignments as D-B, which will allow for any number of comparisons once the project is 
complete.  This requires a long-term perspective for which it is difficult to gain political support.  
The risk is significant, but so is the potential reward if D-B can be shown to be a success story as 
part of such an important and visible project as Crossrail.   
 
13.15 Crossrail Delivery Strategy 
 
Crossrail has procured both a “project” delivery partner (DP) and a “program” delivery partner.  
The Project Delivery Partner will manage the delivery of the central tunnel section (CTS).  CRL 
awarded the £400M Project Partner contract to Bechtel in April 2009554.  The Program Delivery 
Partner will handle non-CTS elements and macro-level management.  CRL awarded the £100M 
Program Partner Contract in March 2009 to Transcend – a joint venture comprising AECOM, 
CH2M Hill, and Nichols Group555.  The following is the strategic framework for the two delivery 
partner strategy: 
 
 
 Program Delivery Partner 
 Project Delivery Partner 
Figure 13.13 – Crossrail Delivery Strategy 
                                                 
554 Crossrail.  “Up to 14,000 Jobs Anticipated as Key Crossrail Contract Awarded.” 
555 Crossrail.  “Transcend confirmed as Crossrail Programme Partner.” 
1
2
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13.15.1 Crossrail Program Delivery Partner  
 
The Program Delivery Partner’s role is mostly one of coordination and outreach.  It will help to 
resolve interface issues in merging many different components into a single railway.  For this task, 
the Program Partner will work very closely with NR, RfL and LUL.  The Program Partner will also 
oversee the development of stations being funded by private developers Canary Wharf Group and 
Berkeley Homes.   
 
The Program Partner will work alongside CRL staff in an integrated Program Delivery Team, 
comprised of both CRL and Program DP staff.  The best individual will be chosen for each role 
regardless of employer.  The integration of the Program Partner and CRL early in the delivery 
process will provide a critical safeguard for CRL and its owners, TfL and DfT.   
 
CRL will evaluate the possibility of hiring its own staff to reduce the size of the Program DP 
contract in later years, and to bring more control in-house.  Once construction begins, however, the 
Program Partner role is expected to be scaled down, as long as all is going well.  
 
Managing the overall program requires flexibility, adaptability, effective negotiation, and wide-
ranging professional experience.  The Program Partner’s role is less clearly defined than the Project 
Partner, and is influenced largely by factors beyond its own control.  Therefore, it will be more 
difficult to create an incentivization package for repayment, and risk transfer will be less appealing to 
the Program Partner than for the Project Partner.   
 
13.15.2 Crossrail Project Delivery Partner  
 
The Project Delivery Partner will manage the safe delivery of the central tunnel section (CTS), 
including stations and systems.  They will manage procurement of the substantial number of 
contracts required to build the CTS.  The contracts, however, will be between CRL and the 
contractors, with the Project Delivery Partner acting on CRL’s behalf. 
 
The CTS is reasonably well-defined and self-contained, so it will require more traditional project 
management skills.  These characteristics make risk transfer more practical and desirable, and allow 
for the Project DP to be incentivized through common metrics, such as time, cost and quality.     
 
Specifically, the Project DP will handle: 
 
• engineering and design implementation; 
 
• interface management within the CTS; 
 
• procurement; 
 
• construction management and administration; and  
 
• infrastructure testing and commissioning. 
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Both DPs are expected to have input on the final procurement strategy.  Both will have experience 
and views on how procurement should be organized, what the ideal contract sizes and packages are, 
and what incentivization structure would maximize quality and output.  
 
The two-DP strategy has both advantages and disadvantages.  CRL can control most of the project 
but only influence the program, so having a Program DP will ensure better program management.  
However, some of the efficiency gains in having a single point of responsibility with a one-DP 
strategy are lost.   
 
There are alternatives to the use of a DP: 
 
• for CRL to take on the core DP role itself; 
 
• for CRL to employ different firms for different functions, and to coordinate overall program 
management work itself; or 
 
• for CRL to pass most of the DP role down to a major contractor, while employing its own 
adviser. 
 
The temporary nature of CRL is a strong argument against having it perform these management 
tasks itself.  Also, DPs have people already available, while CRL would have to recruit personnel and 
develop its own processes. 
 
While there is limited scope for transferring risks to DPs on a project the size of Crossrail, it would 
be possible to make a significant part of repayment based on overall performance to time and 
budget.   
 
13.15.3 Crossrail Staffing Levels 
 
The Program DP could have 100 staff members at its peak in the early-2010s, and the Project DP as 
many as 500, which would make their combined labor forces to be even larger than CRL’s expected 
peak personnel level of 500: 
 
Table of Staffing Numbers 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
CRL staff 366 400 450 480 500 500 500 500 400 200 
Two DPs combined staff 120 200 410 600 600 600 600 320 200 50 
Design Contractors 260 390 450 350 220 50 50 50 0 0 
Industry Partner staff 90 165 165 175 300 400 390 90 70 0 
Table 13.10 – Crossrail Staffing Numbers 
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13.16 Crossrail Overall Governance Structure 
 
The full extent of Crossrail’s governance structure is outlined in the diagram below: 
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Figure 13.14 – Crossrail Governance Structure 
 
13.17 Review Points (RPs) 
 
There are four specific opportunities for the Crossrail sponsors to review the project and decide 
whether or not to continue, two of which remain.  The first remaining opportunity, Review Point 3 
(RP3), is September 30, 2009.  By this time, DfT is expected to have contributed £206M towards 
Crossrail, and TfL £761M.  The second and final opportunity, Review Point 4 (RP4), is December 
30, 2010.  By RP4 DfT will have spent about £457M and TfL £1.65B.  The RPs may still change in 
both scope and timing.   
 
The sponsors retain much control over the Crossrail project until after RP4.  They can authorize 
CRL’s expenditures and manage risk with greater certainty.  For example, CRL may not release 
tender documents to contractors until after RP3, and may not award any contract for any task other 
than design or survey works until after RP4.    
 
Once the sponsors have agreed to proceed beyond RP4, however, they will then be committed to 
their combined contribution of £13.4B.  CRL will acquire a large degree of flexibility in the manner 
in which it delivers Crossrail post-RP4.  Provided that CRL stays within the constraints of the 
delivery strategy it will be empowered to conduct most of its business without having to seek 
sponsor approval. 
 
13.18 Intervention Points (IPs) 
 
If, however, Crossrail project costs are forecast to exceed target prices, the sponsors (in the first 
instance TfL, and then subsequently DfT) have increased intervention rights and the ability to direct 
CRL.  These “Intervention Points” (IPs), of which there are three, are the sponsors’ main protection 
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against cost overruns.  
 
The IP mechanism becomes effective at RP4 and ceases to be effective when Crossrail passenger 
services commence.  Each IP is calibrated according to available sources of funds.  The IP 
thresholds can fluctuate, but are tested on a semi-annual basis by referencing CRL’s semi-annual 
construction report, which forecasts costs to completion.   
 
The first Intervention Point, IP0, is breached if CRL’s direct costs exceed roughly £12.2B.  This is 
considered a “P50” event, meaning there is a 50% likelihood of it happening.  TfL can then require 
CRL to prepare an action plan to remedy the problems that led to the cost overruns.  The only 
restriction under IP0 is that TfL requires DfT consent for certain actions.   
 
IP1 comes into effect when CRL’s direct costs exceed roughly £12.8B, which is believed to have a 
probability of occurring of 15%-20%.  Notably, this is after TfL has contributed its £600M in 
contingency funding.  After this point, TfL can take direct control of CRL and make whatever 
changes it deems necessary to deliver Crossrail.  TfL still has to gain DfT’s consent for certain 
actions, but under IP1 TfL can amend the Delivery Strategy to reflect a new direction.  TfL cannot, 
however, unilaterally change either DP or make any material change to the incentivization package 
for either DP contract.   
 
At IP1 DfT can also step in and require TfL to prepare a Project Completion Plan, and subsequently 
a Handover Plan setting out TfL’s proposal for transition of control of CRL from TfL to DfT 
should either the Put or Call Option be exercised, which can happen after RP2.   
13.19 Put and Call Options 
 
Once CRL’s costs get to roughly £13.3B, which has a 5%-10% probability, IP2 comes into effect 
unless TfL commits further funding to CRL.  At this point, DfT can exercise a “Call Option” 
whereby ownership and control of CRL transfers from TfL to DfT.  TfL will only have limited 
rights to influence Crossrail thereafter, but would retain the right to transfer operating responsibility 
to DfT if it wishes.   
 
TfL also has the right to exercise the “Put Option” whereby DfT is obliged to acquire CRL, and TfL 
is released from further funding obligations.  Within 60 days of CRL being transferred to DfT, DfT 
must announce its intention to proceed or abandon the Crossrail project.  This announcement does 
not restrict DfT’s ability to abandon at a later date.  If IP2 is breached and neither the Put nor Call 
Option is exercised the sponsors would then have to determine together how to complete Crossrail. 
 
DfT or TfL have the right to exercise the Call or Put Option, respectively, if the other party is in 
violation of its obligations under the Core Agreements or if there is a funding failure that is not 
remedied within nine months. 
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Chapter 14:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This thesis has evaluated alternative delivery strategies from several angles, including their respective 
advantages and disadvantages for transportation megaprojects in: 
 
• establishing the business case; 
 
• reducing and allocating risk; 
 
• providing management; and 
 
• writing and enforcing contracts. 
 
Because of their inherent uniqueness and reliance on exogenous factors, the appropriate use of 
alternative delivery strategies (ADSs) on transportation megaprojects must be tailored to each 
specific situation.  Yet there are several broadly applicable conclusions and recommendations that 
come out of the research in the following areas: 
 
• policy; 
 
• management, transparency and oversight; 
 
• process and procurement; and  
 
• contracts and contract structures. 
 
14.1 Policy Conclusions 
 
• Alternative delivery strategies (ADSs) require policy alignment at multiple levels of government.  A major 
barrier for alternative delivery strategies (ADSs) to be able to penetrate the market is that 
they require all levels of government to permit their use.  Greater consensus that, at the very 
least, explicitly allows ADSs would increase the likelihood of ADSs being considered on 
future transportation megaprojects.  Several countries, including Canada, require an ADS 
screening process on projects over a certain monetary threshold, and have also established a 
federal agency to handle procurement issues.  These have been effective steps in the right 
direction.   
 
• Experimentation with ADSs should continue to allow for further comparison and analysis.  Public 
agencies fall into a trap of experimenting with an ADS model and then abandoning that 
strategy long-term if growing pains are felt initially.  In order for there to be sufficient 
reflection, public sector agencies wishing to incorporate ADSs should do so on multiple 
projects of multiple scales.  The fact that these ADSs are fairly new and are providing 
modest benefits means there is a strong likelihood that public sector agencies will be able to 
build upon the lessons already learned from their initial forays into the ADS market.   
 
• Federal Transit Administration (FTA) policy should be more receptive to ADS models.  Many state and 
local agencies report that, on average, 60%-65% design is required before FTA will issue a 
Full Funding Grant Agreement (FFGA) under the New Starts program.  This high level of 
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specificity generally precludes the use of ADSs.  A 10%-30% design is more appropriate to 
capture the inflation avoidance and other benefits provided by ADSs.  Given the relative 
success of the Turnkey Demonstration Program and other select New Starts projects that 
have used ADSs, FTA should encourage their continued experimentation by allowing for 
FFGAs to be granted at an earlier design stage. 
 
• ADS models and environmental policy should be better streamlined.  While NEPA does not involve 
design beyond the 25% design level, many environmental permits require a higher level of 
design to be completed prior to construction commencement.  This can inhibit the use of 
ADS models which may provide ancillary environmental benefits.  The transportation and 
environmental sectors can work together to establish benchmarks that may allow for 
innovative procurement when it can be proven to meet mutual goals. 
 
14.2 Management, Transparency, and Oversight Conclusions 
 
• Transportation megaproject development requires a greater focus on long-term functionality.  When there is 
pressure to keep capital costs down and to complete projects on schedule, function may 
ultimately be sacrificed, which has a major impact on long-term benefits.  Strong 
management, focused on end-state functionality and early operator involvement, ensures 
that long-term benefits of a project are not sacrificed by the short-term interests of 
contractors and partners under pressure to deliver to time and schedule.     
 
• Particularly if it is an owner’s first use of an ADS, it is helpful to have a program manager (i.e. owner’s rep) 
employed from the start of the project.  A dedicated consultant whose sole purpose it is to act on 
behalf of the owner’s interests during procurement will help guide the owner though 
sometimes difficult decision making and contract execution.   
 
• Integrated project organizations (IPO) need to be incorporated from the start of a project in order to be 
effective.  On the Big Dig, the decision to merge B/PB and state of Massachusetts personnel 
into an IPO was not made until 1998.  This was well after construction began and, more 
importantly, came after a decade during which B/PB should have been held accountable for 
their actions.  Once the entities were essentially merged, the state’s ability to hold B/PB 
accountable was undermined, but by this point the primary objective was to reduce 
adversarial pressure that had built up and get the job completed.   
 
• Collocation of partners leads to open dialogue.  By almost all accounts, efforts made to locate 
project partners in close proximity lead to better collaboration and increased transparency.  
Conflicts and differences of opinion can be discussed and ameliorated more quickly, without 
excess delay and misunderstanding.    
 
14.3 Process and Procurement Conclusions 
 
• Projects using alternative delivery strategies benefit from earlier market tests.  The opportunity to take a 
project to the marketplace at 30% design rather than final design allows the public sector to 
much earlier assess project costs and risks.  These market tests will surely include a large 
amount of contingency in contract bids given the level of uncertainty that exists at 30% 
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design.  However, public sector agencies are aided because the contingency helps them to 
price project risks accordingly and determine which risks it may wish to manage themselves 
rather than attempt to transfer to the private sector.   
 
• Early operator involvement leads to better quality and functionality.  Unless appropriately incentivized, 
designers and builders will tend to focus more on constructability than on functionality and 
performance.  It helps to have operators procured early in the development process so that 
they can influence final design and also better understand the system that will ultimately be 
handed over to them upon project completion.   
 
• Even if ADS models are infeasible as a single contract for an entire project, they may be appropriate for 
smaller subsections of projects.  The level and number of interfaces that exist in a project should 
ultimately determine the delivery strategy, and the Puerto Rico and Boston examples each 
demonstrate the difficulty of interface management.  For projects with unique, yet 
independent sections (i.e. a change on one section will not significantly impact other 
sections), an approach that allows for traditional D-B-B for parts of the project and an ADS 
model for others may provide added benefit.  ADS models allow for the design flexibility 
that many sections of projects require and stand to benefit from, but this requires that all 
interfaces can be identified and managed well.   
 
• Independent, unbiased cost estimation and forecasting is essential for establishing a prudent business case.  
Reference Class Forecasting, sensitivity and Monte Carlo analysis, and Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) generation by independent bodies are all worthwhile tools that help to 
support value for money arguments.  Such early analysis helps public sector agencies better 
understand the delivery marketplace before committing to a particular project or delivery 
strategy.   
 
• Information exchanges and industry workshops are beneficial.  It is advantageous for the client to seek 
knowledge and guidance throughout planning and procurement.  This helps the client to 
more clearly outline its objectives, which can then be shared with prospective bidders before 
final contract proposal submission. 
 
14.4 Contracts and Contract Structure Conclusions 
 
• Designers should be retained in an oversight capacity throughout construction.  Whether or not an ADS 
is strictly employed, having the designer acting on the client’s behalf to ensure proper design 
implementation serves two key functions.  First, it limits the construction contractor’s ability 
to cut corners in order to reduce cost.  Second, it ensures that the designer does not 
overdesign the facility since it will have some accountability in implementing it.   
 
• Repayment structures should incentivize contractors and partners to deliver on the owner’s expectations.  
Ideally, there is an incentive package that rewards good performance both at select intervals 
throughout the project (i.e. every three months), and also at project completion.  Contractors 
therefore are not only looking towards the final completion date but are also attempting to 
meet deadlines throughout, which should help the project maintain schedule.   
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• Hiring construction managers willing to put themselves at-risk generally provides better value for money.  A 
construction manager not at-risk will usually seek to obtain its maximum fee with minimum 
effort.  On the other hand, if a construction manager puts itself at-risk and stands to gain 
from good performance it will lead to better outcomes.  Of course, the public sector will pay 
a premium to retain a CM@Risk, though the incentive for the CM to perform well will 
usually make the investment worthwhile.   
 
• Bidders should be reimbursed for their proposal fees.  Proposal costs are relatively small in 
comparison to overall project costs.  If stipends are granted, owners should retain ownership 
of all proposals for possible incorporation later on.  There is much value added, and the 
ideas in the proposals not chosen may still be able to be incorporated into the final contract.  
This allows bidders new to the ADS market to assume minimal risk in putting forth a bid 
proposal, leading to increased competition and improved quality.     
 
• Unsolicited project proposals from the private sector should be allowed and even encouraged.  The public 
sector, being under no obligation to accept the proposal, at the very least receives some free 
and calculated advice that can be incorporated into its broad transportation policy goals.  
The benefit from the private sector perspective is that it can hope to win contracts on 
proposals it submits, which will likely showcase that private firm’s skills and specializations. 
 
14.5 Crossrail Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
• Delivery partners need to be complementary, not adversarial.  As the delivery partner (DP) contracts 
are implemented, it is still quite unclear what level of integration will exist among many of 
the key stakeholders involved in Crossrail:  TfL, CRL, DfT, the Project DP, and the 
Program DP.  These relationships will surely continue to form and evolve as the final 
delivery and contracting strategies are developed throughout 2009 and 2010.  But it should 
be reinforced to the DPs in their contracts that they are to be complimenting one another 
and that they are working to achieve mutual goals.  
  
• Interfaces on the central tunnel section will need to be very carefully managed.  The Project DP will take 
the lead on the Central Tunnel Section (CTS), but the work will have a major effect on the 
overall Crossrail “program.”  It would be shortsighted to assume that the Project DP can 
fully manage the CTS without also having significant involvement of the Program DP as 
well.  Collaborative relationships between the DPs will not occur naturally.  The 
responsibility falls on TfL and CRL, in particular, to ensure that the two-DP model as 
implemented instills healthy partnership between the DPs.  Incentive-based repayment 
structures in which each DP benefits from overall performance and outcomes will increase 
the likelihood that the DPs are motivated to work together.  Since the final completion date 
of 2017 is still far away, interim targets and rewards will be needed. 
 
• For Crossrail’s business case to hold up during economic downturn, the arguments for its existence need to be 
tailored to the times.  In a good economy, Crossrail serves the region by reducing congestion.  
In a bad economy, Crossrail serves the region by stimulating reinvestment.  If the congestion 
argument continually weakens, stakeholders will need to unite around other benefits that will 
endure.  This public relations aspect is one that the Program DP will be instrumental in 
facilitating. 
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• Crossrail is not yet “too big to fail,” but soon will be.  TfL and DfT have two remaining 
opportunities to abandon the Crossrail project entirely; Review Point 3 (RP3) in 2009 and 
Review Point 4 (RP4) in 2010, though these dates may change.  TfL has invested significant 
time and money into Crossrail, and would take a public relations hit if it were to withdraw 
support.  However, the public will be receptive to such an effort to “trim the fat” during 
economic hardship.  The fact remains that the amount already invested is minimal compared 
to the total expected public sector contribution, and after 2010 both TfL and DfT have very 
little recourse to back out, barring a blatant breach of contract that would trigger one of the 
Intervention Points (IPs).  This is not to suggest, by any means, that TfL abandon Crossrail.  
But TfL needs to work diligently over the next year to ensure that the financial package, 
ridership projections, and other business case factors still hold up.  TfL should also require 
much more detail from CRL on the final delivery strategy and the development of CRL’s 
own organizational capacity. 
 
• A shift in mindset from risk transfer to risk reduction may be most cost-effective.  There is already fairly 
strong consensus at TfL that risk transfer on Crossrail will be difficult given the many 
interfaces and high degree of uncertainty.  Still, risk transfer is among the goals in the 
delivery strategy.  While those limited opportunities for risk transfer may exist, it will be 
more cost-effective in the long-term to do further preliminary analysis that reduces 
uncertainty.  This will ultimately reduce risk and contingency put into the very large design 
and construction contracts soon to be procured.  Also, risk transfer should only be sought 
for elements on which TfL is willing to relinquish much control.  There are many risks too 
important to leave to chance that TfL and DfT should strategically retain.  It will be up to 
TfL and DfT to jointly determine which risks these are.   
 
• Securing an operator should be a near-term goal rather than medium- or long-term.  The current plan is 
to have Rail for London (RfL) act as a “shadow operator” for a period of time, perhaps 
years.  Now that the Project DP and Program DP are in place, Network Rail (NR) will begin 
to be engaged.  There may be tensions between NR and RfL if NR has an overarching 
interest in having one of the existing train operating companies (TOCs) already operating on 
Crossrail right-of-way (First Great Western, National Express) selected as the Crossrail 
TOC.  Another issue to be reconciled is the contract structures and expiration dates for the 
TOCs already operating on the eventual Crossrail right-of-way outside of central London.  
This is an matter best managed by the Program DP. 
 
• Delivery partners should be strategic partners rather than simply an extension of CRL staff.  There is a 
danger in having the DPs too far integrated into CRL such that it blurs the critical 
distinction in their roles.  This was a flaw in the Big Dig’s IPO structure.  Specifically, if CRL 
and the Project DP don’t agree on certain issues related to the construction of the CTS, then 
the Program DP may be called in to provide a second opinion.  This collaboration is 
definitely worthwhile, but Crossrail would suffer if the Program DP were roped in too far to 
project-specific conflicts such that for any extended period of time there is essentially no 
entity focusing on the critical programmatic elements.  In other words, the DPs should 
certainly work together on overlapping issues, but not at the expense of their core 
responsibilities. 
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14.6 Further Research 
 
There is undoubtedly much research still to be done on this subject.  Assuming continued public 
sector funding shortages, experimentation with alternative delivery strategies will surely grow.  Some 
of the ways in which this research may be built upon include: 
 
• FTA New Starts project analysis.  This thesis has noted a handful of rail transit projects that 
have both utilized ADSs and also qualified for New Starts funding.  A comparison between 
those projects and other New Starts projects that have used traditional delivery methods may 
identify trends, positive and negative, that can be attributed to delivery strategies.   
 
• ADS financial analysis.   The private sector’s ability to secure financing is a major catalyst for 
seeking its involvement in transportation megaprojects.  While this thesis acknowledges this 
to be the case, it does not delve much into the specifics of how private financing is secured 
and what its implications are.   
 
• Big Dig comparison to Boston Harbor Cleanup.  While the Big Dig was being conceived and 
constructed, another infrastructure megaproject was also being delivered:  the Boston 
Harbor Cleanup.  The Harbor Cleanup has widely been heralded as a major success.  In the 
late-1980s both the Cleanup and the Big Dig were essentially at the same stage of 
development.  An in-depth look into why one turned out so much differently than the other 
could prove telling.    
 
• Crossrail comparison to Channel Tunnel Rail Link or Jubilee Line Extension.  As Crossrail gets off 
the ground and closer to completion in the coming years, more opportunities will emerge to 
compare its development to any of several other major rail infrastructure projects that have 
been delivered in the U.K. in recent years.   
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Appendix A:  North American Rail Projects Utilizing Alternative 
Delivery Strategies 
 
Appendix A provides short synopses on 16 rail transit projects in North America with capital costs 
of $100M or more that have utilized alternative delivery strategies.   
 
A.1 Synopses of North American Rail Projects Utilizing Alternative Delivery 
Strategies 
 
Alameda Freight Corridor:  The Alameda Corridor is a 20-mile rail cargo route linking the Ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach to Downtown Los Angeles and connections to cross-country freight 
lines556.  Opened on-time and under budget in April 2002, the Corridor now handles over 7,200 
containers per day, many of which would otherwise have had to be transferred onto trucks which 
would sit in, and contribute to the notorious Los Angeles traffic, and would also exacerbate air 
quality issues in the Los Angeles basin557558.  This $2.5B project was completed with 24 construction 
contracts.  All but one were procured under traditional D-B-B, but the centerpiece of the project, a 
10-mile-long, 50-feet-wide, 30-feet deep trench was bid as a D-B contract valued at $712M to a joint 
venture led by California-based construction firm Tutor-Saliba559.   
 
Puerto Rico Tren Urbano:  Tren Urbano is a 17.2-km heavy rail metro system in San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, with 16 stations560.  Tren Urbano was procured with six D-B contracts and one DBOM 
contract awarded to the Siemens Transit Team for $500M561.  It was the first DBOM contract 
sponsored by the FTA, and gave operations and maintenance responsibilities to the Siemens Team 
for five years, with the option for a five-year renewal562563.  Largely because of major scope changes, 
poor management and oversight, and shifts in political ideologies, Tren Urbano was delivered three 
years late in 2005 at a cost of $2.25B; $1B over its original budget564.   
 
New Jersey Hudson-Bergen Light Rail (HBLRT):  The HBLRT is a $2.2B light rail system that 
serves dense New Jersey communities and provides them with links to the rail networks that 
connect to New York City via tunnels under the Hudson River565.  Originally opened in April 2000 
with 16 stations, the HBLRT has been incrementally extended and now has 23 stations566.  At full 
build-out, the HBLRT will have 32 stations in total567.  The 21st Century Rail Corporation was 
awarded a 15-year DBOM contract for the line, after which time it will be transferred back to the 
local transit authority, New Jersey Transit (NJ Transit)568.  NJ Transit had initially sought private 
sector financing for the project, but once it became apparent that the cost of private financing would 
                                                 
556 Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, http://www.acta.org/projects/projects_completed_alameda.asp. 
557 Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, http://www.acta.org/newsroom/Releases/releases_041202.html.  
558 Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, http://www.acta.org/newsroom/Releases/REL_ACTA_Sixth_Ann.pdf. 
559 Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority, http://www.acta.org/newsroom/Releases/releases_18.html. 
560 Railway Technology.  “San Juan Tren Urbano Light Rail System, Puerto Rico.”   
561 Perini Corporation.  “Operations.” 
562 Alternativa de Transporte Integrado.  “Tren Urbano.”   
563 Middleton, 2000. 
564 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Audit of the Tren Urbano Rail Transit Project.”   
565 Railway Technology.  “Hudson-Bergen Light Rail System, USA.” 
566 New Jersey Transit.  “Hudson-Bergen Light Rail.”   
567 Miller, 2002, 135. 
568 Hoboken Terminal.  “Governor Whitman Officially Launches New Jersey’s First Modern Light Rail System.”   
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be far greater than public financing, it removed that component from the contract569.  The transit 
authority retained full farebox revenue risk and rate-setting authority570. 
 
New York City JFK Airtrain:  The Airtrain is an elevated, automated light rail service directly 
linking New York City’s John F. Kennedy International Airport to the New York City subway 
system and the Long Island Railroad commuter rail network.  Funded by a $3 passenger facility 
charge (PFC) tacked on to the price of each ticket for outbound JFK flights, the Airtrain was 
procured through a DBOM contract with Air Rail Transit Consortium for five years with two 
possible five-year extensions571.  The 13-km system opened in December 2003572.   
 
Denver Transportation Expansion (T-REX):  T-REX is a 19-mile light rail extension combined 
with a 17-mile interstate highway reconstruction573.  As two existing interstate highway in the Denver 
Metropolitan area approached capacity in the 1990s and were expected to have to serve nearly twice 
as many vehicles within 20 years, the Colorado DOT entered into an agreement with the Regional 
Transportation District (RTD) to combine a major road widening effort with two new light rail 
corridors.  The $1.67B project included the largest D-B ever awarded in the U.S. at $1.2B to 
Southeast Corridor Constructors574.  T-REX was delivered on-budget and 22 months ahead of 
schedule575. 
 
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) San Francisco International Airport (SFO) 
Extension:  This 14-km, $1.55B project extended the BART heavy rail system to SFO Airport and 
also included three new stations to the south576.  The project was procured with two traditional D-B-
B contracts and four D-B contracts577.  The project was delivered 16 months late and nearly $500M 
over budget578579580.  This extension is part of plans to eventually connect the BART system down to 
the burgeoning communities at the south end of San Francisco Bay.     
 
Vancouver Canada Line:  The Canada Line is a C$1.9B, 19-km, north-south extension of 
Vancouver’s Skytrain automated light rail system that will connect Downtown to the 2010 Olympic 
Village, Vancouver International Airport, and the city of Richmond upon completion in 2009581.  
The project includes an underground tunnel from Waterfront Station in Downtown Vancouver to 
south of 64th Avenue in Richmond, then will proceed on an elevated guideway for the rest of the 
route582.  It is a critical transportation link for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games.  InTransitBC is the 
company contracted to design, build, partially finance, operate and maintain (DBFOM) the Canada 
Line for a 35-year period in return for a share of the operating revenue.  InTransitBC is also 
                                                 
569 Loulakis, 193. 
570 Ibid, 194. 
571 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  “Port Authority’s Airtrain JFK Nears Completion as Airtrain Newark Ridership 
Continues to Rise.”  
572 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  “All Aboard!  Governor Pataki Dedicates Airtrain JFK on 100th Anniversary of 
Wright Brothers’ First Flight.” 
573 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  “Colorado’s T-REX:  Mega, Multi-modal, Design-Build.”   
574 Ibid. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Parsons Brinckerhoff.  “BART San Francisco Airport Extension.”  
577 Parsons Brinckerhoff.  “BART San Francisco Airport Extension, Constructed Project of the Year, 2003.”   
578 Business Wire.  “BART Information Managers Select ReviewIt AEC for BART-SFO Extension Project.”   
579 Bay Area Rapid Transit, “BART to SFO ridership jumps 65%.”     
580 Wilson, 2. 
581 Canada Line.  “About the Canada Line.”  http://www.canadaline.ca/about.asp.     
582 “Vancouver Celebrates as Canada Line Tunnel Completed.”  The Canadian Press.   
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contributing roughly C$700M towards capital costs583.  This is a performance-based contract with 
some volume incentive.  Adjustments to monthly payments made to InTransitBC will be made 
based on system performance and asset condition584.  Canada Line Rapid Transit, Inc. (CLCO) was 
created by the agencies funding the transit line specifically to oversee the procurement, design, 
construction and implementation of the project.   
 
NJ Transit RiverLine:  The RiverLine is a 34.5-mile diesel light rail system that runs from Trenton 
to Camden along the Delaware River585.  The best-value DBOM contract for this project was 
awarded in June 1999 to Southern New Jersey Rail Group, LLC, a consortium led by Bechtel and 
Adtranz586.  The system came in several hundred million dollars over budget at $998M and opened 
fourteen months behind schedule in March 2004587.   
 
Los Angeles Metro Gold Line Eastside Extension:  This 6-mile extension of the Los-Angeles-
to-Pasadena Gold Line to East Los Angeles will feature 2 underground and 6 at-grade stations588.  It 
is being procured with one $400M D-B contract for the 1.8-mile tunnel portion and one $200M 
conventional D-B-B contract for the at-grade portion589.  Construction was more than 80% 
complete as of May 2008, and the line is scheduled to open on-time and on-budget in mid-2009590.   
 
Minneapolis Hiawatha LRT:  The Hiawatha Line is an 11.6-mile, 17-station light rail line 
connecting Minneapolis and St. Paul to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) and the 
Mall of America591.  The majority of the project was procured utilizing a D-B approach.  Due to 
concerns about constructing two 1.4-mile long tunnels below two airport runways, the Metropolitan 
Airport Commission opted for a traditional D-B-B approach to the two airport stations592.  It is 
estimated by the FTA that $25M-$38M and one year was saved due to the innovative D-B 
strategy593.   
 
Las Vegas Monorail:  The Monorail is an extension of the original one-mile route that opened in 
1993 and connected the MGM Grand and Bally’s hotels.  The full line opened in July 2004 and has 
seven stations spanning four miles.  The sponsoring hotels invested a total of $30M in the project, 
and the Las Vegas Monorail Company, led by Bombardier and Granite Construction, invested an 
additional $18.5M for a total private sector cash investment of $48.5M into this DBFOM project.   
 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Blue Line Extension:  The 
extension of WMATA’s Blue Line east to Prince George’s County, MD, was awarded with two D-B 
contracts and one D-B-B contract594.  A contract for both site preparation and a crossing over the 
Washington Beltway were included in the D-B-B contract, while all systems, stations, and parking 
                                                 
583 Canada Line.  “Financing.”  http://www.canadaline.ca/aboutFinancing.asp.  
584 Partnerships British Columbia.  “Canada Line.”   
585 New Jersey Transit.  “River LINE.”   
586 Loulakis, 203.   
587 Pearsall. 
588 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “New Starts Program Assessment, Appendix A:  Case Study 
Report.” 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ubaldo, Jose, and Littman, Marc.  “Metro Gold Line Eastside Extension is More Than 80 Percent Complete.”   
591 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Highway Administration.  “PPP Case Studies:  Hiawatha Light Rail Transit.”   
592 Ibid. 
593 U.S. Department of Transportation.  Federal Transit Administration.  “Report to Congress on the Costs, Benefits, and Efficiencies 
of Public-Private Partnerships for Fixed Guideway Capital Projects,” 9. 
594 Ghosh, Korzym, Mester, and Rosenbaum.  
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facility work fell within the boundaries of the two D-B contracts.  The 3.1-mile alignment includes 
both tunnel and surface segments and includes two new stations595.   
 
Greenbush Commuter Rail:  The Greenbush line involved the restoration of an 18-mile 
commuter rail line to the South Shore of Massachusetts, outside Boston.  This D-B contract was 
awarded in March 2002 to the joint venture of Jay Cashman, Inc., and Atlanta-based Balfour Beatty 
Construction, Inc. (CBB), for $252M596.  When the contract was awarded, the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority (MBTA) provided CBB with a conceptual design developed to 
approximately 15%597.  Greenbush was scheduled to begin operation in 2005 at a cost of $470M, but 
was delayed two years and increased in cost by roughly $35M598.  Environmental regulatory agencies 
required 60% design in some areas before permits could be issued, and this requirement was not 
included in the D-B RFP package599.  This was partly to blame for the delays and cost increases, as 
were issues pertaining to the acquisition of the right-of-way from the private freight company CSX, 
then Conrail600.   
 
Portland MAX LRT Airport Extension:  The creation of the Red Line expanded the highly 
successful MAX LRT system to Portland International Airport.  It was procured with a unique 
design-build-finance (DBF) contract by which the design-builder, Bechtel, agreed to finance $25M 
of the $125M project in exchange for development rights to a 120-acre lot adjacent to one of the 
stations along the route601.   
 
South Florida Commuter Rail Upgrades:  This commuter rail enhancement provided for the 
double-tracking of a 45-mile segment of the 72-mile South Florida Rail Corridor602.  This corridor 
supports Tri-Rail commuter rail service connecting Palm Beach to Miami, as well as Amtrak and 
CSX freight operations.  Tri-County Rail Constructors - a joint venture between Herzog Contracting 
Corp., Granite Construction Co., and Washington Group International - won the design-build 
contract. 
 
Baltimore LRT Extension:  The Maryland Mass Transit Administration used a design-build 
procurement on its $110M light rail extension completed in 1997603.  This was one of the projects 
developed as part of the FTA’s Design-build Demonstration Program and was the first linear transit 
project completed in the U.S. under a design-build procedure.  
                                                 
595 Ibid. 
596 Jay Cashman, Inc.  “Greenbush Commuter Rail.”   
597 Ibid. 
598 Daniel. 
599 Massachusetts Executive Office of Transportation.  Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.  “South Coast Rail Plan for 
Action,” 39   
600 Interview with Fred Salvucci. 
601 Malone, 2. 
602 Judy, 1.  
603 Light Rail Central.  “Status of North American Light Rail Projects.”   
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